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INTRODUCTION 
Background to the Study  
Van der Merwe (2003:269) writes that “social divisions are what necessitate reconciliation.” 
This framing applies well to the South African context. The history of apartheid, and the 
legislation that actively promoted separation and inequality, contributed to the many social 
divisions that currently exist. The country is in desperate need of reconciliation as a step to 
heal these social ills. This was the aim of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in 
the years immediately following the end of apartheid (Villa-Vicencio & Verwoerd, 2000; 
Borer, 2004; Bishop, 2016; Gibson, 2005). However, Villa-Vicencio and Verwoerd (2000: 
xxi) remark that while debate and truth telling are important to the reconciliation process, 
more is needed in order to bring about social change. In order for reconciliation to be 
authentic and meaningful, it needs to manifest restorative justice that addresses the issues that 
divide people. One of the most pressing of these issues is the deep socio-economic divisions 
between different sectors of South African society (Potgieter, 2016; Hofmeyr, Potgieter, 
Murithi, Meiring, Nkomo, 2017; Hofmeyr & Govender, 2015; Villa-Vicencio, 2000; Villa-
Vicencio & Verwoerd, 2000). 
Despite the work of the TRC on reconciliation, these inequalities extend beyond merely 
income difference to include inequalities in access to basic services, employment 
opportunities and educational opportunities. These are all part of the legacy of apartheid that 
continues to impact South African society today (Potgieter, 2016:2; Durrheim, 2011: 16; 
Hofmeyr et al., 2017: 10;  Hofmeyr & Govender, 2015:1). At the same time, slow economic 
growth, coupled with increasing job losses and an increased cost of living, have resulted in 
households across the country experiencing increasing difficulty in meeting their basic needs. 
These risks form a threefold challenge of poverty, inequality and unemployment, which all 
create tensions and social polarisation, and which are particularly marked along racial lines 
(Hofmeyr, et al., 2017:2 – 4; Chibba & Luiz, 2011:307; Finn, Liebbrandt & Oosthuizen, 
2014:3)
1
. The years 2015 and 2016 saw widely-publicised protests resulting from these vast 
                                                          
1
 One realm where evidence of these tensions can be found is in the realm of social media. Examples such as the 
racist Facebook post of Penny Sparrow, the comments of Judge Mabel Jansen or the incident where a Rhodes 
scholar refused to tip a waitress until the whites returned the land,
 
as well as numerous other racial incidents that 
have played out in the South African landscape over the past year, are indicative of such tensions. Furthermore, 
Potgieter (2016:1) has found that 43% of South Africans feel that they have access to sufficient financial 
resources, and 45% believe that they have sufficient education to achieve their goals. However, these results 
show stark differences when divided by racial demographics, with the majority of white people feelings that 
they do have enough, while the majority of black people perceive themselves to be in a position of not having 
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socio-economic inequalities in the form of the #FeesMustFall (FMF) protests (Booysen, 
2016:2; Hofmeyr & Govender, 2015:2; Potgieter, 2016:2). This movement and its calls for 
change
2
 “made apparent the multiple layers of advantage and disadvantage, access and non-
access, and inclusion and exclusion that exist among and between various groups” (Hofmeyr, 
et al., 2017:7) in South Africa.
3
  
Gqola (2001:95) notes that while South Africa is now free of many of the forms of apartheid 
oppression, some of its manifestations still remain, such as the linguistic heritage of apartheid 
which divides people into categories based on race, such as terms like “black,” “coloured,” 
and “white.” This is representative of a system of thought that sought to control people 
through division and the rigid shaping of people’s identities. This control of people through 
separations based on arbitrary, imposed categories, and politicised distinctions in categories 
such as race, gender or tribe, forms an essential part of the way in which colonisation 
managed to assert control over societies (Schiwy, 2007:272; Gqola 2001:95; wa Thiong’o, 
1987:1). Furthermore, colonialism
4
 imposes a system that is all encompassing, with rigid 
control over the economy, politics, military, culture, education, spirituality and psychology 
(wa Thiong’o, 1987:2; Maldonado-Torres, 2010:97; Quijano, 2010:23). Colonialism “denotes 
a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the 
power of another nation” (Maldonado-Torres, 2010:97). It was a violent process where the 
wealth of a majority was concentrated into the hands of a few (Western) countries (Quijano, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
enough. This is important, since Potgieter (2016:3) also finds a strong connection between existing conditions 
and equality of opportunity, and states that inequality of opportunity will equal inequality of outcome. For more 
information on these examples see various news articles written about these events such as the ones listed 
below: 
Wicks, J., 2016. ‘It’s Just the Facts – Penny Sparrow Breaks Her Silence’ News24, [Online] Available at: 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/its-just-the-facts-penny-sparrow-breaks-her-silence-20160104 
[Accessed: 1 May 2017]; eNCA., 2017. ‘Mabel Jansen in Hot Seat Over Racism’ eNCA, [Online] Available at: 
http://www.enca.com/south-africa/mabel-jansen-faces-inquiry-into-racism-accusations [Accessed: 1 May 2017] 
2
 It needs to be noted that Fallists and the #FeesMustFall movement reject the transformation discourse 
completely, in favour of discourses of decoloniality and decommodification. In this thesis I will be making some 
use of the term ‘transformation.’ However, I am using the term transformation in a more general sense to mean 
socio-economic change, while acknowledging FMF’s disdain and repudiation of the transformation discourse, 
and without invalidating these claims.  
3
 Furthermore, my honours research on the Pietermaritzburg #FeesMustFall movement showed that the 
reactions from society to these protests was polarised (Grassow, 2016). These protests make apparent the need 
for much deeper understanding between individuals and groups and their experiences of socio-economic 
inequality (Hofmeyr et al. 2017:8; Potgieter 2016:2).   
4
 It should be noted that within the colonisation discourse there are many similar terms - such as coloniality, 
colonisation, decoloniality and decolonisation - which, while similar, do not have the same meaning. 
Colonisation and decolonisation refer to the process of colonial occupation and its subsequent dismantlement. 
Coloniality, on the other hand, is used to refer to the systems implemented by colonisation which continue to 
function in contemporary society, ensuring the continued oppression of the formerly colonised, while 
decoloniality refers to the dismantling of this process. These definitions are explored in greater depth in chapter 
two of this dissertation.  
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2010:22). Stemming from this, discourses of coloniality arise, referring to the patterns of 
power that take hold as a result of colonialism and continue to be perpetuated in post-colonial 
societies (Maldonado-Torres, 2010: 97). Coloniality recognises that despite the end of 
political colonisation, colonial domination and power continue. In contrast, decolonisation 
aims to expose the ways in which colonisation functioned and continues to function, 
highlighting the privileging of this system which promotes an ideology of social hierarchy 
and racism. Furthermore, decolonisation involves the task of producing counter-narratives 
and alternate systems of thought (Karkov & Robbins, 2013:4; Mignolo, 2010:17; Quijano, 
2010:23). Decolonisation challenges the coloniality of power and the colonial matrix of 
power (Mignolo, 2010:17).  
It is this system which #FeesMustFall calls for an end to through their demands for 
decolonisation.  This call for decolonisation can be understood as the call for a total and 
radical change. Furthermore, despite apartheid and its policies of inequality ending over two 
decades ago, South Africa remains a country of deep divisions and great socio-economic 
inequality. These divides are perpetuated by the matrix of colonial power that continues to 
exist (Erasmus & Garuba, 2017:342). If authentic reconciliation is defined as reconciliation 
that involves restorative justice which involves addressing the divisions between people, then 
this suggests that reconciliation is needed now more than ever. 
Chapter Layout and Summary 
Chapter 1 – Reconciliation: South African Narratives 
This chapter contributes to answering the question of how #FeesMustFall Pietermaritzburg 
has been expressive of a protest for decolonising reconciliation in South Africa, as well as 
how an indecent theology of reconciliation might contribute to this through the objective of 
discovering the extent to which reconciliation discourses are useful and still active within 
current South African society. It begins by establishing a working definition for 
reconciliation, while recognising that despite its familiarity and frequency of use, 
reconciliation remains a highly contested term without any one accepted definition. It then 
explores some models and understandings of reconciliation as well as theories about the ways 
in which the construct of reconciliation functions in society. The chapter then moves on to 
examine South Africa’s interactions with reconciliation, beginning with historical interactions 
and progressing to current contextual reconciliation discourses. South Africa’s most 
memorable and well known interaction with reconciliation can be found in the form of the 
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Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). With its establishment at the dawn of South 
Africa’s new democracy, the TRC was tasked with discovering the truth about the human 
rights abuses and atrocities committed during the apartheid regime. The belief was that with 
the exposure of truth would come catharsis and healing, which in turn would inevitably lead 
to reconciliation. 
However, South Africa is more than twenty years into its new democracy and the Truth and 
Reconciliation process has been officially ended. Chapter 1 thus continues by exploring the 
impact of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and its conception of reconciliation on 
the current South African context. Furthermore, the chapter explores the current discourses 
on reconciliation which are active within the South African context today. It offers a brief 
assessment of the successes and failures of the TRC and its version of reconciliation. This is 
drawn not only from the opinions of South African people on the success of the TRC, but 
also from an assessment of the socio-economic climate within South Africa today.  
Chapter 2 – Decolonisation: What Does It Mean?  
It is impossible to fully assess the success of the TRC and the reconciliation narratives in 
post-apartheid South Africa without also understanding something about the larger context 
which produced apartheid and led to the need for reconciliation in its aftermath. South 
Africa’s contemporary history, like the histories of most African countries, is one of 
colonisation. The process of imperial rule imposed by an outside force, most often from 
Europe, left a marked impact on both South Africa and all other colonised nations. As a 
result, this chapter begins by exploring and defining some of the terms commonly found 
within the discourse of colonisation. Inevitably, colonial rule came to an end, resulting in a 
process of decolonisation. However, while marking the end of outside occupation, 
decolonisation did not result in the end of colonial systems which were instrumental in 
shaping the worlds of the colonised. This legacy has been referred to as coloniality. As a 
result, Chapter 2 aims to answer the research question by exploring how a paradigm of 
decoloniality can meaningfully contribute to reconciliation between South Africans. 
The chapter then explores the concept of coloniality. These are systems which continued to 
enact the colonial legacy through an interlinking matrix involving power structures, 
constructions of being and systems of knowledge. The first system – the coloniality of power 
– functions through the construction of hierarchies which control both the political and 
economic worlds of the formerly colonised. The coloniality of being is the second system 
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explored. This system relies on the already created hierarchies of power to enforce a 
systematised racialisation of people. This system makes use of a binary construction of race 
where whiteness is synonymous with humanity, dignity and civility, and blackness is 
dehumanised in colonial thinking, and thus black people are seen as not deserving of dignity 
or civility. This binary is extended to gender relations, with males viewed as superior to 
females, and a heterosexual western family structure is viewed as the ideal.  The result is that 
the coloniality of being ascribes humanity to Western, European, patriarchal whiteness, while 
subjugating all others. The third system explored in this chapter is that of the coloniality of 
knowledge. This system draws on the previous two, functioning through the privileging of 
Western ways of thinking and producing knowledge, and suppressing all other forms of 
knowledge and thinking. These three systems are interrelated, functioning together to sustain 
and reinforce one another. The result is a global system that privileges and values all things 
European and Western while subordinating all that is not. The end of colonisation did not end 
the systems of oppression developed by the colonisers. These systems of coloniality continue 
to function within postcolonial, post-apartheid South Africa, causing the continued 
oppression of the very people who were supposed to find freedom with the fall of apartheid. 
Chapter 3 - #FeesMustFall: Establishing the Narrative 
This chapter aims to explore and describe the #FeesMustFall narrative both in its national 
form and in its individual, local expression on the Pietermaritzburg campus of the University 
of KwaZulu-Natal. This is done in order to begin to determine how movements such as 
#FeesMustFall Pietermaritzburg are articulating a call for reconciliation. The chapter begins 
by introducing FMF. It traces the emergence of FMF out of the #RhodesMustFall (RMF) 
movement and explores the context which gave rise to both RMF and FMF. The chapter then 
explores the aims and principles of the broader FMF movement which swept the country and 
engulfed tertiary institutions in 2015 and 2016. After this, the narrative of FMF on the 
Pietermaritzburg campus is explored, comparing and contrasting both the similarities and the 
differences between the national and the local protests. Furthermore, in order to understand 
whether there is in actual fact a call for reconciliation which exists within #FeesMustFall, the 
chapter will examine FMF’s stance on and interaction with the reconciliation narrative. 
Without first understanding the fees protests and the context out of which they emerged, it is 
not possible to fully understand their call for decolonisation and the implication of this call.  
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Chapter 4 - #FeesMustFall: Decolonisation  
Chapter 4 continues the exploration of FMF that was initiated in Chapter 3. This chapter 
builds on articulating the FMF aims and the narrative already established, and deepens the 
focus and aim of Chapter 3, namely to determine how movements such as #FeesMustFall 
Pietermaritzburg are articulating a call for reconciliation. Specifically, Chapter 4 focuses on 
FMF’s use of decolonisation, exploring what is meant by the use of this term. At first glance, 
the call for decolonisation may seem perplexing since decolonisation has already taken place 
with the removal of colonial occupation. However, this chapter demonstrates that the call 
involves more than a call for the removal of colonial occupation. It is a call for 
transformation of both the physical academic space as well as the psychological spaces of 
tertiary education.  
This chapter shows that FMF’s call is in fact a call for the removal of the systems of 
coloniality explored in Chapter 2. As a result, the FMF aim of decolonisation needs to be 
understood as asking for more than simply a change in racial composition within academia. 
FMF is calling for an end to the psychological violence experienced by black students on 
university campuses that are not representative of their lived reality, and that privileges the 
ideologies, cultures and perspectives of whiteness. It is calling for a resurgence of Black 
Consciousness that will combat the coloniality of being which endows whiteness with 
humanity, goodness and dignity while stripping blackness of these same properties. The call 
for decolonisation of university campuses is therefore also a call for the end of the coloniality 
of being.  
Additionally, intertwined within the call for the end of the coloniality of being is a call for the 
end of the coloniliaty of knowledge and the colonialiy of power. It is a call for both the 
curriculum and subject matter taught to change, as well as a call for a shift in the paradigms 
and epistemological traditions of academia. What FMF is calling for is not decolonisation but 
rather the ending of the interlinking web of colonialities which perpetuate the colonial and 
apartheid legacies, keeping South Africans oppressed. It is not possible for reconciliation to 
occur while condition of oppression continue to exist. As a result, true reconciliation cannot 
take place until the decoloniality called for by FMF is a reality.   
Chapter 5 - #FeesMustFall: Theological Responses 
This chapter aims to ask to what extent Marcella Althaus-Reid’s liberation theological 
framework might inform reconciliation and transformation in South Africa. The work of 
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Althaus-Reid focuses on developing and providing counter-narratives which give voice to 
those on the margins. This provides a helpful framework in the FMF protests where the 
narrative is dominated by certain more powerful voices, such as tertiary institutions and news 
media, while the voices of the less powerful, most notably the students, are not heard. 
Althaus-Reid’s work provides a helpful framework in which to explore the ways in which 
some voices are silenced or marginalised within the FMF narrative. Furthermore, Althaus-
Reid’s Indecent Theology is an explicitly sexual theology and aims to expose and explore the 
ways in which sexual constructions within theology play a role in causing the disappearance 
and marginalisation of people. This approach gives a unique perspective on the ways in 
which theology has been complicit in the silencing of FMF protestors. Furthermore, it also 
provides a unique framework within which to develop new theological responses to FMF 
which are liberating and life-giving. 
 The previous chapters feed into the discussion of Chapter 5, showing in what ways 
#FeesMustFall is expressive of a protest for decolonising reconciliation in South Africa. The 
FMF protests have highlighted the need for narratives of reconciliation to be redefined in 
terms of decoloniality. Chapter 5 will continue this exploration by examining the role of the 
church and its theology in the FMF protests. Similar to how the fees protests have been sites 
of contestation which have provoked mixed reactions, the church and theological responses 
have also produced mixed reactions. This mixed response is remarkably similar to the 
response of the church during apartheid. In order to make this comparison, the chapter 
explores the church’s response to apartheid, specifically in the form of the Kairos Document, 
and the chapter uses the Kairos framework to assess current theological responses to FMF. 
Kairos theology was instrumental in offering the church a prophetic theological response to 
apartheid. However, an analysis of church theological responses to FMF shows that too many 
of these responses are reflective of Church Theology, with very few prophetic responses. 
Furthermore, some interactions and responses to FMF display a disturbingly toxic and 
oppressive theology. After exploring these theological responses, the chapter then explores 
Indecent Theology and the insights it can provide into the functioning of theology in both 
FMF and the coloniality/ decoloniality narrative.  
Research Questions and Objectives 
The overarching question which this research asks is in what way #FeesMustFall 
Pietermaritzburg has been expressive of a protest for decolonising reconciliation in South 
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Africa, and how an indecent theology of reconciliation might contribute to this. Firstly, the 
objective is to discover the extent to which reconciliation discourses are useful and still active 
within current South African society. A second objective is to determine how movements 
such as #FeesMustFall Pietermaritzburg are articulating a call for reconciliation. The third 
objective is to discover how a paradigm of decoloniality can meaningfully contribute to 
reconciliation between South Africans. The fourth and final objective is to ask to what extent 
Marcella Althaus-Reid’s liberation theological framework might inform reconciliation and 
transformation in South Africa. 
 
Methodology  
My study will be located within the tradition of Liberation Theology and Feminist Theology/ 
Queer Theology. It will seek to take a liberation theology approach to #FeesMustFall, 
reconciliation narratives and the discourses surrounding decolonisation in order to answer the 
question posed.  
The study will make use of critical discourse analysis to look for trends within existing 
literature in order to frame the answer to the research question. Furthermore, this study will 
rely on documentary research to answer the research question. Research from the fields of 
Reconciliation, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Decolonisation and Coloniality, 
#FeesMustFall, Protest Culture, Education, Queer and Liberation Theology, and the 
Development Discourse will be used in order to engage with and explore the key research 
question as well as the objectives of the dissertation. Among the key thinkers in these areas 
are Villa-Vicencio, Terrblanche, Gibson, Mignolo, wa Thiong’o, Naaido, Booysen, Duncan, 
and Althaus-Reid, among others. 
In the field of Reconciliation, recent literature that critically describes and assesses 
reconciliation narratives in post-apartheid South Africa will be used. Particular emphasis will 
be placed on literature which critically engages with the topics of the functioning of the TRC, 
research theorising its different roles in the reconciliation process in South Africa, as well as 
research assessing the impact of reconciliation and the successes, or otherwise, of 
reconciliation narratives within the current South African context. The research focus will be 
restricted to literature from the year 2000 onwards in order to focus on research from the 
post-transitional, post-TRC era, and thus to give a contemporary view on reconciliation after 
the work of the TRC was largely completed.  
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The field of Decolonisation and Coloniality will focus on literature that examines the 
constructions and power dynamics present within the colonial systems of the past as well as 
examining how these impact our present day societal constructions in the form of various 
expressions of coloniality. Furthermore, attention will be given to literature on decolonisation 
and the process of decolonisation within South Africa. This will be studied with particular 
emphasis on the interactions between this and the emergence of discourses on coloniality and 
decoloniality. Research will be limited to literature from recent discussions, conceptions and 
debates around coloniality/ decoloniality in the context of South Africa, with particular 
emphasis on literature published post-1994.  
The topic of #FeesMustFall will also be limited to documentary research. The dissertation 
will pay particular attention to literature that traces that inception and trajectory of the 
#FeesMustFall movement. The research uses literature that establishes a #FeesMustFall 
narrative for the local context of Pietermaritzburg, as well as literature that investigates the 
causes and results of these protests and the effects on society. Furthermore, the dissertation 
will undertake an analysis of the fees protests from the position of participant-observer, 
drawing on experiences and insights from this position as well as from established literature. 
The exploration of FMF, decoloniality and reconciliation is further explored through the 
theological framework of the Queer Theology work of Marcella Althaus-Reid (2000), using 
two of the themes prevalent in her concept of Indecent Theology, namely the themes of 
disappearances and body theology. These concepts are employed to critically analyse the 
church’s interaction with the #FeesMustFall protests as well as to examine its contribution to 
a theology of decoloniality. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Reconciliation: South African Narratives 
“Reconciliation is then perhaps the normative underpinning of hope. To be reconciled 
carries with it the wish for belligerents to no longer harbour or bear arms toward 
each other, for individuals to reconcile with each other, for societies to reconcile with 
their pasts. It is at once collective, individual and symbolic. For this reason, it clearly 
remains a difficult concept to translate into a social science measure that would 
determine whether, how and to what extent a society might have ‘reconciled.’” 
(Pillay, 2016:62) 
1.4. INTRODUCTION 
Since the introduction of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) at the end of 
apartheid, the term reconciliation has become part of common discourse. However, despite its 
familiarity and frequency of use, reconciliation remains a highly contested term without any 
one accepted definition. This lack of conceptual clarity was but one accusation levelled at the 
TRC and its processes. With its establishment at the dawn of South Africa’s new democracy, 
the TRC was tasked with discovering the truth about the human rights abuses and atrocities 
committed during the apartheid regime. The belief was that the exposure of truth would lead 
to catharsis and healing, which in turn would naturally lead to reconciliation. However, since 
the official closing of the TRC process, and with South Africa being more than twenty years 
into its new democracy, the question that needs to be asked is what the impact of 
reconciliation has been on the country. This chapter will explore the current discourses on 
reconciliation which are active within the South African context today. Furthermore, it will 
assess what the state of reconciliation is two decades after the TRC, keeping in mind that 
reconciliation is both an end goal and a process.  
1.5.WHAT IS RECONCILIATION? 
In order to begin to explore the concept of reconciliation and the extent to which discourses 
of reconciliation are still active within South Africa, it is necessary to first understand what 
reconciliation is. The difficulty of this task lies in the fact that reconciliation is a complex and 
laden concept without much consensus on its actual meaning in lived reality (Hay, 1998:13; 
de Gruchy, 2002:14; Nagey, 2002:326; Gibson, 2004:3; Skaar, 2013:57; Cantacuzino, 
2015:2; Lefko-Everett, et al., 2016:6; Seils, 2017:1). Hay (1998:13) remarks that 
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reconciliation is an abused term with many different groups, both religious and political, 
using it as a means to express their own ideological beliefs. Further contributing to this 
ideological complexity is the fact that reconciliation can be understood as both a process –   
where both parties work towards reconciliation –  as well as a goal – where to be reconciled 
is the end process to be attained (Nagey, 2002:326; Bloomfield, 2006:6; Skaar, 2013:65; 
Lefko-Everett, et al., 2016:6). It is a concept that is often traced to religious roots, but has 
since become adapted to secular use. The contestation of meaning around ideas of 
reconciliation has resulted in a multitude of definitions with many nuanced differences 
between them, with de Gruchy (2002:16) remarking that “many voices speak of 
reconciliation, but what they say depends on who is speaking, on their experience, their 
location in society, their perception of the past, the audience they are addressing, and the 
reason why they are speaking.” Cantacuzino (2015:2) agrees, remarking that each 
individual’s definition of and response to forgiveness is one that is interpreted through 
individual experience and context. Since individual circumstances differ so widely, 
understandings of forgiveness will necessarily differ too.  
  
What most conceptualisations of reconciliation have in common is defining reconciliation as 
an attempt at the restoration of relationships between people or parties, linked to divisions 
caused by unjust, oppressive or discriminatory actions or conditions. These definitions 
include the idea that accountability between parties is necessary, as well as some form of 
redress for wrongs, and not allowing the pain of past wrongs to continue to dictate the future 
(van der Merwe, 2003:269; Sacco & Hoffmann, 2004:160; Chapman, 2003:13; Gibson, 
2004:4; Cantacuzino, 2015:3; Bishop, 2016:2; Guthrey & Brouneus, 2017:87). Furthermore, 
there is a distinction between peaceful conflict resolution and reconciliation. Peaceful conflict 
resolution can be understood as two conflicting people or groups reaching some form of 
compromise that leads to the end of violent conflict. However, simply finding a non-violent 
end to conflict does not necessarily imply the restoration of relationships between parties 
which is implicit in reconciliation. It is entirely possible for a peaceful resolution of conflict 
to be reached without any reconciliation ever taking place (Bishop, 2016:2; Seils, 2017:1). 
Reconciliation is much more than a mere peaceful resolution to conflict. As a result, the 
concept and definition of reconciliation is a complex one where definitions are contested.   
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1.6.CONCEPTIONS OF RECONCILIATION 
1.6.1. Thick Reconciliation  
Not only can reconciliation be understood as both a process and an end goal, but it can also 
fall into two distinct categories or approaches, namely Individual Reconciliation (IR) and 
National Unity and Reconciliation (NUR) (Nagey, 2002:328; Borer, 2004:24; Seils, 2017:5).  
Individual Reconciliation, sometimes called ‘thick’ reconciliation, is reconciliation that takes 
place between individuals on an interpersonal level, usually between a perpetrator and an 
individual. This model of reconciliation is most often associated with therapeutic or religious 
paradigms, where the emphasis is on the healing of the individual through truth telling and 
the experience of catharsis, as well as the mending of broken relationships. Reconciliation in 
this form focuses on the reparation and restoration of relationships between people in 
situations of gross human rights violations. This model makes use of a therapeutic style of 
language, and the framing and understanding of terms such as reconciliation and forgiveness 
is often focussed through a religious lens. The Individual model is often more complex and 
multidimensional than presented, since reconciliation of individuals can include 
reconciliation between victims and perpetrators, perpetrators with themselves, victims with 
themselves, victims with victims, as well as both victims or perpetrators with the broader 
community (Nagey, 2002:328; Borer, 2004:23-25; Seils, 2017:1,5). This conception of 
reconciliation is one which is relationship orientated. It places focus on the building of 
relationships between individuals and communities (Lederach, 2001:842; McCandless, 
2001:13; Bloomfield, 2006:7; Skaar, 2013:65; Seils, 2017:1,5). Furthermore, it is a slow and 
long-term process requiring time and effort (Bloomfield, 2006:8). Individual Reconciliation 
places its emphasis on reconciliation between individuals and on an individual level.  
 
1.3.2. Thin Reconciliation 
The second model of reconciliation, National Unity and Reconciliation, is distinct from the 
first. While IR deals in individuals and attempts reconciliation from an individual 
perspective, NUR is more concerned with reconciliation from the perspective of groups, 
specifically socio-political institutions and process. Furthermore, while IR is closely related 
to a religious or medical paradigm, NUR is better situated within a political paradigm. This 
model of reconciliation is concerned with a commitment to rule of law and respect for the 
processes of law. It attempts to create reconciliation through a shared commitment to building 
the future with others in a manner that is respectful of diversity, welcoming of political 
disagreement, and conducive and open to political competition. Additionally, this form of 
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reconciliation aims to ensure that the law is used to mediate discord, and aims to foster a 
political culture that is respectful of the human rights of all people. While IR uses the 
approach that believes that former enemies will be able to agree and find common ground 
upon which to create reconciliation, the NUR model does not take this approach. It 
approaches reconciliation with the belief that parties with conflict or animosity will have 
great difficulty in finding common ground and are unlikely to agree with one another on very 
much. As a result, this conception of reconciliation aims for coexistence (McCandless, 
2001:13; Borer, 2004:25; Bloomfield, 2006:13). This model aims to create reconciliation 
where people are able to listen to one another and participate in the process of public 
compromise, building on areas of commonality in order for a form of peaceful coexistence to 
be achieved. This model of reconciliation is sometimes called ‘thin’ reconciliation and is 
much more secular in approach, and is no less complex than the IR model (Borer, 2004:25-
26). This type of reconciliation concentrates on (re)building social relationships on a broad 
level between communities and groups. Its emphasis is on the rebuilding of social 
relationships to foster relationships between communities that are able to negotiate shared 
socio-economic landscapes in the future (Nagey, 2002:328; Hamber, 2003:81; Bloomfield, 
2006:12; Skaar, 2013:65; Seils, 2017:1). Furthermore, it should also be noted that while the 
aim of the NUR model is national unity, its understanding of this unity is not one of 
authoritarian nationalism. 
 
1.7.WHAT IS RECONCILAITION IN SOUTH AFRICA? 
1.4.1. Taking Stock: Past Reconciliation Efforts  
In order for the process of reconciliation to begin, some way of dealing with the conflict and 
trauma of the past needs to be decided on. In cases where reconciliation is needed, not simply 
between two individuals but on a larger scale such as in a country, Sacco and Hoffmann 
(2004:158) remark that there are at least six different approaches to doing this. These are: 1) 
amnesia – where the acts of the past are forgiven and forgotten without prosecutions or 
repercussions for past actions; 2) trials and justice – where attempts are made to hold trials 
for perpetrators with some form of punishment as the outcome; 3) lustration which results in 
the disqualification from holding public office for any and all perpetrators and collaborators; 
4) negotiated restitution and compensation; 5) political re-education; and finally, 6) truth 
commissions. Furthermore, they remark that the commonality found in all of these 
approaches is “a need for social acknowledgement of past suffering; a demand for the truth 
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concerning loved ones; and a desire for justice” (Sacco & Hoffmann, 2004:158). Emerging 
from a past that involved decades of violent oppression, division and conflict caused by the 
legalisation of racism in the form of apartheid, South Africa needed such a process in order to 
facilitate transition to a different and democratic future.  
 
As a result, South Africa entered into a negotiated settlement which included in it the 
provision for one such reconciliation process to be adopted. This was an attempt to balance 
the demand for accountability and justice – as asked for by the many South African liberation 
movements – with a need for amnesty – as asked for by the white ruling party. Out of this, 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) emerged, established by an act of 
Parliament in the form of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (no. 34 of 
1995). This was established in an attempt to facilitate healing and reconciliation in South 
Africa as the country attempted to transition away from its apartheid past (Bishop, 2016:8-9; 
Sacco & Hoffmann, 2004:159; Gibson, 2006:410; Borer, 2004:26; Mccall Smith, 2015:xvi; 
van der Merwe & Sensabaugh, 2016:27; Lefko-Everett, et al., 2016:6-7). The TRC was 
implemented throughout South Africa, led by the Archbishop Desmond Tutu, with the 
purpose of holding hearings into gross human rights abuses perpetrated under the apartheid 
regime. Victims of abuse were given the opportunity to give testimony of their experiences of 
abuse. Similarly, the perpetrators were invited to give testimony of their actions and given the 
opportunity to plead for amnesty (Tutu, 1999:61; Foster, 2010:3-4; Seils, 2017:9). This was 
an attempt to create a bridge between the atrocities of the past, riddled with injustice, 
violence and suffering, and the desire for a future that was founded on principles of human 
rights for all people. In order for this to happen, it was necessary to first establish the truth in 
relation to past abuses and to make these findings known publically, based on the belief that 
truth-telling would lead to reconciliation. To accomplish its mandate, the TRC established 
three committees, namely a committee for human rights, one for reparation and rehabilitation, 
and a third for amnesty (Sacco & Hoffmann, 2004:150-160; Bishop, 2016:18). These 
committees were all to play a role in South Africa’s attempt to meet the demand for 
accountability and justice in the form of the TRC.  
 
1.8. HOW DID THE TRC DEFINE RECONCILIATION? 
As is clear from the name of the commission itself, the goal of the TRC was to reach 
reconciliation, specifically national reconciliation. However, “the meaning of the phrase was 
hotly contested in the struggle against apartheid, during the work of the TRC, and it remains 
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controversial” (de Gruchy, 2002:14). In order to understand and assess the work of the TRC, 
it is important to first understand how the commission framed and understood the idea of 
reconciliation. The term ‘reconciliation’ is one often used with the assumption that everyone 
is working from the same definition and understanding, and the use of the term in the TRC 
has been no exception. While the TRC has done much to popularise the term ‘reconciliation,’ 
it did so without providing any form of clear definition for what it intended when using the 
word or how the commission understood reconciliation. Tutu (1999:51) bases his 
understanding of the process of reconciliation on the notion of Ubuntu where “the central 
concern is not retribution or punishment but…the healing of breaches, the redressing of 
imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships.” This orientation towards a process of 
restoration, Mccall Smith (2015:xvi) remarks, has left a lasting impact on a world 
accustomed to “talk of retribution and the humiliation of one’s enemies.” Furthermore, Tutu 
(2015:xii) explains that forgiveness is a process that makes space for negative emotions such 
as hatred and anger, while also being willing to forgo the right to revenge. This type of 
justice, Tutu (1999:51) argues, seeks the rehabilitation of both perpetrator and victim, looking 
for ways in which their reintegration into communities can take place.  
 
However, the TRC was not given much outside guidance on how to interpret or structure its 
use of the concepts of reconciliation and, as a result, it never articulated a clear and definitive 
understanding of what it believed reconciliation to be. The commission explored the 
complexities of the term to some extent by acknowledging reconciliation as both a process 
and an end goal and identifying four levels at which reconciliation can take place, namely: 1) 
with oneself; 2) between perpetrators and victims; 3) between members of a community; and 
4) on a national level (TRC Commission, 1998:106).
5
 This lack of a clear definition for the 
concept has resulted in the TRC appearing to adopt an approach that moves back and forth 
between differing understandings of reconciliation (Borer, 2004:23-30). This ‘mix and 
match’ movement between definitions of reconciliation is echoed in the models of 
reconciliation from which the TRC worked. Van der Merwe (2003:270) and Chapman 
(2003:13) both remark that within the TRC’s approach one can find a combination of both 
secular, political and religious understandings and approaches to reconciliation, as well as 
instances where these are conflated with one another.  
 
                                                          
5
 The online PDF version of the reports have been used for this work, however, the same information can be 
found in the print versions in Volume 1, Chapter 5, paragraph 13, p. 106 of the TRC final report. 
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Furthermore, within the TRC report there is evidence of the language and structure of an 
individual approach to reconciliation. This is seen, amongst other things, in the report’s 
foregrounding of the healing of victims and perpetrators as being either between each other or 
with themselves. The IR model is most evident in the TRC’s framing of the first two levels of 
reconciliation. On the first level, where reconciliation takes place with oneself, truth telling 
and disclosure help victims to deal with and become reconciled with their pain, and help 
perpetrators to come to terms with their own complicity, shame and guilt (Borer, 2004:24-
26). The second level of reconciliation takes place after the truth has been told and both 
victim and perpetrator have become reconciled with one another. It is then hoped that they 
might be able to become reconciled with one another. Both of these two levels are examples 
of reconciliation framed within the Individual Reconciliation model. This individual 
approach to reconciliation is seen in Tutu’s (1999:34) explanation of the TRC as being a third 
option for amnesty which avoided either the extreme of the Nuremberg trials or complete 
blanket amnesia. This third option provided amnesty in exchange for full disclosure of 
wrongdoing – the proverbial carrot and stick, where the carrot was possible freedom in 
exchange for truth, and the stick was the possibility of arrest and prosecution. The type of 
reconciliation being conceptualised is that of individual reconciliation, since it is the 
individual who is required to make full disclosure, and it is the individual who is held 
responsible should they not give account of their actions. In this discussion, one can see 
evidence of the framing of the TRC’s reconciliation as an individual reconciliation. 
 
Not only does the TRC show evidence of having used an IR model of reconciliation, but the 
NUR model is also evident in the TRC’s reconciliation work. This is seen in the 
conceptualisation of the fourth level of reconciliation – the reconciliation of communities and 
the nation. Here the TRC final report
6
 states that “a healthy democracy does not require 
everyone to agree or become friends. However, a culture of human rights and democracy 
does require respect for our common human dignity and shared citizenship, as well as the 
peaceful handling of unavoidable conflicts” (TRC Commission, 1998:108, vol 1, ch 5). This 
conceptualisation of reconciliation is reflective of the model of National Reconciliation, 
where peaceful coexistence is the aim, rather than individual reconciliation (Borer, 2004:29; 
Villa-Vicencio, 2000:208). In reflecting on this use of both the IR and the NUR models of 
                                                          
6
 The final report submitted by the TRC consists of five volumes documenting the entire proceedings of the 
commission, with two volumes containing indices and transcripts of interviews. These were presented to then 
president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, on 29 October 1998.   For more on the TRC and its final report see 
Online:  http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/ [accessed: 1 May 2017]. 
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reconciliation within the TRC, Borer (2004:29) remarks that the TRC report did not clarify 
the difference between the two models. This, he comments, leaves the impression that the 
only difference between the two models is a matter of numbers, or an increase in numbers, 
when in reality the two models could, in some instances, be irreconcilably opposed to one 
another. Furthermore, Anjie Krog (1998:109) comments on South Africa’s attempt at 
reconciliation, asking how relationships can be restored when “there is nothing to go back to, 
no previous state or relationship one would wish to restore.” In light of this, the TRC was set 
an extremely challenging task, namely to create restoration where there was no harmonious 
or respectful relationship to begin with.  
 
1.9.OBJECTIVES OF THE TRC 
Despite this lack of conceptual clarity, Gibson (2006:410) remarks that as a result of South 
Africa’s TRC process, similar forms of transitional justice and truth telling processes have 
been established in other countries around the world. Furthermore, while the TRC did appear 
to sidestep the difficult issue of defining its use of the term reconciliation, it had established 
objectives which it hoped would facilitate the process and end goal of reconciliation. The 
Commission was given four major tasks to complete in order to achieve this aim. These tasks 
were: 1) to create as complete a picture as possible of the human rights violations, their 
nature, causes and effects in the period starting 1 March 1960 and ending 10 May 1994
7
; 2) 
using the process of testimony and truth telling in order to facilitate and restore the civil and 
human dignity of the victims; 3) facilitating the process of amnesty granting; and 4)  
presenting recommendations to the President in an attempt to prevent future violation of 
human rights (Sacco & Hoffmann, 2004:159-160; Bishop, 2016:18; Borer, 2004:27). When 
commenting on this, Borer (2004:27) remarks that “there appears to be an underlying 
assumption that these four tasks, once completed, will have in some ways contributed toward, 
or effected, reconciliation in South Africa.” However, the report never discusses how this 
might work or why it might be true. Nevertheless, there are many themes that can be 
identified from TRC that demonstrate the ways in which it functioned to bring about 
                                                          
7
 Tutu (1999, p. 59) remarks that in some senses there is a certain amount of arbitrariness to the dates that the 
TRC uses in the establishing of its scope. The dates could have been extended further back to the beginning of 
the National Party rule or even further back to the beginning of colonial occupation. However, he also remarks 
that in order to give the commission any reasonable chance of success, the scope needed to be a manageable 
one. Furthermore, too large of a scope would have caused the commission to become so bogged down in dealing 
with the past “for so long that we were held to ransom by it, effectively sabotaging the peaceful transition” 
(Tutu, 1999, p. 59).   
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reconciliation. Two such themes will be explored in this paper, namely truth telling as 
collective memory making, and a narrative of mass systematic human rights abuses.   
1.9.1. Truth Telling as Collective Memory Making  
As already established, truth telling was an integral part of the TRC process. It was seen as a 
necessary component to gain clarity on the atrocities of apartheid as well as to promote 
reconciliation and forgiveness (Tutu, 1999:55; Foster, 2010:4; Lefko-Everett, et al., 2016:7). 
When reflecting on the process of the TRC, its truth telling and its emphasis on individual 
testimony, Tilley (2010:1) as well as van der Merwe and Sensabaugh (2016:25), 
conceptualise this process as being the formation of collective memory making. This, Gibson 
(2005:353) notes, was one of the objectives of the TRC process. He explains that a collective 
memory is “an accepted version of the truth about the country’s past” (Gibson, 2005:353). In 
giving testimony, the victims are telling their stories and in turn, these stories are being 
recorded and made official as part of a published collection. These stories then become part 
of the public record and help to create a shared form of memory. In order for this to take 
place, the TRC and the South African government created a reconciliation process that was 
intentionally public in nature. They did this by holding hearings that were open to the public, 
and by publishing the final reports and then making these available to anyone who wanted 
access. It was hoped that this form of social acknowledgment would help to promote national 
unity and build reconciliation between people (Bishop, 2016:20-21; Sacco & Hoffmann, 
2004:161; van der Merwe & Sensabaugh, 2016:25). Furthermore, it was hoped that the act of 
storytelling would be cathartic for both individuals and the nation, thus promoting healing 
and reconciliation (Moon, 2006:257). This type of collective memory is important because 
once an accepted account of the past is established and becomes publically accepted, it 
becomes part of the public memory. This makes it difficult for others to deny what happened 
or to deny the depth of the atrocities that took place. This does not necessarily mean that there 
should be only one simple, sanctioned truth, but rather that the TRC created an 
“amalgamation of ideas about the past with which all South Africans must at least contend” 
(Gibson, 2005:353).  Furthermore, it was hoped that this type of storytelling would create 
narrative closure for both individuals and the nation (Moon, 2006:272). 
However, while it can be seen as positive and constructive to create a public narrative in 
order to promote reconciliation through collective memory, there are also some concerning 
points worth considering. Tilley (2010:2)  explains that the genre of collective memory 
making can be influenced by the temptation of state elites to want to create official narratives 
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or histories that reflect “the state’s project to extend its hegemony over its domestic 
population by lending nationalism a moral coherence, romance, vision and grandeur that will 
inspire more certain and passionate loyalty.” In terms of building national unity, this can be 
positive, however, it can also be problematic. Villa-Vicencio (2000:199) agrees, remarking 
that any state-sanctioned program brings with it the danger of creating a brand of nationalism 
in place of reconciliation which distracts from the imperatives of human rights and justice. 
However, Tilly (2010:2) notes that there are frequently more influences to the creation of 
such a narrative or hegemony than just the state. These players are influenced by their own 
interests or agendas, which may or may not be congruous with that of the state.  
Furthermore, the act of creating an official narrative for reconciliation forces the narrative of 
reconciliation into a defined organising category which then “seeks and imposes concordance 
in place of contestation, conditioning the way in which South Africa’s history is related in 
symbolic and material ways” (Moon, 2006:272). This defines and shapes what is told, but it 
also shapes what is not told. The construction of the narrative around reconciliation is that 
truth telling provides catharsis, which in turn allows for healing and the reconciliation of 
individuals with themselves, between victims and perpetrators, and for communities with 
each other. However, what happens if victims or perpetrators arrive at the end of this process 
and are not reconciled? This narrative positions victims in such a way that the implication is 
that by the end of the process they should be forgiving of the perpetrators; however, what 
happens should the victims not be in a position where they feel able to forgive or where they 
have no interest in reconciliation? The TRC did not provide the victims with the language 
with which they could say that they did not feel reconciled; it did not recognise a category for 
unreconciled (Moon, 2006:264). As a result, the construction of a narrative, while helpful, is 
also problematic in that it positions people such that they may feel obligated to forgive and 
reconcile even if they do not yet feel like they are able to do so. 
Furthermore, Moon (2006:260-261) remarks that the creation of a narrative also constructs 
with it positions for all the players within that narrative. This narrative forms categories such 
as perpetrator and victim, subject and object. Within this type of reconciliation construction, 
subjects do not have power to independently produce discourse, “but  are constituted by 
discourse, and they in turn reproduce the particular assumptions of the discourse within 
which they are constituted, thus ensuring its hegemony and continuity and also, crucially, the 
invisibility of its reproduction” (Moon, 2006:261). These categories also determine who has 
power to speak and how they may speak, and this power is most often determined by those 
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who hold power in the form of authority or expertise. As a result, the constructed narrative of 
reconciliation is constraining in its conceptualising of power relations – who has power to 
speak and who does not – that imply expected conformity (Moon, 2006:273). In this sense, 
the TRC is problematic in that it attempts to force unity where there is conflict, and in so 
doing it risks silencing some voices. As a result, a criticism levelled at the TRC’s 
reconciliation process is that it is a created and fictional narrative, albeit a transformative one 
(Moon, 2006:272). In addition to this charge levelled against the TRC process, others have 
commented that people’s memories can themselves be obstructive to the conflict resolution 
process. Some have raised the question as to whether public airings of such horrendous 
abuses are in fact constructive in the healing of this trauma, or if they instead contribute to re-
traumatising already traumatised victims (Tilley, 2010:1; van der Merwe & Sensabaugh, 
2016:25).  
1.9.2. Mass Systematic Human Rights Abuses 
In its construction of a narrative that shapes collective memory about the South African 
apartheid past, a parallel theme also emerged. This was that of mass systematic human rights 
abuses. One of the investigative objectives of the TRC was to uncover “gross violations of 
human rights” (TRC Commission, 1998:104. vol 1, ch4). Up until this point, there had been 
no systematic classification as human rights abuses for the atrocities which happened under 
the apartheid regime. By doing so, the TRC “identified, defined, and quantified precisely 
which categories of violations were central to its investigations” (Moon, 2006:260). 
Categories such as killing, ill treatment, torture and abduction were established and defined 
as specific categories of human rights abuses. Further limitations were placed on the scope of 
the TRC by limiting investigations to those crimes perpetrated as a result of a political 
motive. Only violations committed with a political objective could, according to the TRC, 
qualify as being gross human rights abuses under the apartheid system, and thus be 
investigated by the committee with testimonies and hearings (Tutu, 1999:34; Nagey, 
2002:324; Moon, 2006:260; van der Merwe & Sensabaugh, 2016:25). The international 
discourses on human rights gained prominence in the aftermath of World War II,
8
 and played 
an important role in shaping South Africa’s process of reconciliation; without this discourse, 
                                                          
8
 For more on Human Rights and the emergence of this discourse, see:  
Ishay, M., 2008. The history of human rights: From ancient times to the globalization era. University of 
California Press. 
Cmiel, K., 2004. The recent history of human rights. The American Historical Review, 109(1), pp.117-135. 
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the history of the country would not have been understood or framed as that of a history of 
human rights violations (Moon, 2006:260). 
 
Furthermore, in being asked to investigate the atrocities of the apartheid regime, the TRC was 
asked to investigate a very large span of the country’s history. Without creating some way of 
categorising and delimiting this time period, the TRC would have had an impossible task. As 
a result, the creation of a defined category for human rights abuses that provided limitations 
for investigation was necessary (Tutu, 1999:34; Moon, 2006:260). Without this, the TRC 
would have had little hope of accomplishing their objectives. Those responsible for deciding 
and delimiting which atrocities and events which qualified for investigation by the committee 
were not simply the TRC committee officials, but rather those who were involved in the 
negotiations for peace prior to the end of apartheid. This was an attempt to ensure that all 
interests were represented and to ensure that deciding what was investigated and what was 
not did not appear to be biased towards one political party or another (Moon, 2006:260).  The 
view was that for processes of transitional justice like the TRC to succeed, “a history of mass 
systematic abuses should be openly confronted” (van der Merwe & Sensabaugh, 2016:25).  
 
While there is the belief that such human rights abuses should be confronted in an open and 
public manner, what still remains unclear is how, and to what extent, this benefits the public 
(van der Merwe & Sensabaugh, 2016:25). Furthermore, by creating a delimiting category for 
investigation, the TRC created limitations on the scope of its work that ran the risk of 
excluding other atrocities that were as pertinent. Establishing a narrow category for inclusion 
into the TRC’s investigations and hearings also created only a narrow view of truth. It 
excluded other forms of violations which would have added to public narratives of apartheid 
abuses, such as violations of socioeconomic rights, state corruption or gender-based violence. 
The exclusion of truths such as these creates a distorted narrative of South African history – a 
history with blind spots in it (van der Merwe & Sensabaugh, 2016:25; Moon, 2006:260). 
Furthermore, creating categories through delineation creates an official and recognised 
history. While this was one of the objectives of the TRC, it led to the obscuring and silencing 
of other histories that may have been able to claim equal weight and truth value in the South 
African historical landscape. Moon (2006:260) remarks that structural violence, such as that 
which causes people to be exploited, was integral to apartheid’s maintenance. As a result it 
was arguably more damaging and widespread than some of the politically motivated abuses. 
However, this was not recognised within the TRC’s process of reconciliation.  
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1.10. WAS THE TRC SUCCESSFUL? 
The year 1998 saw the finalisation of the work of the TRC in the form of its final report.
9
 The 
question remains whether, after the completion of this process, reconciliation has been 
achieved. Furthermore, it is uncertain to what extent the discourses of reconciliation are still 
helpful and relevant in South African society today. The difficulty in attempting to answer 
this question is noted by Borer (2004:20), who writes that the lack of a definite understanding 
of reconciliation makes it hard to judge whether reconciliation has taken place. How is 
reconciliation to be judged without a clear understanding of what reconciliation is? It remains 
unclear whose idea of reconciliation will be used as a measure, and when respondents are 
offering their opinions and beliefs on the progress of reconciliation within the country, it is 
unclear what exactly they are assessing. Furthermore, Guthrey and Brouneus (2017:85) 
remark that the expectations of the outcomes of truth commissions tend to be abstract, thus 
making any assessment of such a process challenging. Nevertheless, some attempts have been 
made to gain insight into whether the TRC was successful in its reconciliation efforts.  
Prior to the commencement of the TRC, 63 percent of surveyed white people displayed a lack 
of trust that the TRC could accomplish its reconciliation goals, while over 70 percent of black 
people showed confidence in the TRC (Theissen, 1999:31). When asked again after the 
conclusion of the TRC what their feelings on the success of the TRC’s reconciliation project 
was, 55 percent of people surveyed thought it had been good for the county and had achieved 
its aims. However, these results significantly differ when divided by race. When looked at in 
this way, over 70 percent of black respondents felt that the TRC had been beneficial to the 
country, with only 45 percent of white respondents feeling this way (Theissen, 1999:31). 
Furthermore, a majority of black people believed that the TRC had made a positive 
contribution to reconciliation, while the majority of white people maintained that the TRC 
had failed to do so (Theissen, 1999:46). Theissen (1999) argues that this was part of a broader 
mistrust and rejection of institutions established by the new and democratically elected 
government by the white segment of the population. This could be interpreted as both a 
rejection of the TRC and its reconciliation processes as well as “a larger statement of 
skepticism and distrust of the new government” (van der Merwe & Sensabaugh, 2016:27). 
The stark difference in opinion between racial groups has persisted and even increased after 
the conclusion of the TRC, a concerning trend in the effort for reconciliation. This could 
                                                          
9
 Since the Amnesty committee continued to operate for a further four years, the TRC’s final reports were only 
published after this in 2003, rather than at the time of its closing in 1998. 
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suggest that reconciliation discourses may not have successfully taken hold in all segments of 
South African society.  
However, these numbers are simply a measure of the opinions and perceptions of South 
Africans, and are not necessarily an accurate representation of reality. Van der Merwe and 
Sensabaugh (2016:29) remark that simply because there was resistance to the TRC and its 
processes does not mean that the TRC failed. They note that the TRC contributed to shifts in 
perspectives through the large amount of media exposure and through its influence on the 
shaping of political debates. These elements have shaped public opinion and seeped into 
public consciousness in the time after the end of the TRC. Furthermore, the view that the 
TRC, and other truth and reconciliation processes like it, are vital in the promotion of 
reconciliation now is common within international scholarship (Gibson, 2006:410). 
Nevertheless, the TRC process did not conclude without criticism, and retrospectively, this 
criticism appears to have increased. This has included criticism of the exclusion of other 
apartheid abuses such as forced removals and the pass laws, as well as the refusal of former 
president PW Botha and other senior apartheid era leaders to participate in the reconciliation 
work of the commission (Lefko-Everett, et al., 2016:8). While these results may not be 
depictions of the reality of the successes of the TRC, they do offer insight into the public 
perception of the commission. Furthermore, these perceptions appear to have had an impact 
on the level of criticism the commission has received.   
The question must be asked as to whether truth really does lead to reconciliation. Corder 
(2000:105) contends that the concepts of ‘truth’ and ‘reconciliation’ are in opposition to one 
another. Borer (2004:20) points out that simply repeating something (that truth leads to 
reconciliation) is not enough for it to be true. It may also be that the airing of painful truths 
leads not to catharsis but rather to increased anger and pain. A further issue with this 
assumption is that success is measured solely through reconciliation when there can also be 
other means of measuring the success of such a transitional justice project. This issue was 
acknowledged by the TRC who contend that “the reconciliation of victims with their own 
pain is a deeply personal, complex and unpredictable process,” further stating that “knowing 
the complete picture of past gross human rights violations, or even the facts of each case, may 
not lead to reconciliation” but that “truth may, in fact, cause further alienation” (TRC 
Commission, 1998:106, volume 1). Thus, the process of truth and reconciliation is 
undertaken with the acknowledgement that the process of truth telling leading to 
reconciliation is not simple or straightforward. 
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Villa-Vicencio (2000:199) adds to this, writing that if the success of the TRC is understood as 
its reconciliation of the nation, then the whole process is doomed to fail. He argues instead 
that the TRC was always concerned with the promotion of reconciliation and with 
contributing towards laying a foundation upon which reconciliation could be built. The TRC 
committee further notes that there were instances when it felt that it was able to assist in the 
process of reconciliation, but that there were other instances where this reconciliation was 
complicated by other issues and may not have been as successful. The commission also states 
that in their understanding, truth does not always lead to reconciliation, however it is the vital 
first step towards it (TRC Commission, 1998:106 volume 1). From this discussion, it is 
evident that the TRC has always recognised reconciliation to be both a goal and a process, 
and that the commission did not necessarily view their task as completing the process of 
reconciliation within the nation. Instead, the TRC’s goal was to bring forth truth so that the 
reconciliation process might begin and, even more importantly, continue after the TRC had 
concluded. Any attempts to assess the success, or otherwise, of the TRC, and the larger 
project of reconciliation within South Africa, needs to take this into account too.  
1.11. PRESENT STATE OF RECONCILIATION 
Villa-Vicencio (2000:209) remarks that “it is essential that South Africans agree to coexist. 
National reconciliation is necessary for South Africans to become dedicated citizens of one 
nation.” However, in the intervening years since the end of the TRC, the definitions for what 
reconciliation in South Africa would look like have remained unclear, and the promised 
reconciliation itself appears elusive. Gibson (2004:4) conceptualises a reconciled South 
Africa as one where a human rights culture
10
 is entrenched and extended to all people, where 
people of different races are respectful and trusting of one another, and where tolerance for 
differing political views is celebrated. However, since it has been recognised that there is 
both a goal and a journey inherent in the process of reconciliation, many scholars believe that 
it might still be too early to establish whether the TRC was successful and whether South 
Africa has accomplished reconciliation successfully (Borer, 2004:33; Biko, 2000:193; 
Bishop, 2016:1). While this might be so, it is still possible to attempt to assess the current 
state of reconciliation based on public sentiment, societal structure and political discourse in 
South Africa today. 
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 Scholars such as van der Ven et al. (2000:114), Gibson (2004 b:10) and Campbell (1999:6) note that human 
rights legislature is simply not enough to guarantee human rights. They argue that human rights might also be 
lost through legal means. As a result, human rights scholars have shifted to speaking about human rights culture 
– a society that nurtures a culture that is respective and protective of the human rights of its citizens.   
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At first glance, South Africa would appear to be struggling with many issues that might imply 
that reconciliation has not yet taken hold. With a Gini coefficient of 0.69, South Africa is one 
of the most socio-economically unequal societies in the world (Potgieter, 2016:2). These 
inequalities extend beyond mere income difference to include inequalities in access to basic 
services, employment opportunities and educational opportunities. These factors are all part 
of the legacy of apartheid that continues to impact South African society today (Potgieter, 
2016:2; Hofmeyr & Govender, 2015:1; Hofmeyr, et al., 2017:10). At the same time, slow 
economic growth, along with increasing job losses and an increased cost of living has 
resulted in households across the country experiencing greater difficulty in meeting their 
basic needs. These risks form a threefold challenge of poverty, inequality and unemployment 
which create tensions and social polarisation. This is particularly marked along racial lines 
(Hofmeyr, et al., 2017:2-4; Chibba & Luiz, 2011:307; Finn, et al., 2014:3). One space where 
evidence of these tensions can be found is in the realm of social media. Examples such as the 
racist Facebook post of Penny Sparrow, the comments of Judge Mabel Jansen or the incident 
where a Rhodes scholar refused to tip a waitress until the whites returned the land,
11
 as well 
as numerous other racial incidents that have played out in the South African landscape over 
this past year, are indicative of such problematic tensions. These would appear to point 
towards a lack of reconciliation within the South African landscape. However, as Lefko-
Everett et al. (2016:5; 19) note, too often assessments of this question are based off of 
anecdotal evidence, unqualified opinion, stereotype and bias, when the answer can never be 
this simple.  
1.12. MEASURING RECONCILIATION TODAY 
One ongoing attempt at measuring the extent of reconciliation within South Africa is the 
South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB).
12
 This is a public opinion survey, 
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 For more information on these examples see various news articles written about these events such as  
Wicks, J., 2016. ‘It’s Just the Facts – Penny Sparrow Breaks Her Silence’ News24, Online: 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/its-just-the-facts-penny-sparrow-breaks-her-silence-20160104 
[accessed: 1 May 2017]; eNCA., 2017. ‘Mabel Jansen in Hot Seat Over Racism’ eNCA, Online: 
http://www.enca.com/south-africa/mabel-jansen-faces-inquiry-into-racism-accusations [accessed: 1 May 2017]; 
or Staufenberg, J., 2016. Independent Online, Online:  http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/rhodes-
campaigner-oxford-university-student-refuses-to-tip-white-waitress-until-land-is-returned-in-a7009786.html 
[accessed: 1 May 2017].  
12
Another such measure offering insight into the question of reconciliation is that of the Afrobarometer. While 
not doing work specifically on reconciliation, Afrobarometer is a research network that is independent, non-
partisan and pan-African. Like the SARB, it conducts surveys and research on public opinion. It covers a range 
of topics such as politics, economic stability and democracy in a range of countries throughout Africa, and as 
such can provide valuable insight into issues that inform reconciliation within the South African context. The 
scope of this dissertation is not broad enough to cover all of these elements. As such, this work will continue 
with the theme discussed above and focus only on a small area of reconciliation, in this instance human rights 
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conducted annually, the results of which are released for access by members of the public. 
The survey is conducted by the Policy and Analysis Programme of the Institute for Justice 
and Reconciliation.
13
 It aims to be nationally representative of public opinion on 
reconciliation in South Africa, with particular focus on issues such as race relations, 
economic stability and politics (Potgieter & Govender, 2016:v). There are many areas and 
elements which the SARB (2015) covers with relation to reconciliation in South Africa. In its 
most recent survey results, published in 2015, some of their key findings were surprising, 
some less so. They found that with 59.2% of South Africans, more than half of the 
population, believe that at least some national reconciliation progress has been made since the 
end of apartheid. Even more people (69.7%) believe that the country should continue with its 
reconciliation project and 71% believe in the importance of creating a united country (SARB, 
2015:1). However, inequality and economic disadvantage remain the most prevalent reasons 
given for social division within South Africa, with many people believing that reconciliation 
will never be achieved until this is addressed.  
Furthermore, most of the respondents expressed an experience of racism as part of their daily 
experience, with 61.4% feeling that relations between people of different races had worsened 
or remained the same since 1994 (SARB, 2015:1). Nevertheless, the SARB also found that 
nearly 50 percent of white respondents disagreed that “the institutionalised racism of 
apartheid amounted to a criminal dehumanisation of black people,” with this response 
showing a steady increase when compared to responses to the same question from earlier 
survey numbers (van der Westhuizen, 2016:176). These results seem to offer a negative 
picture of the success or progress of reconciliation discourses within South African society.  
1.12.1. NARRATIVE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 
As established above, the creation of a narrative that understands the events of apartheid 
within a human rights framework, and the understanding of apartheid as mass violations of 
human rights, was central to the work of the TRC. As such, an assessment of the state of 
reconciliation, framed within the human rights narrative, will give helpful insight into the 
current state of South African reconciliation. The results noted above indicate a backwards 
trend in white respondents’ opinions when affirming the statement that apartheid was a 
“criminal dehumanisation of black people.” This is a worrying indication of the state of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and human rights abuses. For more on this project and to access the surveys, data and reports see: 
Afrobarometer, available online: http://www.afrobarometer.org/about [Accessed: 25/08/2017].  
13
 For more on this program and to access their reports see: South African Reconciliation Barometer Blog, 
available online at: https://reconciliationbarometer.org/ [accessed: 24 August 2017].  
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narrative, as established by the TRC, of apartheid as systematic, mass human rights abuses. 
Van der Westhuizen (2016:176) remarks that this is an indication that either these white 
people do not agree that apartheid was a human rights violation and a crime against 
humanity, or (perhaps and) these people believe that black people do not belong to humanity. 
Regardless of which option is applicable, the result, according to van der Westhuizen 
(2016:176), is that the humanity of all black people is called into question by many white 
respondents. Clearly, this is an alarming step backwards in terms of the TRC’s attempt to 
establish a narrative of human rights abuses as the base on which to begin reconciliation.  
In order to explore this issue in more depth, two specific instances of human rights violations, 
and the extent to which reconciliation has been achieved, will be examined. These are race or 
racial reconciliation, and poverty or economic reconciliation. According to the South African 
Bill of Rights,
14
 neither the state nor any individual person may discriminate against another 
on any grounds, including that of race, colour and culture (South African Government, 1996). 
As a result, any form of discrimination would be considered a violation of the South African 
Bill of Rights and a violation of an individual person’s human rights. However, this 
enshrining of human rights was only established post-apartheid and in reaction to the 
apartheid dispensation’s discriminatory policies. A cornerstone of the apartheid dispensation 
was its division and subsequent discrimination against people based on race. This 
discrimination took many forms, but was primarily racial and economic, leaving many people 
of colour
15
 disadvantaged (Hofmeyr & Govender, 2015:9; Crankshaw, 2016:86). As a result, 
the areas of historical human rights abuses, where reconciliation might be needed, are those 
of race and poverty.  
 
                                                          
14
 The Bill of Rights forms part of the South African Constitution which is considered one of the best in the 
world, largely because of the Bill of Rights included in it which enshrines human rights for all people. For more 
on this see Crush, J., 2000. The Dark Side of Democracy: Migration, Xenophobia and Human Rights in South 
Africa. In: The Human Rights of Migrants. Geneva: International Organization for Migration United 
Nations:103-134. 
 
15
 Apartheid policy divided people into categories such as white, coloured, Indian, and black. All race groups 
besides the ‘white’ category were treated discriminatorily, with those who qualified as ‘white’ being given 
economic, political and social preference. The level of discrimination varied somewhat based on colour 
grouping, with those in the ‘black’ or ‘African’ category being the recipients of the greatest disadvantage. Here 
the phrase ‘people of colour’ is being used to denote all those who did not fall into apartheid’s historically 
‘white’ category. Furthermore, I recognise that race is a social construct which has no meaning other than that 
which it is assigned by society (The Cambridge Companion of Sociology, 2006:490). However, the racial 
constructs of our South African past remain alive within South African society today, and as a result much of 
the research conducted in the country still takes these categories into account. I will thus make some use of these 
categories in my dissertation. 
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1.12.1.1. Racial Reconciliation 
The ending of apartheid saw the destruction of legislated racism, however, this did not cause 
the disappearance of segregation or the racism which caused it. As a result of decades of 
legislated racism, both the geography and patterns of lives in South Africa have been created, 
established and entrenched and now “legislation is no longer required to sustain apartheid” 
(SARB, 2015:9). It is this which the TRC’s program of reconciliation hoped to address. A 
brief survey of recent events as reported in the news or on social media will display many 
examples of racially motivated incidents; another such example can be found in the case 
where two white farmers forced a black man into a coffin, threatening to burn and kill him for 
allegedly stealing copper cable from them.
16
 Incidents such as this and those mentioned 
earlier in this chapter could lead to the conclusion that racial reconciliation in South Africa is 
at a new low since the end of apartheid, and future prospects seem dim. Nevertheless, 
empirical research such as that of the SARB will give a better indicator of the levels of racial 
reconciliation between South Africans. Gibson and Claasen (2010:260) remark that there is a 
relationship between racial prejudice and racial reconciliation in that the conditions necessary 
for reconciliation to occur are ones where prejudice is absent. As a result, they conceptualise 
racial reconciliation as being characterised by the willingness of all people to accept each 
other as equals deserving of the dignity and respect inherent in the South African human 
rights ideals.  
Furthermore, this reconciliation will be marked by the lessening of prejudice between 
historically divided groupings and an increase in intergroup contact and interaction (Gibson 
& Claasen, 2010:260). Racial reconciliation, as conceptualised and theorised by the TRC, 
would be accomplished through increasing intergroup contact. It was believed that contact 
with people from other groups would correct misconceptions and erode stereotypes, thus 
reducing prejudice and promoting reconciliation (Mangcu, 2016:106; Bishop, 2016:141 – 
142; Crankshaw, 2016:86). Understanding reconciliation in this manner was drawn from the 
work of Gordon Allport (1954), an American psychologist noted for his work on personality 
psychology as well as in areas of discrimination and prejudice. Working in the post-World 
War II era, he formulated a theory proposing that positive intergroup contact would reduce 
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 For more on this story see: Al Jazeera, 2017. White South African farmers guilty in 'coffin assault'. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/south-african-farmers-guilty-coffin-assault-
170825124016651.html [Accessed 26 08 2017]. 
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prejudice. Allport’s Contact Theory (1954)17 holds that prejudice can be reduced through 
positive intergroup contact so long as: 1) there was equal status between those interacting; 2) 
the groups shared common goals and were willing to cooperate with each other, and 3) there 
was support for the initiative from communities and authorities (Pettigrew, 1998:66; Mangcu, 
2016:106; Crankshaw, 2016:86). This theory was influential in the TRC’s formulation of 
racial reconciliation, where it was assumed that increased interracial contact would naturally 
lead to the dissolving of racial prejudice, which in turn would lead to the formation of closer 
relationships and racial reconciliation.  
The question that arises is whether and to what extent racial reconciliation has taken place 
between South Africans, as was hoped for by the TRC. The SARB (2015:9) reports that 61.4 
percent of South Africans believe that race relations have either remained the same or 
worsened since 1994. These results, when divided by race groups, show that white people 
reported the highest agreement (67%) and black people the lowest agreement (59.8%) with 
this statement. Furthermore, when asked about their trust for South Africans of other racial 
groupings, 67.3 percent of respondents expressed little to no trust for those of other groupings 
(SARB, 2015:15). When asked about their contact with other racial groupings, a total of 50 
percent of people said that they never had any contact in social gatherings, 52.6 percent said 
this in respect of communal gatherings and 53.9 percent for religious gatherings. These 
numbers were smaller for places of work or study (39.3%) and shops (31.7%), however 
52.7% of respondents reported never having contact with people from another race group in 
their homes. When the results are broken down according to race, black South Africans are 
the most likely grouping never to come into contact with those of other racial groupings 
(SARB, 2015:13).  
These results may be limited in that they are surveys of the opinions of South Africans, 
opinions which may be swayed by current mood, bias, recent bad experiences, anecdotes and 
other subjective experiences and perceptions. They are, nevertheless, a helpful indication of 
the levels of reconciliation experienced by ordinary South Africans. From these results, one 
can see that black people are the least likely group to experience great amounts of interracial 
contact. This, Crankshaw (2016:102) suggests, could be partly attributed to “different rates of 
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a simple scholarly search will turn up a multitude of articles on ‘Contact Theory.’ However, to read the original 
see:  Allport, G., 1954. The Nature of Prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
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urbanisation among the races,” where white, Indian and coloured people have experienced 
much faster rates of urbanisation, resulting in a higher likelihood of experiencing contact with 
people from other race groups. However, he also notes an increasing trend of urbanisation 
amongst black people. Thus, he contends that it is possible that with this urbanisation will 
come increasing intergroup contact for larger numbers of black people. Furthermore, with 
very high numbers of people reporting little to no contact with those of another race group, 
the place where the largest number of people experience interracial contact appears to be in 
places of work or study. However, with an unemployment rate of 27.7%,
18
 there is more than 
a quarter of the country’s population who, potentially, do not have access to this type of 
intergroup interaction. If large groups of people do not experience interracial reconciliation in 
areas of their lives such as religion or social contexts, and they are unemployed, then there 
are very few opportunities left for interracial contact to take place.  
It is also necessary to question the quality of the contact that is experienced in the workplace 
or place of study as opposed to in social or religious settings. As noted earlier, Allport’s 
theory posits that positive intergroup interaction can only occur in settings where those 
interacting are equals. However, in the workplace this is not always so. In interactions such as 
those between a boss and an employee, the interaction would not be an equal one, and as 
such, the statistics on contact alone are not enough. The quality and type of the interaction is 
equally important in breaking down barriers of prejudice and promoting racial reconciliation. 
This is possibly a contributing factor to the astonishingly high number of respondents who 
report not trusting those of other racial groupings. Although these results are worrying in that 
they remain so high, when compared to previous surveys taken on the same issues, scholars 
have identified a small improvement (Lefko-Everett, et al., 2016:18; Crankshaw, 2016:92; 
Mangcu, 2016:106).  
Therefore, while indicating a worrying outlook for reconciliation, these results also display a 
gradually increasing amount of interracial contact and a greater willingness of people from 
different races to talk to and interact with one another. For example, the 2004 SARB survey 
showed that only 23 percent of South Africans had social contact with people from other race 
groups, whereas the current number stands at 43 percent (Lefko-Everett, et al., 2016:18; 
Crankshaw, 2016:92; Mangcu, 2016:106). With more than 60 percent of South Africans 
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believing that the relationships between people of different races has either worsened or 
stagnated since the beginning of democracy, it would appear that racial reconciliation has 
generally not occurred amongst South Africans of different races. Furthermore, the fact that 
half of the population express distrust of people of other races would appear to point towards 
the persistence of interracial prejudice. However, if Allport’s theory of intergroup contact 
holds, then this is perhaps not all that surprising, given the high numbers of people who 
report never having contact with people of other races coupled with a lack of opportunities 
for equal intergroup contact.  
1.12.1.2. Economic Reconciliation 
Van der Westhuizen (2016:171) explains that one of the tools used by the apartheid regime to 
entrench racial inequality was that of actively disadvantaging black people. One form that 
this dispossession and disadvantage took was economic. Some examples include certain jobs 
being reserved for white people, causing economic disadvantage to non-white people, and 
access to education being divided by race, with better quality education reserved for those 
classified as white. The TRC (1998:109 volume 1) reflects this reality in their report, where 
they state that:  
Gross socio-economic inequalities are the visible legacy of the systematic, institutionalised 
denial of access to resources and development opportunities on grounds of colour, race and 
sex. But they are also the less tangible consequences of centuries of dehumanising 
devaluation of ‘non-Europeans’, ‘non-whites’ and ‘non-males.’ 
The result of such apartheid policies was the privileging of white people at the expense of 
black people. In this vein, Erasmus (2005:171) remarks that “apartheid race categories 
intersected with economic disadvantage to produce racialised patterns of inequality.” Policies 
which are designed to ensure the disadvantaging of people based on constructed race 
categories are patently discriminatory. This amounts to robbing people of their dignity, and is 
a direct violation of human rights as accorded to all people by the South African Constitution 
(South African Government, 1996:6, chapter 2). Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the 
current context of economic inequality and its resulting poverty was directly linked to 
apartheid policies and, as a result, this is an issue that requires some form reconciliation, 
namely economic reconciliation.  
The SARB (2015:7) report explains that there should be more to reconciliation than simply 
denoting a non-racial community, country or society. In this regard, the TRC (1998:109, 
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volume 1) remarks that central to the post-amble of the Constitution is that reconciliation 
must take place between those who are beneficiaries of past injustices and those whose 
disadvantage continues as a result of past injustices. Furthermore, a survey of current 
economic and poverty levels can indicate the level of economic reconciliation within South 
Africa. The TRC was limited in its ability to create this type of reconciliation. While the 
committee was tasked with compiling a report and making recommendations to the newly 
formed South African government on reparations to be paid to individual victims, they had 
no actual authority or resources of their own to make such reparations or to demand 
reparations be paid by others (Orr, 2000:242). A further concern for the committee was that 
the definition of a victim of apartheid atrocities who would qualify for reparations was 
restrictively narrow. The result of this was the “unavoidable fact that only a very small 
percentage of the ‘victims of apartheid’ would benefit from individual reparation” (Orr, 
2000:242). Reparations were intended as a means of compensation which would contribute 
towards the reconciliation project of the TRC. Therefore, while many people were 
disadvantaged by apartheid and deserving of reparations, a restrictively narrow definition of 
the term ‘victim’ resulted in very few people qualifying for any form of reparations.  
Furthermore, in its investigation of the continuing causes of divisions between South 
Africans, the SARB (2015:7) found that more than 60 percent of respondents felt that 
reconciliation would remain impossible so long as “those disadvantaged under apartheid 
remain poor.” These results differed by racial grouping, with 49 percent of white people and 
63 percent of black people agreeing that this was true. Finn et al. (2014) explain that poverty 
is conceptualised and measured in two ways. On the one hand, poverty is conceptualised in 
monetary terms, where the amount of money someone has in order to provide for their daily 
needs provides a measure of their wealth or poverty. The average wage for most South 
Africans is R2900, and has to be divided by an average of 3.8 family members resulting in an 
average wage per person per month of R763.16. This is alarming considering that the upper 
bound of the poverty line is R1077 per person per month. Therefore, the average South 
African is earning poverty wages (PACSA, 2017:2). These wages are too small for people to 
meet their basic needs for goods, and as a result, many South Africans, especially black South 
Africans, live in oppressive poverty.  
On the other hand, poverty can also be measured and conceptualised through access to basic 
services. In this measure, being able to afford and access municipal services such as refuse 
removal, running water and electricity are an indication of wealth, and the lack of access 
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indicates poverty (Finn, et al., 2014). To this end, the beginning of the new democratic order 
saw the South African government introducing policies and strategies that aimed to improve 
socio-economic conditions for its poorest citizens by addressing issues of access to basic 
services. They aimed to introduce free basic services (FBS) such as water, sanitation, 
electricity and refuse removal to indigent households (SERI, 2013:9).
19
 To this end, Statistics 
South Africa (2017 b:xiii) reports that there has been progress made in areas of service 
delivery. According to their most recent 2016 results, almost 90 percent of households have 
access to piped water and electricity, with just more than 60 percent using flush toilets and 
receiving refuse removal services (Statistics South Africa, 2017 b:xiii). This indicates that, by 
this measure, the average South African is not poor.  
However, these numbers are deceiving since they obscure a huge variance in the lived 
experience of many South Africans. For instance, access to running water does not 
necessarily mean that there is running water in each household. It could instead mean a tap 
within walking distance. In the same vein, access to sanitation does not always mean a flush 
toilet in the household, but can also include access to a public toilet within walking distance. 
Furthermore, these statistics do not show the variance between municipalities, where the level 
of service delivery and access to services is generally better in urban and wealthier 
municipalities, and poorer in rural, less wealthy areas (Statistics South Africa, 2017 b:xiii). 
Furthermore, through their research, SERI (2013:73) has found that there are many problems 
with the indigent services offered by local municipalities, ranging from problems with access 
to registering for services to being denied these services altogether. They remark that local 
governments “seem less concerned with ensuring the widest possible access to basic services 
for those who are in dire need” (SERI, 2013:73). This is reinforced by the Statistics South 
Africa (2017 b:xiii) survey measure which finds that 75 percent of South African households 
did not believe that their municipalities were active in tackling the issues they were most 
concerned about. As a result, even this measure of poverty indicates great levels of inequality 
and lack of access.  
The recent Afrobarometer survey measuring people’s opinions of economic and social gains 
since 1994 finds that only 37 percent of respondents believed that life had improved since the 
                                                          
19
 SERI is the Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa. It is a not-for-profit organisation that works 
with grassroots organisations such as community groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and social 
movements with the aim of improving the socio-economic rights and circumstances of South Africans. They 
work to implement strategies aimed at challenging inequality, as well as providing legal assistance and 
conducting surveys and research. They can be found at: http://www.seri-sa.org/   
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end of apartheid, 38 percent of people believed that life had become worse, and 24 percent 
believed it had remained the same. Only a very small 17 percent of respondents believed that 
there had been any improvement in the gap separating rich and poor (Lekalake, 2016:2). 
Some 29 percent of people believed that their living conditions had worsened since the end of 
apartheid. Furthermore, the experience of lived poverty is still largely divided according to 
racial lines, with white respondents reporting the lowest rates of deprivation (Lekalake, 
2016:1; 5). These low levels of lived poverty amongst white people are reflected in the 80 
percent of white respondents who reported never having experienced any shortage in basic 
necessities. This is in comparison to the 72 percent of black people who did report 
experiencing material deprivation (Lekalake, 2016:2). Nevertheless, while the Afrobarometer 
shows that the majority of South African people believed that they had better human rights 
and civil liberties since the end of apartheid, such as freedom of expression or the freedom to 
vote, only 52 percent of people believed that issues of equality showed an improvement, and 
an even smaller 39 percent believed that the standard of living of South Africans had 
improved (Lekalake, 2016:5).  This is reflected in the statistics on poverty released by 
Statistics South Africa, who have found that 30.4 million people – over half of the South 
African population – are living in poverty, with 13.8 million living in absolute poverty,20 and 
observing a Gini coefficient indicating a very large level of income inequality between South 
Africa’s richest and poorest people (Statistics South Africa, 2017). Therefore, by both the 
measures of finance and access to basic services, the majority of South Africans remain 
disenfranchised and live in poverty despite the end of the apartheid legislation which had a 
hand in causing this deprivation.  
From this, it is apparent that South Africa is still burdened with many socio-economic 
problems. The legacy of apartheid continues to live on in South Africa in the form of poverty 
and inequality, where this inequality is predominantly divided along racial lines. 
Furthermore, with a Gini coefficient of 0.69, where 0 indicates perfect equality and 1 
absolute inequality, South Africa displays one of the most unequal societies in the world 
(Potgieter, 2016:2). A further indicator of continuing socio-economic problems in South 
Africa is its very high unemployment levels of 27.7 percent (Statistics South Africa, 2017). 
These issues of poverty, inequality and unemployment (PUI) form an interlinking web of 
continuing oppression that help explain the continuing socio-economic problems plaguing 
South African society (Chibba & Luiz, 2011:308; PACSA, 2017:2; Finn, et al., 2014:1). This 
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 Statistics released 22 August 2017 based on the 2015 statistical survey. 
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framework highlights the interaction between poverty, unemployment and inequality, and the 
manner in which each feeds into, reinforces and sustains the others, creating a form of 
deprivation trap.
21
 South Africa’s attempts to combat these problems have involved the 
implementation of a series of national initiatives such as the Reconstruction and Development 
Program (RDP) and the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) framework, most 
of which do not appear to have shown any real results in reducing PUI issues (Chibba & 
Luiz, 2011:208-209). Furthermore, PACSA (2017:1) remarks that adding to these PUI 
problems are that 1) South Africa is not creating very many new jobs, 2) the jobs that there 
are pay poverty wages, which are not enough to assist in overcoming PUI issues, and 3) the 
country’s response to this has been to attempt the creation of more low wage paying jobs. In 
the South African context these problems are both structural, as a result of ineffectual policies 
and programs, and historical, due to apartheid’s methodological implementation of systematic 
oppression. From these results, it can be concluded that socio-economic class issues are more 
pressing than race issues in terms of where South Africa’s reconciliation process still needs 
work.  
However, Mancu (2016:107) explains that these issues form part of a greater issue of 
structural racism, where the structure of South African society is such that discrimination still 
occurs based largely on race, although the expression of this is seen in socio-economic terms. 
Van der Westhuizen (2016:172) argues that the issues of race and economics should not be 
viewed as separate but rather as a multidimensional and intertwined. She argues that it is not 
a debate between either race or class, but that the solution to beginning to deal adequately 
with these issues is to take an intersectional approach, one that recognises how these issues 
interact with and reinforce one another in ways that cause the dehumanisation of some. 
Furthermore, van der Westhuizen (2016:175) notes that the 2013 SARB results showed that 
the majority of South Africans agreed that there is a link between race and class, but that 
many people were not able to identify the link between reconciliation and socio-economic 
disadvantage. These results were dominated by “a majority of white South Africans [who] 
refute apartheid’s socioeconomic legacy and its particular racial dimension, whether applied 
to white profit or black deprivation” (van der Westhuizen, 2016:175). From these results she 
concludes that there is white resistance to economic rectification and reconciliation for the 
                                                          
21
 The term “deprivation trap” was first developed by R. Chambers in 1983 and can be found in Rural 
Development: Putting the Last First, published by Longman, London. It is characterised by “the isolation in 
which communities find themselves. This isolation is reinforced by poverty, physical weakness, powerlessness 
and vulnerability” (de Beer & Marais, 2005:54).  
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socio-economic damage done by apartheid.  However, van der Westhuizen (2016:188) also 
notes that the only way to forward an agenda of transformation and reconciliation is to 
acknowledge and rectify the material base upon which apartheid was built. A denial of this, 
ultimately, is to continue to reinforce the remnants of apartheid and deny the humanity of 
black people.   
1.13. CLOSING: RECONCILIATION AS A CATCH ALL PHRASE 
 
The idea of reconciliation was one that captured the imagination of South Africans in the 
early 1990’s with the dawning of the new democratic order and the formation of the TRC. 
However, over two decades have passed, South Africa’s democracy is no longer so new, and 
the TRC has wrapped up its proceedings and published its reports. The TRC was tasked with 
promoting reconciliation between South Africans through the exposure of the truth of the 
country’s apartheid past. It was believed that this truth would have a cathartic effect, on both 
a national and an individual level, which would promote reconciliation. While the TRC never 
provided conceptual clarity on how they defined and understood reconciliation, they did hope 
that reconciliation could take place between individuals, between communities and 
nationally. The closing of the TRC, and the subsequent publishing of its findings, may have 
left the impression that the work of reconciliation was complete.  
 
However, any brief survey of South African society will produce numerous incidents of 
racially-motivated clashes which point towards continuing issues with reconciliation. In order 
to begin to understand in what way #FeesMustFall could be expressing a call for decolonised 
reconciliation in South Africa, it is necessary to first understand what reconciliation within 
the current South African context is. As a result, this chapter has explored both the past and 
present discourses surrounding reconciliation in an attempt to understand in what ways 
reconciliation is still an active and useful discourse within the current South African context. 
This chapter explored some of the ways in which the TRC functioned, concentrating 
specifically on the ways in which it created a discourse that recognised apartheid as creating 
conditions for human rights abuses, and demonstrating the TRC’s creation of a form of 
national collective memory of the past. These both functioned positively in the creation of 
reconciliation, despite there being some criticism levelled at each process. Nevertheless, this 
work was accomplished in the past, and does not answer the question of the present state of 
reconciliation within South Africa.   
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In order to begin answering this question, this chapter concentrated on the narrative of human 
rights and reconciliation, as already established by the TRC, using current research survey 
data from the South African Reconciliation Barometer. The chapter concentrated on two 
specific human rights issues, namely racial and economic inequality. Racial reconciliation, 
the TRC believed, would be achieved through positive intergroup contact. This would lead to 
positive interactions which, in turn, would cause the easing of prejudice and, in time, 
reconciliation. However, key findings from the SARB show that this has not yet happened. 
These findings show that a majority of South Africans believe that race relations have not 
improved since apartheid ended. They also show that many of South Africa’s citizens do not 
trust people of other races. This is worrying, since distrust of other racial groupings indicates 
the continued existence of racial prejudice. This ultimately suggests that, while some small 
gains in racial reconciliation are evident, it has in fact not taken root within South African 
society as deeply as could have been hoped.  
 
The second human rights issue, that of socio-economic reconciliation, was not directly within 
the control of the TRC, who were tasked with making recommendations on reparations, but 
who had no actual power to award such reparations. However, economic reconciliation is of 
vital importance, since key to the maintenance of the apartheid regime was the control and 
oppression of people through economic deprivation. Key findings of this chapter were that 
issues of poverty, inequality and unemployment are still rife within South African society and 
interact with and reinforce one another. While most people acknowledge that reconciliation 
remains impossible so long as those economically disadvantaged due to apartheid remain so, 
the lived reality of the majority of South Africans shows that the poverty gap remains 
worryingly large. The issues of both racial reconciliation and economic reconciliation are of 
equal importance in the South African reconciliation landscape, and both show large gaps in 
their progress towards reconciliation. 
 
Key findings of this chapter are that in both areas of race and economics, the South African 
landscape shows that more reconciliation is needed. Furthermore, Moon (2006:260) remarks 
that structural violence, such as that which causes people to be exploited, was integral to 
apartheid’s maintenance. As a result, it was arguably more damaging and widespread than 
some of the politically-motivated abuses. However, this chapter has shown that this was not 
recognised within the TRC’s process of reconciliation. Due to this, the TRC appears to have 
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focussed more on reconciliation between individuals and the individuals that comprise 
communities. This chapter has shown that the results of apartheid systems and policy have 
been systemic injustices which have resulted in poverty and inequality, and that is marked 
particularly along race lines. However, reconciliation efforts have not focussed on apartheid’s 
legacy in relation to structural injustices. This is an area where more work is needed.  
Both issues of race and socio-economics do not exist on their own or in a vacuum, but rather 
are intertwined and affect one another. As a result, they should be treated as intersectional in 
order to address reconciliation of both race and socio-economics. Doxtader and du Toit 
(2010:ix) remark that  
The question of reconciliation is persistent. It is a question that we have in common, a shared 
question that must be posed and posed again if we are to come to a fuller understanding of 
who we have been, what we are, and what we hope to become – together. 
In posing and reposing this question, it is perhaps time to ask whether the reconciliation of 
the TRC is still useful to the current South African context. The research and results of this 
chapter suggest that the reconciliation of the TRC has not worked as well as was hoped, or 
perhaps it has done as it was intended by laying a foundation on which to build future 
reconciliation efforts, but that much more work is still required. Nevertheless, it is evidently 
necessary to begin to explore new forms of reconciliation which might further the 
reconciliation work begun by the TRC.   
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CHAPTER 2 
Decolonisation: What Does It Mean? 
 
“The colonial state did not set out to develop Africa or to create economically 
independent and self-reliant nations. European powers did not invest in the conquest 
to lose money. They were also too racist to accord respect and recognition to positive 
values among their subjects. Their black successors were not racist, although they, 
too never put true development in their agenda. Paramount on the agenda of the 
colonial state was the maintenance of law and order. The conquest of Africa was an 
act of violence; to retain power, force was necessary to subdue Africans and pursue 
the narrow economic agenda of the state. The postcolonial state has continued this 
legacy, also relying on the use of violence to keep power, lacking legitimacy and 
credibility, the colonial and postcolonial state justify power and control by force” 
(Falola, 2005:9) 
 
“Viewed from outside of the transitional justice perspective, the problems of South 
Africa and Rwanda are in fact colonial problems. Both countries emerged from 
histories of foreign subjugation, which was transferred to local minorities through 
whom subjection could continue. South Africa became a settler colony under white 
minority rule” (Pillay, 2016:64) 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
It is impossible to fully assess the success of the TRC in post-apartheid South Africa without 
having explored some of the context in which both apartheid and the TRC took place. The 
contemporary history of South Africa, like the majority of Africa, is dominated by the impact 
of colonisation. The process of imperial rule imposed by an outside force, most often from 
Europe, left a marked impact on both South Africa and all other colonised nations. Inevitably, 
colonial rule came to an end, resulting in a process of decolonisation. However, while 
marking the end of outside occupation, decolonisation did not result in the ending of colonial 
systems which constructed and defined the worlds of the colonised. This legacy has been 
referred to as coloniality. These are systems which have continued to enact the colonial 
legacy through an interlinking matrix involving power structures, constructions of being and 
systems of knowledge. The three interlinking systems are the coloniality of power, the 
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coloniality of being and the coloniality of knowledge. The coloniality of power functions 
through control of the political and economic world of the formerly colonised. It constructs 
hierarchies which ascribe prominence to Western systems of governance and economy in 
ways which ensure that the formerly colonised remain oppressed and disadvantaged. The 
second system, the coloniality of being, relies on the already created hierarchies of power to 
enforce the systematised racialisation of people. In so doing it classifies people according to a 
binary where white people are accorded humanity, dignity and civility, and black people are 
constructed as primitive, unhuman and not deserving of dignity.  
Furthermore, this binary system is extended to gender, where the male is given supremacy to 
the female and the heterosexual western understanding of the family structure is privileged 
above all others. The result is that the coloniality of being ascribes humanity to Western, 
European, patriarchal whiteness while disparaging all other ways of being. The third system 
of the matrix of coloniality, the coloniality of knowledge, draws on the previous two systems, 
extending the constructions of systematised hierarchy and binary divisions. It does so by 
privileging Western ways of thinking and knowledge as well as Western epistemologies. Not 
only is Western knowledge considered superior to indigenous knowledges, but Western 
methodologies construct themselves as being natural, rational and unbiased. This is in 
contrast to the portrayal of indigenous knowledge systems as subjective, biased and irrational. 
These three forms of coloniality function together, sustaining and reinforcing one another. 
The result is a global system that privileges and values all things European while denigrating 
all that is not. The ending of colonisation did not end the systems of oppression developed by 
the colonisers. These systems of coloniality continue to function within postcolonial, post-
apartheid South Africa, oppressing black people.   
2.2. DEFINITIONS 
2.2.1. Colonialism 
In order to begin to understand contemporary South Africa, and indeed Africa in general, it is 
necessary to first examine the history that has created the country as we know it today. This 
requires one to examine South Africa’s colonial past and the way in which it has impacted, 
and continues to impact, the landscape and discourses of South Africa. That is not to say that 
the history of South Africa only began with colonisation; indeed, the history of the country is 
far broader than this. However, an extended history falls outside of the scope of this 
dissertation. Furthermore, the aim of this chapter is not to account for the history of 
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colonialism in Africa or South Africa, but rather to examine what colonialism is and the ways 
in which it functions. Colonialism should not be confused with imperialism. Both 
colonisation and imperialism are marked by the invasion, conquering and occupation of a 
territory by an external force (The Cambridge Companion of Sociology, 2006:79). However, 
the hallmark of imperialism, as evinced with the ancient Roman Empire, is seen in the 
extending of citizenship to the people of the conquered territories. Colonisation, on the other 
hand, is most often marked by an inequality between the conquered and the conqueror, 
“resulting in a basic dependency of the colony on the metropolitan power” (The Cambridge 
Companion of Sociology, 2006:79). The process of colonisation in Africa is one that became 
distinct in the eighteenth century and beyond, specifically with the post-1885 scramble for the 
continent by European countries such as England, France, Germany and Portugal (Falola, 
2005:4; Mignolo, 2002:61; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:13). This invasion and conquest led to the 
occupation of territory by the coloniser who then governed, in both the administrative and 
military capacities, their subjects without consulting those they were governing.  
 
The process of governing brought with it the implementation of the systems of governance of 
the Western coloniser, such as capitalism and Western epistemology, in the guise of bringing 
civilisation and promoting development (Mignolo, 2002:59). Furthermore, the result of 
Western colonisation was the creation of colonial countries which were established solely for 
the benefit of the colonising power. These powers did not create colonial countries with the 
intention that they should be in any way independent or self-reliant. Instead, these new 
conquests were turned into assets to benefit the conquering power. The natural and human 
resources of these countries was leveraged and exploited to benefit the colonial powers 
(Quijano, 2010:22; Falola, 2005:9; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:13). Thus, colonialism was a 
process of domination by Western countries over others like Africa and Latin America. It 
involved the establishment and implementation of political, cultural and social systems to 
enforce this domination. Implicit within colonialism was an ideology of superiority, which 
saw the colonising force as superior and constructed the victims of colonisation as inferior 
and “other.”  
 
The idea of colonialism can be further expanded by understanding that it can be divided into 
three forms, namely internal colonialism, external colonialism and Settler colonialism (Tuck 
& Yang, 2012:4; Grosfoguel, 2011:14). External colonialism, sometimes called exploitation 
or exogenous colonisation, is where parts of the colonised world are expropriated and 
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exported back to the world of the coloniser with the express intention of creating and 
supplementing the wealth of the colonising force. These extracted fragments include animals, 
human beings and plants, with examples such as the slave trade, tea, spices, opium, tobacco 
or diamonds. The expropriated fragments served to feed the appetites of the colonisers at the 
expense of the colonised. All things that belong to the colonised world are redefined as 
natural resources to be used for the benefit of the coloniser, even the lives and bodies of the 
colonised people. Furthermore, this form of colonialism often requires “a subset of activities 
properly called military colonialism” (Tuck & Yang, 2012:4). Here colonialism uses the 
military complex – the creation of war, enemies to be united against, resources for the 
creation of war and bodies to fight – to further its colonial project. Internal colonialism, by 
contrast, is concerned with the management of the land, people and plants within the 
colonising nation in order to ensure the superiority of the nation and its elite. This is 
accomplished through the use of various modes aimed at control such as policing, ghettos, 
prisons and schooling. Further measures used are the divesting and dislocation of people, 
forcing the non-elite to the periphery through measures such as segregation and surveillance, 
and the criminalising of ‘undesirable’ activities on both social and structural levels (Tuck & 
Yang, 2012:4 - 5).  
 
The third form of colonialism, Settler colonialism, operates as a combination of the first two 
forms. It uses the elements of both internal and external colonialism in order to accomplish its 
goals. The reason for this combination is the small separation between the colony and the 
metropole. Here the colonised land is settled by colonisers who are also settlers planning on 
living on the land and making it their new homes. This process is one that insists on the 
sovereignty of the settler, and requires the full appropriation of the colonised world in order 
to ensure and sustain this authority. Instead of the expropriation of select resources for export, 
like diamonds or tea, this form of colonialism aims at total expropriation of all aspects of the 
colonised world. Central to this expropriation is the aspect of land, including water, air, 
ground level land and subterranean earth. This is seen by settler colonialism as the most 
valuable aspect, firstly because the settlers themselves need land to make their new home, 
and secondly because the land is a source of new wealth.  
 
Furthermore, separating the colonised people from their land, and thus their sources of life 
and livelihood, serves to disenfranchise them, allowing the coloniser greater control over all 
aspects of the colonised people and their world (Tuck & Yang, 2012:5). Like external 
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colonialism, all aspects of the colonised world are viewed as resources for the benefit of the 
settler-coloniser. This includes the bodies and the lives of the colonised people. However, in 
order to fully expropriate this, the colonising powers need to make use of the mechanisms of 
control used by internal colonialism, such as forced labour and legislated disenfranchisement, 
in order to gain control over the indigenous people of the land (Tuck & Yang, 2012:6). This 
is the form of colonisation experienced in South Africa, where the indigenous people of the 
country were disenfranchised from their land by the white European settlers who saw 
themselves as superior and on a “civilising” mission. All three forms of colonisation have in 
common the creation of a narrative that positions the coloniser as superior to the colonised, 
with the coloniser’s identity closely tied to the idea of themselves as bringing civilisation and 
modernity to the colonised world.  Commenting on this construction of identity, Tuck and 
Yang (2012:6) remark that “the settler positions himself as both superior and normal; the 
settler is natural, whereas the Indigenous inhabitant and the chattel slave are unnatural, even 
supernatural.” This sentiment is echoed in the work of Fanon who notes that within the 
colonial framework there are two positions, the European who is superior and the African 
who is inferior (Fanon, 1964:21). As a result, colonialism has three forms, each functioning 
differently, and all forms share a common view of the world that seeks to establish and 
impose a binary relationship of superiority and inferiority on the colonised people, oppressing 
them and using all that has been colonised for the benefit and enrichment of the coloniser.  
 
2.2.2. Decolonisation 
A second term frequently found within the discourse of colonisation is that of decolonisation. 
The term is one that is directly linked to colonisation and comes about as a result of the end 
of colonisation. It is used to denote the “withdrawal of direct colonialism from the colonies as 
well as the struggles ranged against those empires that were reluctant to do so” (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2013:20). It denotes a historical process that took place throughout the 1900’s with 
South Africa being the last country to fully decolonise in 1994.
22
 This process of 
decolonisation is further complicated when the form of colonialism is that of settler 
colonialism, such as in South Africa, where there is very little distance between the colony, 
the settler and the colonising force (Tuck & Yang, 2012:7). Here, the relationship and the 
process of decolonisation is fraught with difficulty, because unlike external colonisation 
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 South Africa achieved independence from Britain in 1961; however, with the continued white occupation and 
the institutionalisation of racial inequality in the form of apartheid, South Africa only experienced true 
decolonisation with the end of apartheid in 1994 (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:20). 
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where the process of decolonisation would involve a withdrawal of the external colonial 
force, settler colonialism involves both an external force and an occupying force. In some 
instances, this settler force has occupied the colonised world for many generations, and as a 
result may not want to leave the colony with the withdrawal of the external colonial force. In 
this context, decolonisation cannot merely be the withdrawal of outside colonial forces. It 
must instead involve the restoration of that which was stolen, including land. This process 
needs to take place on more than merely a symbolic level, and it needs to include all people, 
both settlers and the colonised (Tuck & Yang, 2012:7). As a result, decolonisation, while at 
its most simple refers to the withdrawal of colonial forces from the colonised world, is in 
reality a much more complex process fraught with difficulty. 
 
When defining and understanding the concept of decolonisation, Tuck and Yang (2012:2) 
note with concern that more recently, the meaning of decolonisation has been co-opted and 
turned into a metaphor for many other social justice projects. They note a trend showing the 
introduction of decolonisation into areas of education, social sciences and social justice, 
supplanting other perspectives and narratives “of talking about social justice, critical 
methodologies, or approaches which decenter settler perspectives” (Tuck & Yang, 2012:2). 
However, they note that the idea of decolonising should never be used as a metaphor for 
anything other than that which it is. They argue that decolonisation is an idea that is distinct, 
representing a specific process and set of ideals. Furthermore, using it as a metaphor to 
represent the correcting of all manner of social ills causes decolonisation to be subsumed into 
other projects, regardless of whether these are part of the goals and directives of the process 
of decolonisation. However, when decolonisation is turned into a metaphor to represent an 
umbrella of social ills, it becomes “an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards 
liberation” (Tuck & Yang, 2012:7). This strips decolonisation of its reality and meaning, and 
removes the possibility of any actual decolonisation. Therefore, in order for decolonisation to 
be properly understood, it needs to be seen as a historical process involving the systematic 
removal of the ruling colonial powers from their colonies. This freeing of colonies from the 
dictates of external empire is not synonymous with any other projects aiming to fix other 
social ills. These projects might share some aims, but the use and understanding of 
decolonisation should be independent of the temptation to use it as a metaphor for the 
correction of any other social ills. 
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     2.2.3. Coloniality 
The third, and arguably most important, term found within colonisation narratives is that of 
‘coloniality’. Coloniality refers to “the continuity of colonial forms of domination after the 
end of colonial administrations, produced by colonial cultures and structures in the 
modern/colonial capitalist world-system” (Grosfoguel, 2011:13). Furthermore, Arturo 
Escobar (2007:219) explains that the concept of coloniality is one that includes colonialism 
but goes beyond it to include the post-colonial. Coloniality argues that the idea that the world 
has now been decolonised is a myth. Based on the technical definition that decolonisation is 
the removal of colonial power from the colonised territories, decolonisation has come to an 
end. However, coloniality highlights the manner in which the narrative of decolonisation 
serves to obscure the continuing colonial legacy that remains functioning within the world 
today. The belief that decolonisation is an event that is past, that has already happened, 
implies that it is an event that has been concluded after the withdrawal of colonial forces and 
the establishing of colonies as independent nations. However, simply establishing 
independent nations did not necessarily result in the end of the systems which maintained 
colonial power, such as systems of governance, knowledge production and economics 
(Grosfoguel, 2010:74; Quijano, 2010:22; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:11). The belief that 
decolonisation is a historical process, one that is complete, creates a narrative of a post-
colonial world that renders the continuing functioning of these systems invisible. As a result, 
the discourse of coloniality argues that the colonial influence did not end with decolonisation 
but continues within the post-colonial world and is sustained and protected by the myth of 
decolonisation. 
 
However, coloniality should not be confused with colonisation or colonialism. As established 
above, colonialism refers to a historical process of occupation of a foreign territory for the 
profit of the occupiers. It was a political and economic system which held one nation and its 
people as superior to another. Colonisation ended with decolonisation and the independence 
of colonial states. Coloniality on the other hand, denotes long established models of power 
whose legacy is colonisation, but which continue to function within societies today. These 
entrenched patterns and structures continue to shape and define the culture of politics, labour, 
economics and social interaction of the formerly colonised nations. In its construction, it 
continues to reinforce hierarchical structures which treat some as superior to others, codifying 
superiority and inferiority, acceptability and non-acceptability, civilisation and savagery, 
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intellect and non-intellect (Walsh, 2010:83; Maldonado-Torres, 2010:97; Dreyer, 2017:2; 
Hadebe, 2017:6).  
 
Furthermore, coloniality does not simply refer to the remnants of colonisation. Rather, while 
it includes this, it extends to current forms of power such as capitalism and globalisation, 
which continue to support and reinforce the remnants of colonial power structures 
(Maldonado-Torres, On the Coloniality of Being, 2010:97). As a result, scholars such as 
Mignolo (2002:60), Quijano (2010:22) and Grosfoguel (2011:13) argue that coloniality is as 
linked with colonisation as it is with the emergence of discourses of modernity and 
globalisation. They argue that modernity emerged after the Second World War, along with 
the emergence of the myth of post-colonialism. It emerged as a “relation of direct, political, 
social and cultural domination [which] was established by the Europeans over the conquered 
of all continents” (Quijano, 2010:22). Modernity was constructed such that Western, 
Eurocentric forms of knowledge, governance and power are given dominance as examples of 
modern progress. In contrast, other forms of knowledge and systems of governance and 
politics are denigrated as inferior and “backwards.” This Eurocentric view, emphasising and 
reinforcing Western dominance, merely builds onto the power structures established during 
colonisation, reimagining them and giving them new form (Escobar, 2007:217; Quijano, 
2010:22; Mignolo, 2010:9; Grosfoguel, 2011:13). While modernity is often presented as the 
means by which economic or political freedom might be reached, in reality this discourse 
hides its true oppressive nature. As a result, it needs to be understood that “modernity, 
capitalism and coloniality are aspects of the same package of control of economy and 
authority” (Mignolo, 2010:9). Thus, coloniality should not be confused with colonialism. 
Rather, coloniality should be understood to be highlighting the myth of decolonisation, 
allowing us to see the continued functioning of colonial structures of power. Furthermore, it 
highlights the manner in which newer forms of power such as modernity and globalisation 
continue to build on and sustain a colonial matrix of power, continuing to enforce the colonial 
legacy of Eurocentrism and Western dominance within the world.  
 
2.2.4. Decoloniality 
With the emergence of the discourse of coloniality has emerged a parallel and complimentary 
discourse of decoloniality. This fourth term adds to the discourse on colonisation, 
supplementing and expanding it. At its most simple, like decolonisation speaks of the ending 
of colonisation, decoloniality deals with the ending of coloniality. Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
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(2013:12-13) explains that decoloniality emerges because of coloniality and its dehumanising 
of the colonised people. However, Mignolo (2010:11) remarks that coloniality should not be 
seen as either a theory or a model to be understood. As a result, the process of decoloniality 
cannot be seen as a new area of study. Instead, decoloniality should be understood as a 
completely new way of thinking. It is not a set of new interpretive lenses that can be used but 
rather “an other thinking grounded in border epistemology rather than in Greek philosophy” 
(Mignolo, 2010:11). The first step in the decolonial process involves understanding the 
history of the colonised and the role of colonisation, and later coloniality, in the construction 
and maintenance of power. Furthermore, decoloniality is about exposing these power 
structures and the ways in which they function. It is about “making visible the invisible and 
about analysing the mechanisms that produce such invisibility or distorted visibility in light 
of a large stock of ideas that must necessarily include the critical reflection of the ‘invisible’ 
people themselves” (Maldonado-Torres, 2010:116). Decoloniality is not a united school of 
thought, but rather is a related grouping of ideas that is concerned with the interruption of 
colonial power through the deconstruction of coloniality (Mignolo, 2010:11; Maldonado-
Torres, 2010:116; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:13). This decoloniality is concerned with 
transforming the way in which modernity is constituted by uncoupling the interlinking 
structures of power and interrogating them with a view to their transformation. This, Karkov 
and Robbins (2013:4) note, is key to decolonial processes in their attempt to create a 
“counter-genealogy of thought” to counteract the consistent privileging of coloniality as the 
foundation of modern life.  
 
2.3. SYSTEMS OF COLONIALITY 
2.3.1. Coloniality of Power 
Central to understanding coloniality is understanding what the Peruvian sociologist, Anibal 
Quijano, calls ‘coloniality of power’ or the ‘colonial matrix of power.’ First coined by 
Quijano in the early 90’s and developed over the next decade, coloniality of power describes 
the functioning of coloniality as a series of inter-relating systems that work together to form a 
matrix of power which sustains itself (Mignolo, 2010:3). Coloniality of power can be 
understood as working primarily in three different systems. The first is a system of hierarchy. 
Here the coloniality of power functions by creating a system of hierarchy that places some 
people above others. This is done through social classification in the form of race and racial 
classification as well as through labour and the stratification of the labour market. This, 
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Quijano (2010:25) remarks, is a shift from the colonial classification of people as colonised 
and coloniser. Instead classification shifted to one of biological stratification of inferior and 
superior, where white, Western and European were the superior traits. This system of 
hierarchical classification was further refined with the globalisation of coloniality to include 
categories beyond merely black and white. This racialised classification system was then 
imposed onto the economy and the labour market (Quijano, 2000:536; Mignolo, 2001:434; 
Quijano, 2010:25; Walsh, 2010:83). The division of labour created a system where certain 
types of labour were seen as better suited to certain racial groupings. The labour system was 
initially instituted where black people could trade labour for reciprocity, thus reducing the 
black populations to the status of serfdom. On the other hand the status of paid labour was 
reserved for white Europeans. Those who were neither European nor black, such as Chinese 
or Indian people, were classified as lying somewhere between the two, being allowed some 
form of benefits such as some paid labour, but were never afforded the same status or 
benefits as white, Western, European people. As a result, certain forms of labour became 
associated with certain groupings of people. This was done in such a way that “both race and 
the division of labor remained structurally linked and mutually reinforcing, in spite of the fact 
that neither of them were necessarily dependent on the other in order to exist or change” 
(Quijano, 2000:536). Consequently, control of certain forms of labour could result in control 
of the associated grouping of people.  
 
The system of labour control extended to all areas of labour, and included control of 
production and distribution of products that were intentionally created in order to create 
commodities for the global market to the benefit of Europeans (Quijano, 2000:535). The 
control of labour privileged white Europeans at the expense of all others, giving white people 
a clear advantage in accessing and controlling the global economy. Contributing to this 
advantage was the monetisation of labour which “made it possible to concentrate the control 
of commercial capital, labor, and means of production in the whole world market” (Quijano, 
2000:537). This control of labour, coupled with the privileging of Europe, resulted in the 
constitution of a global model of control in the form of modernity and the modern economic 
system of global capitalism (Quijano, 2000:535-536). The global economic system is one 
whose axis remains fundamentally colonial in nature, having originated in Europe both 
socially and geographically, and remaining in the control of European power (Quijano, 
2000:539; Grosfoguel, 2010:69). In commenting on the creation and functioning of the global 
capitalist system, Escobar (2007:214) remarks that a new empire was created. This empire 
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functioned through the imposition of norms such as monetised labour, a free-market economy 
and Western-style democracy. As a result, this new empire, instead of being based on 
physical occupation and domination, functions through economic domination. Thus, key to 
the coloniality of power is the creation of a system of hierarchies, most prominently racial 
stratification, and the control of labour through its systematic classification and assigning of 
certain categories of work to certain races of people. This control of labour and the labour 
market resulted in the creation of a global system of economics in the form of capitalism. 
Capitalism is reliant on these systems of hierarchies for the maintenance of European power 
and control, and at the same time perpetuates and sustains these systems of power inherent in 
coloniality.  
 
The second system functioning within the coloniality of power is that of systems of culture. 
The system of culture functions in two ways. The first is a construction of cultural hierarchy 
that functions similarly to the hierarchical construction of race. This constructs Western 
culture as the superior culture, including its patriarchal gender constructions, Western science 
and reason, capitalist economic structures and Christo-centric ideals, while situating the 
cultures of the formerly colonised as inferior (Quijano, 2010:23). Western cultural 
constructions include a sexual hierarchy which privileges male over female and heterosexual 
people over homosexual or bisexual people. Furthermore, it privileges Christian religious 
ideals over non-Christian ones. This is done by centring European cultures and ideals, and 
placing these as the norm by which modernity should be judged (Grosfoguel, 2010:70-71). 
Not only is there a subordination of the cultures of the formerly-colonised peoples, but also a 
systematic destruction of these cultures. Quijano (2010:24) remarks that in Africa, this 
cultural destruction was more extensive than in other places. In reflecting on this, Fanon 
(1964:31) writes that “the enterprise of deculturation turns out to be the negative of a more 
gigantic work of economic, and even biological, enslavement. The doctrine of cultural 
hierarchy is thus but one aspect of a systematized hierarchization implacably pursued.” 
Within this system, Western culture is presented as the only truly modern culture, while all 
others are viewed as lacking in modernity or even being anti-modern. What this has done is 
to rob non-European cultures of their authority and legitimacy within global discourses 
dominated by Eurocentric cultural patterns (Quijano, 2010:24). This Eurocentric system of 
culture resulted in a system of cultural colonisation and domination.  
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The third system is that of knowledge. Mignolo (2002:59) remarks that along with Western 
capitalism came Western epistemology, including systems of thought such as theories of 
governance and systems of reasoning such as Western philosophy. Quijano (2000:547) 
argues that with the centring of culture within the West, Europe was constructed as the 
hegemonic centre of the world as well as the place where intellectual knowledge is produced. 
He argues that the construction of modernity has also produced a particular system of 
knowledge and mode of knowledge production which prioritises colonial, capitalist and 
Eurocentric forms of thought. This he calls Eurocentrism (Quijano, 2000:549). He writes that 
this term is used for a particular framing and understanding of what constitutes knowledge 
and how this knowledge should be taught. Furthermore, “its constitution was associated with 
the specific bourgeois secularization of European thought and with the experiences and 
necessities of the global model of capitalist (colonial/modern) and Eurocentered power 
established since the colonization of America” (Quijano, 2000:549). As a result, it is no 
accident that the criticisms of these forms of thought, and indeed the development of the 
concept of the coloniality of power itself, has emerged out of spaces on the periphery of 
Eurocentrism (Grosfoguel, 2010:71). The Eurocentric system of knowledge functions by 
intertwining with and drawing on both the system of hierarchy and the system of culture to 
create the current system of control we understand today as the coloniality of power.  
 
2.4. OTHER COLONIALITIES  
Out of the work of Quijano (2000) and his development of the coloniality of power, two other 
conceptions of coloniality have emerged: the coloniality of being and the coloniality of 
knowledge. These both draw on and complement the functioning of the coloniality of power, 
together maintaining historical colonial structures and power. In order to contextualise further 
exploration of both these concepts, it is helpful to have some understanding of Descartes’s 
ontological reasoning captured in the phrase “Cogito ergo sum” (Descartes, 1986). Here 
Descartes defines and proves self and existence by arguing that “I think, therefore I am.” This 
argument defines the self not through existence of bodily knowledge but rather through the 
ability to think and reason (Blackburn, 1999:19). In this formulation, the emphasis is placed 
on the action of thinking – it is because I think that I know that I exist. However, Maldonado-
Torres (2010:106) explains that the critique of Descartes by Heidegger is helpful in 
understanding the essence of coloniality. Heidegger (1962:44) argues that the focus of 
Descartes, and the modern Western philosophy that followed him, was on the ‘ego cogito,’ or 
the act of thinking. However, Heidegger suggests that the more important part of this is not 
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the ‘I think’ but the ‘I am.’ When placing the emphasis on the ‘I am,’ the question of being is 
highlighted. Commenting on this, Ndlovu-Gatsheni remarks:  
In the first place, is the fact that historically modernity promised civilisation that was founded 
on the Cartesian notion of ‘I think, therefore, I am,’ which for Africa and other parts of the 
colonised world, mutated into ‘I conquer, therefore, I am’, which was used to justify 
mercantilism, the slave trade, imperialism, colonialism and other dangerous ‘isms.’ (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2013:12) 
However, Maldonado-Torres (2010:106) argues that what both of these ontological positions 
fail to highlight is the unacknowledged dimension of the Cartesian formulation. He argues 
that the ‘I think’ of the formulation implies the idea that there are others who do not think or 
who do not think properly. Furthermore, ‘I am,’ by implication, denotes a category of others 
who are not, who are less than or who are disposable or without being. As a result, “the 
Cartesian formulation privileges epistemology, which simultaneously hides both what could 
be regarded as the coloniality of knowledge (others do not think) and the coloniality of Being 
(others are not)” (Maldonado-Torres, 2010:106).  
 
2.4.1. Coloniality of Being  
Maldonado-Torres (2010:96) explains that the concept of the coloniality of being emerged 
out of a need to express the effect of coloniality on the lived experience of the colonised. The 
coloniality of being deals with the idea of being and how ideas of being, and by implication 
non-being, are constructed and maintained. Wynter (2003:263) explains that the construction 
of the idea of man, which began during the Renaissance and continued through to the colonial 
area, has played a pivotal role in the emergence of the coloniality of being. She explains that 
during the Renaissance period, a shift in the conception of humanity took place. Conceptions 
that shaped humanity by seeing the world through lenses of mortal and immortal, natural and 
supernatural, human and the ancestors, as well as gods and God, underwent a secularising 
shift. Constructions of humanity and what it meant to be human were now influenced by the 
idea of humanity as individual political citizens of state (Wynter, 2003:263-264).  
Constructions of humanity shifted from being centred round the relationship between 
humanity and God/ the supernatural – a theological orientation – to constructing humanity 
within the boundaries of politics – a secular orientation. With this shift emerged a 
construction of humanity based on the categorisation of differences between people. The 
effect of this classification that created the idea of humanity being, was the simultaneous 
creation of who was not human or who classified as non-being (Wynter, 2003:264). This 
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construction of ‘being’ contributed to the creation of the ideas of coloniser and colonised. In 
this construction, the coloniser is endowed with the properties of humanity and ‘being’ while 
the colonised becomes the non-being (Quijano, 2000:535).  
 
This Maldonado-Torres (2010) calls the coloniality of being, and Mignolo (2002) calls the 
colonial difference. Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1987:3) calls this the ‘cultural bomb’ and explains it 
as the greatest weapon unleashed by colonialism on the colonised. He explains that its effect 
is to render valueless all that a people hold dear – their names, languages, heritage, 
environment, unity and themselves. In annihilating the very being of a people, this culture 
bomb/ the coloniality of being functions by making the colonised want to identify with all 
that is colonial culture and identity. Furthermore, this type of cultural system “plants serious 
doubts about the moral rightness of struggle. Possibilities of triumph or victory are seen as 
remote, ridiculous dreams. The intended results are despair, despondency and a collective 
death-wish” (wa Thiong'o, 1987:3). It is in the midst of this that coloniality of being presents 
itself as the answer to this despair, encouraging the colonised to unquestioningly adopt all 
that is coloniality, including their own subjugation and worthlessness. The coloniality of 
being is the product of colonial domination and is a system that continued to develop through 
colonial rule to justify the continued domination of colonised people. However, even with the 
end of colonisation, the system denoting colonised people as non-human, inferior or less than 
the coloniser did not disappear (Richardson, 2012:3; Delport & Lephakga, 2016:3). The 
maintenance of coloniality of being is most prominently achieved through the classification 
of race and racial difference, and gender and the control of sexuality.  
 
2.4.1.1. Coloniality of Being and Race 
The coloniality of being is developed and maintained through the classification of humanity 
in the form of the creation of race based classification. The issue of race is dealt with in the 
coloniality of power where race is portrayed as a system of social classification used for the 
suppression and control of people, particularly the colonised (Schiwy, 2010:128). The 
coloniality of being draws on and complements this, examining the effects of race on the 
conceptions of who is in possession of ‘being’ and who is not. As was touched upon earlier, 
the construction of race was deeply rooted in ideas of superiority and inferiority, with the 
classification of white coloniser designated as superior and the black colonised as inferior. 
The creation of categories of people also created categories of ‘being.’ Those in the superior 
category, namely the white colonisers, were endowed with being, designated as human and 
53 
 
accorded rights and recognition as such. The inferior category of the colonised were 
classified as non-being, inferior and subhuman, and as a result were not accorded the rights 
and recognition of being human. Through colonisation, these designations of being and non-
being have become inextricably tied to race. This resulted in whiteness becoming 
synonymous with humanity, civilisation and being, and blackness becoming synonymous 
with non-being, uncivility and inferiority.  
 
Following this, blackness is defined by a series of deficits and categorised lacks (Quijano, 
2000:535; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:11-12; van der Westhuizen, 2016:176). By designating 
black as non-being and inferior, the phenotypic traits associated with race as well as the 
cultures belonging to black people also become framed as inferior and uncivilised (Quijano, 
2000:535). In contrast, the cultures and phenotypic features of whiteness become akin to 
civilisation and were seen as representative of humanity. The removal of colonial occupation 
did not remove these ideas of who was endowed with humanity and who was not. In short, 
the coloniality of being is sustained through the racial classification of people which has 
imposed non-humanity onto black people and ultimate humanity onto white people. Indeed, 
the designation of non-humanity was applied to all aspects of being for black people. Fanon 
(1964:38 - 39) remarks that this results in the interiorised group being made to feel that its 
“misfortunes resulted directly from its racial and cultural characteristics,” with the 
consequences being that this group feels guilt and inferiority over their mere existence. He 
argues that this then results in the oppressed group trying to “escape these [feelings], on the 
one hand by proclaiming his total and unconditional adoption of the new cultural models, and 
on the other, by pronouncing an irreversible condemnation of his own cultural style.” 
Therefore, the coloniality of being sustains colonial ideas of inferiority and superiority 
through the creation of racial categories. These racial classifications extend beyond merely 
classifying people according to phenotype, but instead designate all aspects of being for 
colonised people, such as culture and language, as inferior and sub-human.  
 
However, the racial aspect of coloniality of being does not exist in isolation, but is mutually 
influenced and sustained by many other systemic factors such as the construction of class 
categories, labour allocation and even the functioning of the law. The coloniality of being 
draws on the coloniality of power’s constructions of race labour-relations in order to sustain 
its constructions of being. The relationship between racial classification and labour, where 
low waged and unpaid labour was associated with the ‘inferior’ races and paid labour was the 
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right of the ‘superior’ groupings, also has an impact on the constructions of coloniality of 
being. The linking of race and labour results in the creation of a system which implies that 
paid labour is reserved for those in the possession of humanity/being. Furthermore, “the 
racial inferiority of the colonized implied that they were not worthy of wages. They were 
naturally obliged to work for the profit of their owners” (Quijano, 2000:538). This 
construction has a direct impact on an individual’s conception of being. When paid labour is 
reserved for white people only, the implied ideology that white people are superior and more 
deserving is upheld and reinforced. Consequently, the parallel implication that black people 
are not deserving of paid labour – with the dignity, humanity and respect that accompany this 
– is reinforced. Mignolo (2010:17) remarks that this hierarchy of human beings has existed 
since the sixteenth century. However, while some aspects of this might have changed with the 
removal of colonial power, such as most labour being paid, the remuneration for such labour 
has remain unequal, with the distribution favouring the white coloniser and thus reinforcing 
racial and class hierarchies.  
 
Furthermore, Modiri (2012:406) remarks that social systems such as the law have these racial 
hierarchies woven into their very fabric in ways that are frequently overlooked. His argument 
is that the racial hierarchies and inequalities of the coloniality of being continue to persist 
within the contemporary South African context, and are reinforced and maintained by 
systems like the law. He notes that during apartheid the law was used for “the reproduction 
and maintenance of white supremacy and white privilege as well as the systemic exclusion of 
black people through direct and indirect forms of racial marginalisation” (Modiri, 2012:406). 
However, Modiri (2012:406) argues that while apartheid and its sustaining laws ended, the 
system of law continues to reinforce and perpetuate the coloniality of being. He argues that 
reformation of the law has been limited due to the capitalist model adopted by the country, 
which pits social reformation and economic redress against the interests of profit and market 
rationality (Modiri, 2012:408-409). Further contributing to this lack of transformation within 
South African law is the privileging of Roman Dutch Law. Modiri (2012:419) argues that this 
system of law is one that is “thoroughly saturated in a white, male, western and colonial 
perspective,” while attempting to portray itself as rational, neutral and universal. The result is 
a system of law which maintains the colonial legacy and does nothing to change the 
constructions of the coloniality of being, which continues to establish some as having greater 
value than others. Consequently, coloniality of being does not end with systematically 
classifying and creating a hierarchy of people based on race. Its influence extends to other 
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areas of life such as labour, utilising these pre-existing systems to maintain control of the 
oppressed.  
 
2.4.1.2. Coloniality of Being and Gender 
Fanon (1964:33) remarks that “racism, as we have seen, is only one element of a vaster 
whole: that of the systematized oppression of a people.” As a result, there are more factors 
than simply race contributing to the construction and maintenance of the coloniality of being. 
The second contributing factor is that of gender and the control of sexuality. The construction 
of the coloniality of being relies as much on the racialisation of people as it does on the 
construction of gender. The control of people through race functions through both the 
construction of gender and the control of sexuality, both of which are constitutively phallic 
(Maldonado-Torres, 2010:102). Furthermore, constructions of gender do not refer to the ways 
in which only one gender is constructed, but rather to both masculinity and femininity, to the 
constructions that dictate what is appropriate for either gender, as well as the power relations 
surrounding these constructions. Gender is a category that is both historical and social, and 
continuously enacted and employed in all spheres of being (Schiwy, 2007:275). Mignolo and 
Schiwy (2003:6) remark that early modernity and the Enlightenment are marked by the 
beginnings of a construction of what ‘civilised’ masculinity was, shifting from ambiguities 
into more fixed dichotomies of masculine and feminine, civilised and uncivilised. These 
dichotomies were then employed as imageries for all forms of life, constructing ideas of 
progress in forms such as development, science and the conception of the modern European 
city. These spheres were all conceived as being civilised and masculine.  
 
The Eurocentric definitions of gender and civility were subsequently employed by the 
colonial powers in their pursuit of colonial conquest (Mignolo & Schiwy, 2003:6). The 
coloniality of being draws on the same gender constructs established during colonial 
occupation and maintained with the coloniality of power. Implicit within the hierarchy of 
culture imposed by the coloniality of being is a paradigm of gender. This construct is 
patriarchal and binary in its orientation, positioning people as either man or woman. 
Furthermore, it positions men over women in the hierarchy, as well as imposing Eurocentric 
Christian ideals on family structures and sexuality, including concepts like monogamy and 
the idea that marriage is between one man and one woman. Furthermore, adding to the 
hierarchisation of people, European notions and constructions of gender were positioned as 
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the civilised, superior and modern forms of behaviour, with all other gender constructions 
subordinated to this (Quijano, 2010:23; Grosfoguel, 2010:70-71). In this construction, the 
white European male resides at the top of the hierarchy as the example of perfect, civilised 
masculinity. The white European woman holds the position below this as the perfect 
femininity. Furthermore, the colonised male is cast in effeminate and emasculating forms of 
gender that are representative of savagery and a lack of civility. This construction leaves 
colonised men as lacking authority or personhood.  
 
Nevertheless, at the same time these men are depicted as overly sexualised and in terms that 
suggest that the black man is “an aggressive sexual beast who desires to rape women, 
particularly White [women]” (Maldonado-Torres, 2010:109). The colonised woman, then, is 
positioned at the bottom of the hierarchy, constructed as both below men and as uncivilised 
and “other.” The colonised woman is portrayed as highly erotic, with her sole purpose being 
to fulfil the sexual desire of (white) men and to reproduce children. She is depicted as 
“always already sexually available to the raping gaze of the White and as fundamentally 
promiscuous” (Maldonado-Torres, 2010:109). By these constructions, the black man is 
representative of uncontrollable sexuality and tied to the act of raping, while the black 
woman is promiscuous and the legitimate receiver of rape. Inscribed onto these constructions 
of gender are ideas of whose bodies are ‘killable’ and ‘rapeable.’ In these constructions, 
colonised and black people are the ones portrayed as rapeable and killable, thus stripping 
certain groups of their humanity and dignity and making them disposable. The result is that 
the coloniality of being uses gender as a metaphor and a means of othering people, 
reinforcing the Eurocentric notions of Western superiority and the inferiority of being of the 
colonised (Schiwy, 2007:275; Schiwy, 2010:129).   
 
2.4.2. Coloniality of Knowledge 
The second concept that is drawn out of the coloniality of power is that of the coloniality of 
knowledge. Quijano (2000:540) remarks that the European attempt at establishing hegemony 
involved establishing control over all aspects of life, including knowledge and how 
knowledge is produced. This resulted in the system of the coloniality of knowledge. The 
system focuses on all aspects of epistemology, concerning itself with the ways knowledge is 
generated, how it is conveyed and even what knowledge is given primacy (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
2013:11). The realm of knowledge and its production was understood in the same light as 
property, with the coloniser being the owner of said property (Quijano, 2010:27). As a result, 
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much like the coloniality of power and the coloniality of being, the coloniality of knowledge 
functions through the creation of hierarchy with coloniser at the top. In this case, a 
knowledge hierarchy is created that places European, Western knowledge in the position of 
primacy, privileging it above all other forms of knowledge. In the same vein, indigenous 
knowledges are placed below European forms of knowledge. The hierarchy establishes some 
knowledge as worthy and worth learning, and other knowledge is denigrated to the status of 
uncivilised and worthless (Escobar, 2007:217; Grosfoguel, 2010:65; Delport & Lephakga, 
2016:3). The hierarchy of knowledge is established and maintained by drawing on the 
coloniality of power and the coloniality of being.  
 
The structures and systems put in place and maintained by the matrix of coloniality, which 
use gender, race and culture as a means to systematise and classify people, are employed in 
the development and maintenance of a system of coloniality of knowledge. The coloniality of 
knowledge draws on the already established idea that Western, European culture is superior, 
and therefore Western, European knowledge and epistemological systems are also superior. It 
draws on the coloniality of being, and concludes that if the indigenous person and all they 
stand for is worth less, then so too is the knowledge and the knowledge systems they possess 
(Escobar, 2007:217; Quijano, 2010:27; Grosfoguel, 2010:65; Dreyer, 2017:2). The 
coloniality of knowledge can be seen as an extension of colonial domination, where the 
colonised continue to be dominated through the adopting and internalising of knowledge 
hierarchies which alienate them from their own indigenous forms of knowledge in favour of 
knowledge that contains within it the explicit construction that the formerly-colonised people, 
and their knowledge, are worth less than the white, Western former-coloniser.  
 
It is not only the supremacy of knowledge that forms part of the coloniality of knowledge, but 
also the ways in which this knowledge is produced. The Western knowledge systems position 
themselves such that their worldview assumes a universal position which places itself as both 
neutral and objective, where the subject is speaking from a position of enunciation where he 
or she is rendered invisible (Grosfoguel, 2010:67; Walsh, 2010:79; Karkov & Robbins, 
2013:5). The coloniality of knowledge positions Western epistemology as superior, 
constructing it as universal, neutral, objective, natural and rational, and at the same time 
places indigenous knowledge systems as inferior, framing these epistemologies as subjective, 
biased and possessing an irrational nature. The result is a Eurocentric system of knowledge 
production which continues to reproduce colonial subordination (Quijano, 2010:27-28; 
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Walsh, 2010:78; Grosfoguel, 2011:6). During colonisation, this process was controlled by the 
coloniser who imposed their own patterns of knowledge production and meaning making 
onto the colonised, with the process of translation playing a large role in this. Translation and 
interpretation, in both cultural and linguistic forms, gave the coloniser control over the 
construction of epistemic perspectives, which created and enforced the coloniality of being 
(Mignolo & Schiwy, 2003:5). Later, the coloniser began to teach the colonised their systems 
(Quijano, 2010:23). Thus, the coloniser managed to co-opt the colonised people through both 
the internalisation of these systems as well as continuing to perpetuate their own oppression.  
 
Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1987:16) explains that colonisation sought to control the whole world of 
the colonised, with the area most important to this control being control of the mental world 
of the colonised people. He argues that political and economic control can never be complete 
without also controlling the thoughts and mental world of the dominated. He remarks that 
colonisation was achieved through violence, “but the night of the sword and the bullet was 
followed by the morning of the chalk and the blackboard. The physical violence of the 
battlefield was followed by the psychological violence of the classroom.” (wa Thiong'o, 
1987:9). For wa Thiong’o, language and education function in tandem to promote the 
coloniality of knowledge. He notes that language is the vehicle with which culture is taught, 
and education is the means. He explains that language is tied to culture in such a way that it is 
both a means of communication and a carrier of culture. Hence, in order for someone to 
master a language, they also need to master the culture that birthed it. He further argues that 
the coloniser’s insistence that all education should take place in the language of the coloniser 
was the vehicle through which supremacy of language was promoted (wa Thiong'o, 1987:13-
15). The use of language and education were inextricably tied to one another, with colonial 
systems of education promoting the idea that speaking English was the equivalent of 
intelligence, and not being able to speak English was equivalent to stupidity (wa Thiong'o, 
1987:11-12).  
 
These systems of thinking did not disappear with the dismantling of colonisation, and instead 
continue to feed and sustain the coloniality of knowledge. The domination of ‘the chalk and 
the blackboard’ was continued through the schooling and education system where schools, 
universities and colleges have become sites of reproducing the coloniality of knowledge. 
These places were shaped and influenced by colonial governance and structures. However, 
since the end of colonisation, they have remained places where the knowledge and 
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knowledge systems reproduce coloniality. This happens through the formulation of curricula 
which ignore the everyday experiences of the people taught, such as experiences of patriarchy 
and racism. The adopting and teaching of research methodologies which position the West as 
superior, while claiming to be making observations from a neutral standpoint, is another form 
of the coloniality of knowledge. These systems all serve to marginalise, dominate and create 
invisible people, subjecting them to the oppression of the coloniality of knowledge and 
creating an education which emphasises assimilation (Richardson, 2012:5; Tuck & Yang, 
2012:2; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:11). As a result, while the supremacy of knowledge was 
constructed and maintained through the matrix of coloniality, it is actively promoted through 
vehicles such as language, education and schooling. 
 
2.5. CLOSING 
Coloniality of power, coloniality of being and coloniality of knowledge are all interrelated 
and function by drawing on and reinforcing one another, forming a matrix of coloniality. 
While decolonisation took place with the ending of colonial occupation, the matrix of 
coloniality demonstrates that the colonial legacy continues its oppression today. In order for 
this to change, coloniality needs to be addressed on all three of these fronts. Colonisation 
introduced systems of hierarchy into the worlds of the colonised. These systems forced 
classifications onto people using factors such as race and gender. The systems of 
classification used these categories to create and sustain hierarchies which positioned the 
coloniser as superior to the colonised. However, the end of colonisation did not end the 
systems which allowed and sustained it. Coloniality is the term used to refer to the continued 
existence and functioning of the colonial legacy. The coloniality of power is one of the 
systems of coloniality which continues to function today. The coloniality of power refers to 
the systems of power, such a capitalism and the idea of modernity, which construct the power 
dynamics of contemporary society. The second system, the coloniality of being, draws on the 
systems and hierarchies of the coloniality of power to establish a hierarchy of being. The 
coloniality of being systematises people positioning the coloniser as the possessor of 
humanity, dignity and being. The colonised, on the other hand, is classified as non-human, 
not deserving of dignity and not in possession of being. Not only are the political and 
economic systems leveraged to continue the oppression of formerly colonised people, but the 
same systematising hierarchy is used to construct and impose value onto the lives and beings 
of people. 
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However, these oppressive systems do not end there, but extend their oppressive reach into 
areas of knowledge. Through the coloniality of knowledge, formerly colonised people 
continue to be oppressed through the intentional privileging of Western, European knowledge 
and epistemology over indigenous ones. Although delayed somewhat by apartheid, these 
same systems are operational within the contemporary South African context. Apartheid 
systems used and built on to those of colonisation. They emphasised hierarchies based on 
ideas of racial superiority, using economic systems such as the control of labour to do so. 
Central to apartheid was the belief that black people were not equal to white people and were 
not deserving of the same humanity, dignity and being. As a result, while apartheid was not 
directly related to colonisation in the literal sense, it drew extensively on the coloniality of 
power, being and knowledge in order to maintain white power and domination. The intention 
of the TRC was to promote a process of healing and reconciliation in the aftermath of this. 
However, from an examination of the ways in which coloniality continues to function 
globally, it is possible to conclude that despite the end of colonial occupation as well as the 
end of apartheid, the matrix of coloniality continues to operate within contemporary South 
African society. The result of this is a society whose citizens continue to be oppressed, where 
people are not equal, and Western, Eurocentric ideology is privileged above all else. In short, 
the systems of power and governance, the ways in which people define and understand 
themselves and one another, as well as the knowledge and the ways in which this knowledge 
is reproduced, all remain products of the colonial and apartheid regimes. These systems of 
coloniality continue to reproduce themselves in ways that sustain the mentality and 
functioning of colonisation and apartheid that followed it. Thus, it can be concluded that, 
while no longer legislated, the legacy of apartheid systems remains alive and well within 
South Africa.  
 
Key findings in this chapter are that, while colonisation ended with the removal of colonial 
occupation, the systems of coloniality have not ended. These systems ensure the continued 
oppression of the colonised people. Furthermore, apartheid formed part of South Africa’s 
colonial legacy. These legacies continue to function within the current, contemporary context 
of South African society in ways that ensure continued hierarchies of inequality between 
people. This chapter finds that these systems ensure that apartheid’s legacy of inequality 
remains functional even after apartheid’s end. Furthermore, this chapter demonstrates the 
functioning of systematised oppression, building on and giving weight to the assertion of 
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chapter one that reconciliation needs to move beyond conceptions of individual-to-individual 
reconciliation. South Africa needs a reconciliation which attempts to address the systemic 
oppression perpetuated by the colonialities of power, being and knowledge.  
 
If the systems of coloniality continue to function in ways which reproduce apartheid systems, 
then true reconciliation cannot be accomplished. As explored in the previous chapter through 
the Contact Theory, the conditions in which any genuine healing or restoration can take place 
need to be ones where all people are equal and can interact on equal footing. However, the 
continued existence of the matrix of coloniality makes it impossible for all to be equal, and 
therefore impossible for true reconciliation to take place. So long as black people are 
constructed – through epistemologies, ideologies and power structures – as inferior, savage 
and without being, while white people are seen as the paragon of humanity, it remains 
impossible for any equal interaction to take place. Furthermore, it remains impossible for 
reconciliation to have any meaning within a context where apartheid inequalities and 
oppressions are perpetuated.  
 
Biko (1987:21) comments that as a result of this colonial legacy, black people have 
internalised such narratives, leading to feelings of inferiority and worthlessness. He proposes 
that the remedy to this is the growth of a strong “grass-roots build-up of black consciousness 
such that blacks can learn to assert themselves and stake their rightful claim.” Biko’s (1987) 
cry for black consciousness is one that is as important today as it was during the apartheid 
era. South Africa is still caught in the legacy of apartheid which the TRC, despite all its work, 
has not managed to remedy. In order for any hope of reconciliation in South Africa, the 
systems of coloniality need to be dismantled. Based on the background of this discussion, this 
reconciliation is only possible through the active promotion of a decoloniality that is rooted in 
black consciousness, promoting the humanity, dignity, knowledge and being of black 
subjects. Furthermore, this black consciousness has the power to restore true humanity to 
people and to restore that which has been stripped away by coloniality. If the role of 
reconciliation is the restoration of that which was broken, then decoloniality can be 
understood as playing a vital role in the functioning of reconciliation. If reconciliation cannot 
be achieved so long as coloniality functions, and a paradigm of black consciousness is needed 
in order to foster decoloniality, then it needs to be understood that a new and different kind of 
reconciliation is needed in order to accomplish healing and restoration in South Africa. What 
is now needed is a form of decolonising reconciliation for the current South African context.   
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CHAPTER 3 
#FeesMustFall: Establishing the Narrative 
 
“What motivates a student to face teargas and armoured police to march to 
Parliament and the Union Buildings? Is it really simply disillusionment and anger 
that maintained the movement, or is there a hopeful message to find here as well, 
namely that this generation of young people considers their education important 
enough, and corrupt governance contemptible enough, for them to put their bodies on 
the line for those beliefs?” (Wasserman, 2017) 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
#FeesMustFall is a contemporary example of a grass-roots movement, initiated by students to 
draw attention to student concerns. This movement swept the country in 2015 and 2016, 
engulfing tertiary institutions and prompting mixed reactions in South Africa’s public. In 
exploring the way in which the Pietermaritzburg expression of the #FeesMustFall movement 
is making a call for decolonising reconciliation in South Africa, it is necessary to understand 
the fees movement. This chapter will explore the broader fees narrative, examining what led 
to the emergence of the movement, as well as the socio-economic factors sustaining it. It will 
establish the Pietermaritzburg narrative of #FeesMustFall, as well as exploring the aims and 
principles of both the broader movement and the localised expression of it. Furthermore, in 
order to understand whether there is a call for reconciliation which exists within 
#FeesMustFall, the chapter will examine #FeesMustFall’s stance on and interaction with the 
reconciliation narrative.  
3.2. A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY 
#FeesMustFall (FMF) is
23
 a movement that spans the country, including most of South 
Africa’s tertiary institutions. This is a vast movement with a scope that is too large to cover in 
this dissertation. As such, this discussion will take a much narrower scope, focussing on the 
                                                          
23
 I will be adopting the position explained by the Wits Fallists in their book Rioting & Writing (Chinguno, C. et 
al., 2017. Rioting & Writing: Diaries of the Wits Fallists. Johannesburg: SWOP - Wits University, p. 16.). They 
explain that many Fallists hold the position that, while there are no active protests and disruptions, 
#FeesMustFall is a movement that is still ongoing, but its mode of expression is different. As a result, I will be 
referring to FMF is the present tense rather than the past tense.   
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University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) Pietermaritzburg (PMB) campus and the FMF 
activities there. I will begin by briefly outlining and exploring the larger FMF narrative and 
its aims and principles in order to inform and contextualise the PMB iteration of FMF. 
Godsell, Lepere, Mafoko and Nase (2016a:102), in their writing on the #FeesMustFall 
documenting process, remark that “researchers need to study a wide range of 
communications carefully, as not only do they reveal the social movement, they shape it.” In 
my examination of FMF, I will be using academic sources; however, much of the 
communication and documentation pertaining to the protests have not been in the form of 
peer-reviewed academic literature. As a result, I will be following the example of other 
academics who have written about FMF and including documentation other than the 
traditional forms of academic research (Godsell, et al., 2016; Naicker, 2016; Luescher, et al., 
2016).  
My research will draw on information found in both newspapers as well as official university 
communication. The university communicates with its staff and students in the form of 
official communiques and updates circulated via email and made available on the official 
UKZN website.
24
 These are the University’s primary means of communication with its 
community. Godsell et al. (2016a:103) remark that this type of official documentary 
communication from the management structures at universities is what dominates the 
landscape of communication. This was most evident during the height of the protests. 
However, they also note that these documents tend to be hostile to the protest, unidirectional 
and originating from a single authority. The inclusion of newspaper articles will help to 
broaden the narrative. Nevertheless, newspaper articles present a similar problem to the 
official university documents in that they present a unidirectional narrative that emanates 
from one official source (Godsell et al., 2016a:103). These sources, while attempting to 
present a neutral report of events, often were anti-protest and thus only represent one view of 
the protests. Furthermore, these voices hold positions of authority which they bring to any 
narrative. 
Therefore, in order to present a more balanced narrative, it is necessary to also include other 
voices and perspectives, most importantly the voices of those involved in the protest 
themselves. As Chinguno, Kgoroba, Mashibini, Masilela, Maubane, Moyo, Mthombeni and 
Ndlovu (2017:23) remark on their involvement with the FMF protests, “no one other than us 
is better positioned to tell our experience within the #FeesMustFall.” Traditionally, power to 
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[Online] Available at:  https://web.facebook.com/ukzn1/?ref=br_rs [Accessed 21 11 2016]. 
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influence a narrative has been vested in the ability to make your voice heard, most often 
through the ability to publish, such as with journal articles, press releases and newspaper 
reports. The voices of those involved in the protests, who were for the most part students, 
often possess less power than the academy or news networks. However, Godsell et al. 
(2016a:102) write that “protests cannot be understood by relying on written documents alone. 
This is because some crucial issues cannot be communicated in formal documents.” They 
explain that the FMF protests have been marked by a trend of students working outside of 
existing structures such as the Student Representative Council (SRC). They note that this is 
not unusual in protest movements of the twenty-first century.
25
 They also note that 
communication, particularly communicating the messages of the protest, are of vital 
importance in any protest. Commenting on the ways in which they communicated during the 
University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) FMF
26
 protests, Chinguno et al. (2017:17) explain 
that they opened a WhatsApp group for all members to share their ideas. This was by no 
means unusual for those involved in the FMF protests.  Social media platforms such as 
Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp became important tools in reporting events and 
communicating messages. Social media became places where counter-narratives could be 
created (Godsell et al., 2016a:108). Platforms such as Facebook are accessible and available 
to anyone in the country with internet access, effectively subverting traditional print 
hierarchies, and therefore allowing anyone to publish and share knowledge. This is a platform 
that was used by students, and as a result is the place where their narratives and viewpoints 
can be accessed.  
Social media platforms have been integral to the #FMF movement, and as a result, I will be 
following the methodology of Godsell et al. (2016a) who include social media in their 
documentary research. However, there are many social media platforms and many individual 
accounts that could be used for such research on each platform. Therefore, I will limit my 
research to one platform, namely Facebook. Since Facebook is a large platform, the scope of 
this study cannot cover all data found within it. My intention in using a social media platform 
is to gain access to students’ thoughts and opinions which would otherwise not be represented 
within this case study. The social media research will therefore be limited to a selection of 
                                                          
25
 For more contemporary social movements see work by: Castells, M. 2012. Networks of Outrage and Hope: 
Social Movements in an Internet Age. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
26
 The larger FMF movement provides a conceptual umbrella under which the FMF protests took place, 
however there are variances in the individual expressions of FMF across tertiary institutions. 
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key posts from the UKZN #FeesMustFall Facebook page
27
 which demonstrates students’ 
thoughts and perspectives. Furthermore, I will be drawing on my own experiences as both an 
activist and scholar involved in the PMB protests. My participant-observer experience 
informed the research done for my honours research project, and the work done there will 
also be drawn on to inform this dissertation. Chinguno et al. (2017:16) remark that “this 
movement ironically generated unparalleled moments of conflict and solidarity in different 
contexts.” These conflicts and solidarities can be seen in the varying narratives of FMF, and 
the great division in positions and stances on the protests. Through using academic sources, 
official university communication, newspaper articles, student posts on the UKZN 
#FeesMustFall Facebook page and my prior research, I aim to present a multi-layered 
narrative of some elements of the #FMF protests. This narrative will then be analysed in 
terms of the conceptual framework of decolonised reconciliation established in the previous 
chapters. 
Furthermore, in writing and analysing this sort of movement it is necessary to be aware of 
and acknowledge one’s own position within the narrative. I am a white South African 
feminist, who comes from a middle class background. I am thirty years old and funding my 
own studies through a combination of part time jobs and a bursary. I am a hetero-sexual, 
Christian who is also a fallist.
28
 I became involved in the FMF movement on the 
Pietermaritzburg campus of the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal. My involvement in FMF 
began in 2016 during my honours studies at the university. This places me in a position of 
both insider and outsider to the narrative. I am an insider as a result of my involvement and 
affiliation with the FMF movement. In this position, I am a student who believes in the aims 
and goals of the FMF movement and has been involved in FMF initiatives. However, I am 
also partly an outsider because I am able to afford my fees as a result of my historical 
advantage. These factors will necessarily have an influence on my analysis of the FMF 
movement, as a result, it is necessary to clarify my positionality upfront.  
 
 
 
                                                          
27
 Found at UKZNFMF, [Online] Available at: https://www.facebook.com/pg/UKZNFMF/posts [Accessed 21 
11 2016] 
28
 Fallist is the term coined by those involved in the FMF movement to refer to themselves. A fallist is someone 
who adheres to the aims and principles of the FMF movement.  
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3.3. INTRODUCTION TO FMF 
#FeesMustFall can be best understood as a movement
29
 for social change, and as with most 
movements for social change, FMF did not develop in isolation. Is it widely accepted that 
#RhodesMustFall
30
 (RMF), the student-led movement for transformation and decolonisation 
of university campuses, gave birth to the #FeesMustFall movement. The RMF movement 
began at the University of Cape Town (UCT) with the demand that the statue of Cecil John 
Rhodes be removed. The Rhodes statue and the RMF protest came to be representative of 
oppression and colonisation on university campuses, calling attention to the lack of 
transformation on university campuses in South Africa (Naidoo, 2016:182; Grassow, 
2016:22; Kujeke, 2017:85; Chinguno, et al., 2017:16; Thesnaar, 2017:1). The RMF 
movement was calling for the decolonisation of the curriculum, an end to the outsourcing of 
workers and a change in the composition of academic staff. Naicker (2016:57) explains the 
reasons for the emergence of this protest as being connected to the changing demographics of 
SA universities. Formerly white institutions, with white institutional culture and practice, 
have gradually changed demographics. This shift, taking place in the post-apartheid years, 
has led to institutions with a majority of black students. However, the staff and the 
institutional culture have not shifted with the students. As a result, these formerly white 
institutions are still run with white culture and practice (Grassow, 2016:23). However, this 
institutional culture is increasingly in conflict with the cultures, practices and everyday reality 
of the students who are attending these universities. This shift was a contributing factor in the 
emergence of the RMF movement.  
In the aftermath of RMF, “student leaders across the South African public higher education 
landscape…asked themselves in response to #RhodesMustFall the question that ‘if at UCT it 
was the Rhodes statue that had to fall, what “must fall” in their respective contexts?’” 
                                                          
29
 Susan Booysen (2016, p. 2) remarks that the #FeesMustFall student turmoil has been labelled as both an 
uprising and a revolt by the public and the media; while the students have called themselves a movement 
(UKZN FeesMustFall Collective, 2016). A movement can be broadly understood as a network of people or 
groups. These groupings often form based on “shared collective identities which engage in collective actions of 
political and social conflict” (Luescher, et al., 2016:1). Terms such as ‘revolt’ and ‘uprising’ are not neutral 
terms, but are ideologically loaded such that the protestors are cast in a negative light. The term ‘movement’ 
does not have these same pejorative ideological connotations, and as a result, this is a more suitable place to 
begin to understand FMF. 
30
 For more detail on the RMF protests see:  Godsell, G. & Chikane, R., 2016. Chapter 2: The Roots of the 
Revolution. In: S. Booysen, ed. Fees Must Fall:Student Revolt, Decolonisation and Governance in South Africa. 
Johannesburg: Wits University Press:54-73, or Naicker, C., 2016. From Marikana to #feesmustfall: The Praxis 
of Popular Protest in South Africa. Urbanisation, 1(1):53-61. 
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(Luescher, Loader, & Mugume, 2016:6-7). The announcement later in 2015 of what the fee 
increases for 2016 would be, provided the answer to this question. Students began to demand 
a halt to fee increases, and then later the removal of all tuition fees for tertiary institutions. 
What was started with RMF, coupled with the fee increase announcement, became the 
tipping point for what would become a country-wide student movement calling attention to 
the fees crisis within tertiary institutions in SA (Pillay, 2016:155; Booysen, 2016:3; Naicker, 
2016:54). This was done under the hashtag #FeesMustFall, and it would later go on to 
become one of the “most dramatic mass actions post 1994” (Chinguno, et al., 2017:16). 
However, this demand in itself did not emerge out of nowhere, but rather has grown out of a 
situation of increasing financial distress at universities around the county. State funded 
universities have been experiencing increasing financial difficulty over the last seventeen 
years, marked by declining state assistance. The Wits vice-chancellor (VC), Adam Habib, in 
an interview with Jonathan Jansen (2017:29)
31
 explains that in 1994, seventy percent of the 
costs of the university were subsidised by the state, but by 2014, state subsidies only 
accounted for 35 per cent of these expenses. The effect of this declining subsidy has been an 
increase in student fees. Furthermore, many students were, and still are, struggling to meet 
these increased financial demands, with many not qualifying for government subsidised 
funding but also not making enough to cover the cost of tuition
32
 (Jansen, 2017:33). This 
increasing financial distress was most keenly felt by the students, and contributed to the birth 
of the #FeesMustFall student movement. 
Nevertheless, both FMF and RMF emerged out of a greater context which informed and 
shaped both protests. It is important to understand some of this context in order to properly 
understand the FMF movement.  As has been explored in some depth in chapter one, after 
almost two decades of democracy, South Africa is faced with high levels of inequality, 
unemployment and poverty. In most instances, this inequality remains divided along race 
lines, where to be black means to be poor. For many black South Africans, they perceive very 
little transformation to have taken place in the more than two decades that have passed since 
the fall of apartheid (Naicker, 2016:54; Grassow, 2016:22; Headley & Kobe, 2017:1; Dreyer, 
2017:1). These economic factors inform the climate in which both the RMF and FMF 
protests took place.
33
 Furthermore, Satgar (2016:216) explains that these protests happen 
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 Jonathan Jansen is a former University of the Free-State (UFS) vice chancellor 
32
 These students became known as ‘the missing middle.’  
33
 To further explore the issues of transformation within South Africa see Terreblanche, S. 2002. A History of 
Inequality in South Africa 1632 – 2002. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press.  
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within a larger context of national protest. He locates this protest within a second cycle of 
resistance protests seen in the South African context post-1994. He explains that the first 
cycle took place between the late 1990s and the early 2000s, and was characterised by 
resistance against neoliberalism. These protests gave rise to movements such as the 
Treatment Action Campaign, the Landless People’s Movement and the Anti-Privatisation 
Forum.  
The second cycle of resistance began in 2007 and continues into the present, and is marked 
by civic protest action around anti-systemic struggles aimed at resisting the dominant 
hegemony. Most notable among these protests were those addressing a lack of service 
delivery. Satgar (2016:216) argues that the defining characteristics of these protests are the 
desire for a transformed society. As a result, the second cycle of resistance is marked by the 
emergence of movements for transformation around issues such as education, social justice, 
LGBTIAQ+ rights, fighting corruption, and climate justice. These emergences of protests and 
people’s movements share common struggles that seek to “engender systemic transformation, 
advance transformative alternatives, and embrace a new constitutive understanding of power. 
Put more sharply, these are social forces attempting to build and utilise their own capacities 
to advance transformation from below” (Satgar, 2016:216). Naicker (2016:57) agrees that 
both RMF and FMF are protests that are anti-systemic and seeking systemic transformation. 
She remarks that these protests reveal a growing dissatisfaction and loss of faith by young 
black students in governing structures and their ability to create real and lasting 
transformation. Thus, FMF is both produced by and contributes to this second cycle of protest 
and struggle which seeks transformation within society. 
3.4. FMF AIMS AND PRINCIPLES 
The primary aim and demand of the #FeesMustFall movement is, as the name implies, for 
fees to fall. This began with a demand for the annual tuition fee increase to be done away 
with, but eventually evolved into a movement voicing a cry against the financial exclusion of 
students as a result of their economically disadvantaged position (Pillay, 2016:155). This 
evolution led to a demand for tuition-free tertiary education.
34
 This was not the only demand, 
                                                          
34
 The students’ call for free tertiary education does not emerge in isolation, but is drawn primarily from two 
sources. The first is the South African Constitution where the Bill of Rights enshrines the right to education and 
promises that all people should have access “to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, 
must make progressively available and accessible” (South African Government, 1996, pp. 12, section 29). The 
students argue that the increasing university fees, coupled with decreasing governmental support has made 
tertiary education inaccessible and unavailable to students, thus essentially violating these rights as put forth in 
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as the FMF movement also demanded decommodified, quality, decolonised education (Bond, 
2016:192; Satgar, 2016:216; Godsell, et al., 2016a:102; Naidoo, 2016:180; Langa, 2017:6). 
Furthermore, the RMF movement is marked by how it has linked campaign demands for 
decolonisation and transformation with ideas of liberation and Black Consciousness (BC). 
The result of this was that the movement adopted other struggles, such as those of the (mainly 
black) support staff on campuses, and calling for these staff to no longer be outsourced 
workers but to be employed by the universities. This type of intersectionality is one that was 
picked up and built on by the FMF movement (Naicker, 2016:60).  
As a result, the FMF protests continued RMF’s call for the insourcing of workers and racial 
transformation at universities. The movement also took on issues of gender, patriarchy and a 
call for the ending of rape culture. Booysen (2016:3) remarks on this as an “intersectionality 
of continuous societal injustice.” Nevertheless, this protest is not only about a desire for the 
fall of certain oppressive structures – unaffordable tuition, rape culture and outsourcing – but 
it is also a protest for what is wanted, namely a more just and equal society. In their own 
words, the students explain that: 
The FMF movement is/was about economic liberation through education. It rejects the free 
market fundamentalism within the education system and contests the inequalities within the 
education and the broader society that characterise the post-apartheid order. This is 
championed by a new generation of activists with little or no experience of apartheid. Our 
motivation is anchored on the demand for social justice and for a more equal South 
Africa…we are conscious that the commoditization of education and outsourcing of the 
university support staff, who ironically are our mothers and fathers, reproduces inequality tied 
to the apartheid legacy and is catastrophic to social justice. The FMF movement is about 
social justice and equal opportunities and a transition towards an egalitarian society. This was 
a movement built on consensus and engagement at the grass root level. At its onset the FMF 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the Bill of Rights. The second factor on which students draw is what they feel is a promise made by the ruling 
party, the African National Congress (ANC), to provide free tertiary education for the poor. This the students 
draw from numerous promises made by the ANC during its political campaigning, but also from the conference 
resolutions from the ANC’s 53rd annual general conference in 2012. In their published conference resolutions, 
the ANC states that “significant strides have been made in finalizing the policy on free higher education to all 
undergraduate level students from for [sic] the poor and working class communities for phased implementation 
from 2014” (African National Congress, 2012, p. 74). Furthermore, the conference notes that a policy for free 
higher education has been completed and the conference resolves that this policy will be finalised for adoption 
by 2013. The students of the FMF movement feel that their demand for free higher education is both a demand 
for their human rights to be fulfilled as well as a demand that the governing party fulfil their 2012 promise to the 
people.   
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movement was sustained by a democratic tradition based on power and collective decisions 
from below (Chinguno, et al., 2017:24 - 25).  
Along with their central aims, FMF included other principles in their movement. The new 
movement is intentionally leaderless, with no one appointed leader, but rather many students 
all working together communally. Its aims were for a movement that shared power laterally, 
where all had a voice and could have influence in the movement. The aim was for a 
movement that was without hierarchy, where no voices were silenced (Grassow, 2016:24; 
Chinguno, et al., 2017:25). In this sense, the FMF movement is an expression of a grassroots 
movement embodying the voice of the students. In short, what is wanted is a better university 
community, one that works for its students in order for them to create a better future for all in 
South Africa.  
 
When FMF took over university campuses in 2015 and 2016, the reactions to it were mixed, 
and as a result, the analysis of its functioning, successes and failures is mixed too. An 
anecdotal review of any social media platform on the topic of #FeesMustFall will show the 
great division in opinion surrounding the movement. This division is reflected in published 
material, public discourse and newspaper reports around FMF. Jansen (2017:5) claims that 
the FMF movement began well and became increasingly destructive and violent. Jansen is by 
no means the only proponent of this opinion. Many branded the students as violent and 
condemned the protests, as well as the protesting students.
35
 Some, most notably politicians 
such a Blade Nzimande, claim that the FMF protests are simply a vehicle for other political 
agendas to disrupt and destabilise the government.
36
 Others see FMF as pointing out and 
reflecting a divided system and society.
37
 On the other hand, others believe that FMF has 
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 See for example: Chiloane, M., 2016. EWN: Mashaba Condemns Violent Protests in JHB CBD. [Online]  
Available at: http://ewn.co.za/2016/10/26/Mashaba-condemns-protest-violence-in-Jhb-CBD [Accessed 26 10 
2017];  
Sekhotho, K. & Brandt, K., 2016. EWN: Habib: Wits Won't Remove Security Until Students Guarantee 
No Violence. [Online] Available at: http://ewn.co.za/2016/10/23/Habib-Wits-wont-remove-security-until-
students-guarantee-no-violence [Accessed 26 10 2017]; 
 Koyana, X., 2016 b. EWN: Violent Clashes Break Out Between Police, Protestors Outside Parly. 
[Online]  Available at: http://ewn.co.za/2016/10/26/Violent-clashes-break-out-between-police-protesters-
outside-Parly [Accessed 26 10 2017]. 
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 See: Evans, J., 2017. Mail & Guardian: Blade Nzimande: EFF, academics are using #FeesMustFall protests 
for their own ends. [Online]  Available at: https://mg.co.za/article/2017-01-26-blade-nzimande-eff-academics-
are-using-feesmustfall-protests-for-their-own-ends [Accessed 26 10 2017]. 
37
 See: Ngcobo, Z., 2016. EWN: Radebe: #FeesMustFall Movement a Reflection of Divisions in Society. 
[Online]  Available at: http://ewn.co.za/2016/11/21/radebe-feesmustfall-movement-a-reflection-of-systemic-
divisions-in-society [Accessed 26 10 2017]. 
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drawn attention to some of the contemporary issues plaguing South African society, such as 
“how important it is for academics and other members of university communities to step out 
of their comfort zones and listen to views with which they bitterly disagree” (Shay, 2016).  
Regardless of the position taken on the FMF protests, most concede that it has drawn 
attention to the funding crisis facing universities. This crisis is by no means a new one; 
however, until FMF it was an issue that had remained largely invisible to the public’s 
attention (Langa, 2017:9; Chinguno, et al., 2017:16). It has prompted wider discussions on 
the funding of higher education.
38
 Out of this has emerged new and creative attempts to fund 
university tuition for students such as the #Feet4Fees
39
 project were students aimed to walk 
1000km between Wits University and Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU) in 
an effort to raise money for tuition.
40
 Thus, public opinion on FMF and its success, or lack 
thereof, is mixed, with some finding great negatives in the protests and others celebrating the 
victories.  
 
Nevertheless, academic analysis of FMF finds that through its aims and principles, FMF has 
made a range of achievements. Satgar (2016:214) remarks that the FMF movement can be 
understood as falling into the category of post-class politics, where the movement is 
concerned with black consciousness issues and inter-generational identities. In illustration of 
this, Chinguno et al. (2017:16), in their self-analysis, remark that the FMF movement 
exposed a deep ideological divide between students and the state, with the students fighting 
for free education and the state believing that this was not feasible. As a result, they believe 
that one of the most important contributions of FMF has been its formation of a new 
generation of activists interested in issues of social justice, poverty and inequality in post-
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 For examples see:  
Brandt, K., 2016. EWN: Max Price Urges Universities to Find Funding Alternatives. [Online]  
Available at: http://ewn.co.za/2016/11/10/max-price-encourages-universities-to-look-at-alternative-funding 
[Accessed 26 10 2017]. 
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Koyana, X., 2016 b. EWN: Violent Clashes Break Out Between Police, Protestors Outside Parly. [Online]  
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 Other examples include UCT asking parents to donate funds to cover the fee hike for other students; an 
NMMU professor leading a four day fund-raising hike in South America as well as the Feenix project - a 
Standard Bank initiative to facilitate crowdfunding for students. See:  Govender, P., 2016. Mail & Guardian: 
Universities are Getting Creative as They Scramble to Make Up the Budget Shortfall. [Online]  
Available at: https://mg.co.za/article/2016-08-19-universities-are-getting-creative-as-they-scramble-to-make-up-
the-budget-shortfall [Accessed 26 10 2017] and https://www.feenix.org/ [Accessed: 26. 10. 2017].  
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apartheid South Africa.  This has been noted as emerging out of a distrust of the old liberation 
struggle heroes, marking a shift by the students towards fighting for their own causes 
(Thesnaar, 2017:3). In its insistence on a lateral power structure and public participation in 
decision making processes, the FMF movement has adopted a public pedagogy as its 
conceptual framework. This allows the movement to both simultaneously participate in 
meaning-making and knowledge creation, while at the same time posing a challenge to the 
academy and its privileging of Western forms of knowledge (Ahmed, 2017).  
 
Furthermore, Satgar (2016:217) remarks that the FMF movement saw the emergence of new 
developments in post-apartheid South African protest politics. The first was its use of social 
media to mobilise a mass movement. He remarks that using social media allowed FMF to 
mobilise students and protests across campuses and across tertiary institutions in a fast and 
efficient manner. Secondly, the lack of appointed leaders, hierarchy and lateral power 
structure is new to protest culture in South Africa. Thirdly, he remarks on the mimetic nature 
of the protest, where movements on different tertiary institutions will learn from and copy the 
protest tactics of each other in an evolving movement. He remarks that the leaderless nature 
of the movement did cause some internal tension with various groupings jostling for power 
and to have their special interests represented in the protest movement. This, he remarks, left 
little space for any tactical debate or planning, and exacerbated divisions within the 
movement. While the FMF movement has faced some internal difficulties and challenges, it 
has used innovative techniques to highlight and draw attention to its calls for change.   
 
3.5. FMF ON PMB 
The University of KwaZulu-Natal was created at the beginning of 2004 as the result of the 
merging of the University of Durban-Westville and the University of Natal in 
Pietermaritzburg. This was a merger between the traditionally Indian University of Durban
41
 
and the more colonial Natal University College
42
 (UKZN). Kujeke (2017:83) remarks that 
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 The University of Durban-Westville began in the 1960s as a college for Indian students, and due to its rapid 
growth in numbers during the 1970’s, it was granted university status. In 1972 the university moved to its 
current Westville campus, becoming a campus that was the site for continuing anti-apartheid struggle. In 1984, 
the university became autonomous, granting access to students of all races (UKZN, n.d.).  
42
 The Natal University College was established in 1910 in Pietermaritzburg and attained independent university 
status in 1949. By this point the university had established itself as a multi-campus institution, with campuses in 
both PMB and Durban. Howard College was established in 1931 as a result of money donated by Mr T B Davis 
in memory of his son, Howard, who was killed during the First World War. In 1946, the Faculty of Agriculture 
was opened in PMB, and 1947 saw the opening of the Medical School in Durban which catered to non-white 
students (UKZN, n.d.).   
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PMB is rich in colonial history, which can still be seen today in aspects like its architecture 
and racial composition. As a result, there were many differences in institutional culture, 
traditions and histories between the newly merged campuses, leading to some tension within 
the merger. The merger was in response to the government’s restructuring plans for higher 
education institutions, beginning in the early 1990s, that saw the reduction of higher 
education institutions from 31 to 21 (UKZN, n.d.). Kujeke (2017:84) remarks that mergers 
such as this were motivated by the desire to integrate better-resourced universities with less-
resourced ones, commenting that “this was also government’s attempt to resolve the 
impending university funding crisis.” He further remarks that the FMF protests are evidence 
that this strategy has not worked, since many universities remain inadequately funded by the 
state.  
 
UKZN, like most other universities around the country, was swept up in the fees protests of 
2015 and 2016. Much has been said, both academically and in the news coverage, on the 
events taking place on the larger university campuses such as UCT and Wits. However, little 
has been written about the Fees movement on the UKZN campus. This might be because 
UCT and Wits are bigger institutions, are better known, or because they hold higher national 
and international rankings. It is also possible that the coverage that universities such as UCT 
and Wits receive, particularly from the news media, is as a result of proximity to whiteness, 
with these institutions being associated more with whiteness both historically and currently. 
As a result, the FMF protests at these institutions have been more widely and extensively 
covered, with a wealth of information published on these particular FMF movements. A 
number of scholars trace the beginning of the FMF movement to Wits (Pillay, 2016; Godsell, 
et al., 2016; Luescher, et al., 2016; Jansen, 2017:ix; Chinguno, et al., 2017:16). However, 
many UKZN students feel that the FMF movement began at UKZN and not at Wits.
43
 There 
is not much evidence to support this claim, but the tendency remains of the news media to 
only pay attention to disruptions on ‘prestigious’ university campuses. Movements such as 
FMF only seemed to become of interest once the disruptions reached these ‘prestigious’ 
institutions, which might be a factor in UKZN’s claim.  
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  There is not all that much evidence, aside from anecdotal, to support the claim of the UKZN students. Due to 
the documenting process tending to favour the larger, more prominent (white) universities such as UCT and 
Wits, the created narratives and histories of FMF tend to be skewed towards those of UCT and Wits.  
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Scholars largely agree that the protests for RMF began at UCT on 9 March 2015 and that it 
was this which led to the emergence of FMF on Wits university (Pillay, 2016:155; Booysen, 
2016:3; Naicker, 2016:54; Jansen, 2017:ix; Chinguno, et al., 2017:16). However, a point that 
is frequently ignored is that shortly after the UCT students began protesting the Rhodes 
statue, the students at UKZN focussed their efforts on the statue of King George V at Howard 
campus, Durban.
44
 This was done in response to the call by Julius Malema, the leader of the 
political party the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), for the symbols of apartheid and 
colonisation to be removed throughout the country. In this act, the students of UKZN were 
starting their cry for decolonised education. This cry then spread to all UKZN campuses, 
including PMB, which then progressed to student protest marches, led by the SRC, which 
drew attention to the status of transformation within the university as well as to the quality of 
education received by students (Kujeke, 2017:85).
45
 Examining the timeline as it is presented 
in press reporting would appear to show that UCT’s RMF was the first manifestation of the 
Fallist movement, with UKZN following shortly afterwards. However, due to the mimetic 
nature of the protests, it is difficult to accurately pinpoint the genesis of the movement, or 
whether the UCT and UKZN iterations originated independently of each other. Nevertheless, 
these protests informed the Fees protests that began in October 2015 as a protest against the 
fee increase proposed for the following year.
46
 Protest marches were organised and led by the 
UKZN SRC, who led a peaceful march of over 400 students, to the provincial legislature in 
PMB in order to hand over a memorandum to the premier. Similar protests took place on 
other UKZN campuses simultaneously, all under the hashtag #FeesMustFall (Kujeke, 
2017:86). However, regardless of where the FMF protests originated, it is noteworthy that the 
UKZN #FeesMustFall protests, while being influenced by FMF protests on other campuses, 
also have their own history and character. Thus, while FMF movements are united under a 
broad umbrella of shared desires, there are also differences in what is most important to each 
iteration of FMF.  
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 See: News24, 2016. King George V statue defaced at UKZN. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/King-George-V-statue-defaced-at-UKZN-20150326 
[Accessed 26 10 2017]. 
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 Muneinazvo Kujeke is a PhD candidate at UKZN who has based his project both on documentary research 
and on interviews and focus groups with both UKZN students and staff.   
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 See: IOL News, 2016. Students March on KZN Legislature. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/kwazulu-natal/students-march-on-kzn-legislature-1934298 
[Accessed 26 10 2017]. 
75 
 
As a result, understanding the national FMF movement is important to inform the broader 
FMF narrative and aims. However, for a fuller picture, it is also of great importance to 
understand the variances between institutions and the FMF movements that developed at each 
institution. The UKZN FMF, of which PMB FMF was a part, adopted the same intersectional 
approach as other FMF movements, and from this multitude of intersectionalities emerge a 
few dominant concerns. For the FMF movement in PMB, these are free quality higher 
education, decolonised Afrocentric education, and an end to rape culture (Grassow, 2016:21). 
These aims are articulated in numerous posts on the UKZN #FeesMustFall Facebook page,
47
 
where it is stated that “we are not going back to class till [sic] we are met with free quality 
education” (UKZN FeesMustFall Collective, 2016; 24 Aug 2016). In another post it states 
that students refused to return to class until there is “free quality decolonised Afrocentric 
socialistic education” (UKZN FeesMustFall Collective, 2016; 12 Sept 2016). These aims are 
given greater substance in an August 2016 memorandum which rejects the proposed fee 
increases as well as the new online application system for the National Student Financial Aid 
Scheme (NSFAS). It calls for, amongst other things, the cancellation of all historical student 
debt, the improvement of university infrastructure, that racist staff are fired, and that the 
university provide evidence of having dealt constructively with all cases of reported rape and 
provide clear processes for dealing with gender-based violence.  
 
Furthermore, the SRC expressed concern with the lack of decolonisation at the university, 
citing the names of buildings that had not changed, which still demonstrated a celebration of 
colonial heritage (Kujeke, 2017:88). The narrative of FMF in PMB in 2016 was marked by a 
series of student protests, to which the university responded with force in the form of private 
security and public order policing. The clashes between protestors and police became 
increasingly violent, with students attempting a variety of creative forms of peaceful 
resistance which were systematically suppressed with force by the university. This use of 
force would, in most instances, result in violence between protestors and security forces 
(Grassow, 2016:25-31). Furthermore, Kujeke (2017:89) notes an evolution in the UKZN 
FMF’s emphasis in late 2016. He explains that this situation of increasingly violent 
interaction between students and police, as well as the increasing militarisation of UKZN 
campuses, led to widespread feelings amongst the students that their voices were being 
suppressed. He remarks that:  
                                                          
47
 Found at UKZNFMF [Online], Available at: https://www.facebook.com/pg/UKZNFMF/posts [Accessed 15 
10 2016]. 
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police involvement in the movement at UKZN represented a turning point in the grievances 
that the students wished to have addressed. In a short space of time, the movement shifted 
from a call for free quality education to include a loud call against police brutality towards the 
protesting students (Kujeke, 2017:90) 
From this, the evolving and intersectional nature of the protests is apparent. What is also clear 
are the similarities between FMF movements, such as the call for fee-free tuition and 
decolonisation, as well as the differences, such as the emphasis for FMF PMB on police 
brutality.  
 
3.6. FMF AND RECONCILIATION 
In order to answer the question of whether #FeesMustFall Pietermaritzburg has been 
expressive of a protest for decolonising reconciliation in South Africa, it is first necessary to 
ask whether FMF is in fact expressing any type of reconciliation sentiment. The aims and 
principles of the FMF movement make no explicit mention of reconciliation whatsoever. This 
would appear to indicate that reconciliation is not part of the FMF discourse. This is perhaps 
reflective of a national narrative in which both the process and the concept of reconciliation 
has lost its national prominence (Thesnaar, 2017:3). Nevertheless, as explored in chapter one, 
the idea that ongoing reconciliation is needed in South Africa is one that is still supported by 
many South Africans. This prompts the question of why reconciliation is not a focal point in 
the FMF discourse. Doxtader and du Toit (2010:xiii), remarking on the broader appeal of the 
concept of reconciliation outside of the FMF context, note that there is an assumption that 
reconciliation is an empty symbol in the context of South Africa today. Furthermore, as has 
already been noted, the context out of which FMF emerged was greater than simply the 
abolishment of university tuition, but rather was connected to continuing Poverty 
Unemployment and Inequality and socio-economic inequalities.  
The leaders of universities around the country observe that the crises within universities 
throughout South Africa emerge from a “general feeling among students that the government 
had failed to deliver on the promises of the liberation struggle and on the values of the 
Constitution. The students did not feel the benefits of democracy, equality, and dignity in 
their daily lives” (Jansen, 2017:85). Max Price, the VC of UCT, in an interview with the 
author Jonathan Jansen, elaborates on the sentiments that he has heard from students about 
the current state of South Africa. He explains that the students from RMF, and later FMF, are 
connecting to a larger narrative that expresses dissatisfaction with the negotiated settlements 
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which brought an end to apartheid. This view sees the negotiated transition and those 
involved in it, particularly Nelson Mandela, as having sold-out the oppressed people of South 
Africa. Furthermore, this narrative expresses dissatisfaction with the TRC, claiming that it 
was an empty process that had never held white people accountable for apartheid atrocities, 
and that the economy is still dominated by white capital (Maluleke, 2016; Jansen, 2017:85; 
Headley & Kobe, 2017:1). This sentiment, while not explicitly documented by FMF, is an 
expression by the FMF movement of a critique of South Africa’s reconciliation process. 
While not explicitly including reconciliation into its aims and discourse, the FMF movement 
is implicitly offering commentary on the gaps in reconciliation. I argue that the FMF 
movement includes a critique of reconciliation in two forms: reconciliation and the 
disillusionment of the youth, and reconciliation and the myth of the rainbow nation, which 
leads them to conclude that reconciliation has been nothing but a distraction from real 
transformation.  
3.6.1. Reconciliation and the Disillusionment of the Youth 
The disillusionment of the FMF youth is hard to establish through the traditional forms of 
academic writings and publications, since very little has been published on this element of the 
protests. In order to explore and illustrate the disillusionment felt by the FMF youth, I use a 
selection of FMF slogans,
48
 in addition to a thought piece by prominent black feminist and 
intellectual Sisonke Msimang on the disillusionment of the FMF youth, as well as the 
writings of Jonathan Jansen, who as a former VC offers insight into the viewpoint and 
thoughts of an older generation. Some of the VCs
49
 interviewed by Jansen acknowledge a 
deep anger and resentment felt by students with regard to the economic and political climate 
of the post-1994 South African context (Jansen, 2017:82, 84). A brief survey of some of the 
FMF slogans supports this. Protest placards and slogans such as “our parents were sold 
dreams in 1994. We are here for the refund” and “Freedom includes Education” as well as 
“1976: poor; 2015: poor; #FeesMustFall”50 offer rich insights into the psyches of the 
protesting young people. These slogans all indicate that many protestors feel that there has 
been little change in economic status for many South Africans from the apartheid era to 
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 Since the students have very little opportunity  to make their voices heard through the traditional means of 
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today. This indicates a feeling of dissatisfaction from young people, who appear to be 
expressing disappointment with the economic conditions in which they find themselves.  
 
Jansen (2017), in his book reflecting on the FMF protests, offers a particular view into the 
FMF protests. His acknowledged position is that of a VC, and his intention is to portray the 
views and voices of the VCs at the institutions involved in the fees protests (Jansen, 2017:3, 
14). Jansen offers commentary on the interactions between students and university 
management, VCs and authorities during the fees protests, which gives further insight into 
the feelings of the students, helping to illustrate the generational divide between students and 
the older university managers. Furthermore, one can draw from the interactions between FMF 
protesting students and various authority figures to infer commonalities in the sentiments of 
students. In many of the student-authority figure interactions, when the authority figures 
attempted to interact with or address the students, they were met with anger from the students 
who often refused to allow space for the authority figure to speak.
51
 This behaviour by 
students points to anger and distrust of authority figures who, students seem to feel, have 
failed the young people in South Africa by not achieving greater transformation. This is also 
evident in the protest slogans of FMF students,
52
 an idea expressed by Msimang (2015) when 
she writes that:  
These young ones who have just been born do not respect authority simply because the rules 
say they should. The young ones simply have no fucks left to give. They do not care about 
preserving the credibility of those who assert themselves on the basis of what they have done 
in the past or who they once were. Only today matters because what has gone before has been 
so bitterly disappointing. This is the price that must be paid for revolutions betrayed and for 
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forgiveness squandered. The young ones will laugh you out of town if you think that authority 
comes from speaking in an authoritative voice. (Msimang, 2015) 
On numerous occasions throughout the book, Jansen pauses to spend significant time 
establishing the history and struggle credentials of both himself and the many other VCs he 
interviews (Jansen, 2017:47, 128, 136, 138, 135, 144, 145). He appears to express a view that 
the position of VC comes implicit with authority that should be automatically respected by 
students. Furthermore, Jansen expresses bewilderment that the status of the VCs, coupled 
with their struggle credentials, do not garner them respect or a position and voice that holds 
weight with the students within the FMF student movement. This expectation of Jansen, and 
other authority figures, of automatic respect based upon old struggle credentials displays a 
fundamental lack of understanding of the student protesters. Msimang (2015) explains that 
the anger and disappointment of the young people means that they are not impressed by 
struggle credentials from the past, and they consider many of these people to be hypocrites 
who have failed in the transformation project of South Africa. Nevertheless, when the 
students and their protests are framed in negative terms by people in authority like Jansen, 
who see the students as pernicious liars (2017:92,105) whose movement has been hijacked by 
competing political interests (124), as well as propagating a protest that “had transmogrified 
into a deadly vigilantism affecting university principals, their spouses and children, and the 
staff around them” (Jansen, 2017:132), it is not hard to understand how the students would be 
suspicious and disdainful of authority figures. The anger and disappointment of students, who 
felt betrayed by their struggle heroes, many of whom could not understand or support the 
FMF protests, has created a sense of deep disillusionment amongst many young people of 
South Africa. This disillusionment with the traditional struggle heroes extends to the concept 
of reconciliation, which is also perceived to have failed the youth of South Africa.  
 
3.6.2. Reconciliation and the myth of the rainbow nation 
The post-apartheid TRC process located itself within a narrative of South Africa as a rainbow 
nation. This was a phrase coined by Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu, and later accepted 
and promoted by the ANC. It was intended to give South Africans a shared national identity, 
which at the same time celebrated the multicultural dimension of the country (Tilley, 2010:5; 
van der Merwe & Sensabaugh, 2016:26; Delport & Lephakga, 2016:5). However, Gqola 
(2001:99) offers a different perspective on this idea of a rainbow nation. She comments that 
in reality, rainbows are reflections and visual illusions. She adds that the implication of being 
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part of a rainbow is that all members have “equal access to the mythic pot of gold, wealth” 
(Gqola, 2001:100). As a result, the metaphor of a rainbow nation is one which appears to 
promote the illusion of equality and unity for all.  
 
However, Gqola (2001:100) explains that since equal access to resources remains a false 
promise in South Africa, this metaphor is one which trivialises and mocks the poor who 
remain economically disempowered. She argues that the ideology of the rainbow nation is 
one which hides and dismisses the socio-economic effects of apartheid on the South African 
landscape, remarking that rainbowism “reinforces the illusion of pervasive equality and 
negates the need for equity endeavours to rectify the effects of the interlocking systems of 
apartheid, patriarchy and capitalism among others. Thus, oppressive practices can 
comfortably be equated and conflated with the endeavours designed to correct them” (Gqola, 
2001:103). She concludes that rainbowism can be a destructive force, in that it creates a false 
equality that results in the erasure of historical inequality, as well as disguising the continued 
power dynamics that ensure white power and patriarchy are sustained. Her conclusion is that 
the creation of the rainbow nation ideology has suggested that the injustices of the past have 
disappeared and that racism no longer exists in this new and equal rainbow nation (Gqola, 
2001:103-104), distorting the unequal reality. Gqola’s criticism is valid and visible within the 
contemporary South African context where the current SARB results indicate a “white 
refutation of historical profit and black impoverishment” (van der Westhuizen, 2016:174). 
 
Students of FMF are reacting to this state of affairs, and as a result they reject the concept of 
the rainbow nation and the reconciliation it implies as myth that is not reflective of reality. 
Students rejection of rainbowism is coupled with the charge levelled at Mandela of ‘selling 
out.’ They take as their reference point the Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
(CODESA) and the concessions made to the apartheid government during the negotiations of 
the transition. For the students, these concessions are representative of the continued 
concessions made to white people during the TRC and its reconciliation process. As a result, 
they blame these concessions and the TRC for the continued economic exclusion felt by 
many black people, which is often perpetuated by white economic dominance and racism. 
Students felt sold out by political leaders, and the mechanism by which this selling out 
occurred was through CODESA, the TRC and the concept of the rainbow nation (SARB, 
2015:3; Thesnaar, 2017:1; Hofmeyr, et al., 2017:9). These economic factors, coupled with 
the deep disillusionment and anger of the students of the FMF protests, has resulted in their 
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concluding that reconciliation as per the TRC has had no benefit for them, but rather has 
functioned as a distractor from real transformation within South Africa.  
 
Adding to this rejection of rainbowism is the thought and writings of Franz Fanon, who has 
been instrumental in the discourses and framing of FMF protests.
53
 Fanon (1963) writes 
suspiciously of the nationalisation narrative which is often created and narrated in the post-
colony era of many African nations. His suspicion originates with the newly-formed ruling 
elite, who he argues are unprepared for the task of taking over a country (Fanon, 1963:97). 
He argues that the newly formed bourgeoisie, either through lack of preparedness and 
ignorance or through the narcissistic desire for power, assumes it can supplant the colonial 
occupying power (Fanon, 1963:98). When this occurs, the ruling elite inherit and perpetuate 
colonial forms of power, and use nationalisation and Africanisation as the vehicles with 
which they maintain this power (Fanon, 1963:107). In reflecting on this, Mbemebe (2015:10) 
explains that the ruling elite use the idea of self-determination, through the national narrative, 
as a cover to preserve their own interests and foil any attempt at developing an authentic 
national consciousness that benefits all people. Fanon writes that the duty of this newly 
formed ruling elite should be to “learn from the people, and make available to them the 
intellectual and technical capital it culled from its time in colonial universities” (Fanon, 
1963:99). However, in place of this, the new ruling elite rely on creating a narrative of 
nationalisation in order to transfer inherited privilege from the coloniser to the ruling elite 
(Fanon, 1963:100). When students survey the South African political and economic 
landscape, they see politicians who have become wealthy in the aftermath of apartheid, often 
through corruption and misspending of public money.
54
 They also notice that they themselves 
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 In its development of ideology and discourse, FMF draws on authors such as Fanon, Biko and other Black 
Consciousness writers. For examples, see student writings on FMF such as Chinguno, C. et al., 2017. 
Introduction: Reflexivity: Decolonising the Process. In: Rioting & Writing: Diaries of the Wits Fallists. 
Johannesburg: SWOP - Wits University, pp. 16-28, or public political education classes held at UKZN PMB 
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cannot afford education and that they, their parents and their grandparents struggle to afford 
necessities such as food.
55
 The South African context seems eerily reflective of the situation 
that Fanon criticises, where colonialism is presented in the disguise of nation building. 
Furthermore, in light of Gqola’s critique of rainbowism explored earlier, it is easy to 
understand the objection that students might have to the rainbow nation reconciliation 
narrative. As such, the FMF students show little interest in discourses of reconciliation, and 
concepts of reconciliation have been rejected in favour of discourses of decolonisation. This 
is equally true for the PMB FMF movement.  
  
3.7. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has established both the broader FMF narrative as well as the particularities of 
the PMB expression of the fees protests. This chapter has shown that the fees movement did 
not develop in isolation, but rather as a result of its immediate predecessor, the 
#RhodesMustFall movement, which began calling for the transformation and decolonisation 
of university campuses. In the wake of this, many other students began to think about the 
issues they were experiencing in their everyday lives, with the cost of tuition becoming the 
most immediate and pressing of these concerns. It is out of this that the FMF movement 
emerged, adopting many of the aims and principles of the #RMF movement and expanding 
on these. While the individual protests differ in particular emphasis, all expressions of FMF 
are intersectional in their aims and principles. All are protesting for free, quality, decolonised, 
Afrocentric education.  
 
Key findings of this chapter include that the PMB movement, like many others, adopted a 
call for the end of rape culture as well as an end to the outsourcing of university workers. 
Furthermore, this chapter has demonstrated that both the #RMF and the #FMF movements 
emerged as a response to the larger PUI issues facing many South Africans today. It has also 
found that these socio-economic issues are impacted by South Africa’s history of colonialism 
and apartheid which has historically advantaged some over others, resulting in severe 
difficulties for many in meeting their everyday needs. Furthermore, this chapter has shown 
that the increasing university tuition, coupled with decreased government funding and very 
little support for students from economically disadvantaged backgrounds, has led to a 
                                                          
55
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situation where university tuition is making tertiary education increasingly inaccessible to 
many.  
 
In order to begin to understand whether movements such as FMF are expressing a call for 
reconciliation, it is important to explore FMF’s interaction with the narratives of 
reconciliation in South Africa. Key findings in this chapter are that the fees movements do 
not include reconciliation in their aims and principles in any form. This lack of interest in the 
reconciliation narrative stems from a deep disillusionment and anger within the youth 
towards the current state of affairs. Furthermore, this chapter finds that the students are 
expressing, through the FMF protests, a feeling that Mandela and the reconciliation process 
sold them out, compromising on the freedom of black South Africans. Instead, this chapter 
finds that the students express disillusionment with the current leadership of the country, who 
they feel rely on their struggle credentials in order to enrich themselves without doing 
anything to uplift the futures of their fellow South Africans. They conclude that very little has 
changed since the end of apartheid, and that while they are supposed to be free, they are still 
living in socio-economic oppression. Thus, these young people reject the narrative of the 
rainbow nation and reconciliation, which they believe has served to distract from any real 
change or transformation. As a result, this chapter shows that FMF rejects the current 
reconciliation narratives as explored in chapter one, and calls for the adoption of a 
decolonisation approach in order to effect authentic change for the majority of South Africa’s 
citizens.     
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CHAPTER 4 
#FeesMustFall: Decolonisation 
 
“The notion of a decolonised Afrocentric education goes beyond ‘fees falling’; it 
speaks to genuine inclusivity, such as access to and utilisation of land. In a social and 
political context of student protests, ‘being black’ is considered a threat and thus a 
target for state violence.” (Maringira & Gukurume, 2017:33) 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important aims of the FMF movement is a call for decolonised, Afrocentric 
education. The call for decolonisation may, at first glance, seem outdated since 
decolonisation has already taken place. However, this call involves more than a call for the 
removal of colonial occupation. It is a call for transformation of both the physical academic 
space as well as the psychological space. Through its call for free education, FMF is calling 
for the end to the coloniality of power. Where coloniality of power utilises systems such as 
capitalism to maintain power over the formerly oppressed, the FMF call for the end of 
university tuition challenges this. Their call is drawn from both the concept of education as a 
human right as well as the university as being a public good. As a result, the call for free 
education forms part of a greater call for the end of coloniality. It is a call for the system that 
maintains the hierarchy of power and oppression to be changed into one that meets the needs 
of all equally. Through its call for free education, FMF is calling for the destruction of the 
coloniality of power.  
Furthermore, the fees movement positions itself within a framework of intersectionality that 
is concerned with the larger issues of liberation, particularly for black people. Thus, in its call 
for transformation, FMF is both calling attention to the physical racial composition of 
universities as well as the construction of the curriculum and the primacy given to certain 
types of subject matter. As a result, this FMF call needs to be understood as asking for more 
than simply a change in racial composition within academia. FMF is calling for an end to the 
psychological violence experienced by black students on university campuses that are not 
representative of their lived reality and that promote the ideologies, cultures and perspectives 
of whiteness as the only way of being. It is calling for a resurgence of Black Consciousness 
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that will combat the coloniality of being which endows whiteness with humanity, goodness 
and dignity, while stripping blackness of these same properties. The call for decolonisation of 
university campuses is therefore also a call for the end of the coloniality of being. Intertwined 
within the call for the end of the coloniality of being is a call for the end of the coloniality of 
knowledge. It is a call for both the curriculum and subject matter taught to change, as well as 
a call for a shift in the paradigms and epistemological traditions of academia. As a result, 
what FMF is calling for is not decolonisation, but rather the end of the interlinking web of 
colonialities which perpetuate the colonial and apartheid legacies, keeping South Africans 
oppressed.  
4.2. FMF AND DECOLONISATION 
Within the FMF discourse, much has been said about decolonisation and decolonised 
education. This is very clearly part of the aims of the movement (Bond, 2016:192; Satgar, 
2016:216; Godsell, et al., 2016 a:102; Naidoo, 2016:180; Langa, 2017:6; Thesnaar, 2017:1; 
Posholi, 2017:18). However, very little time has been spent on exploring and defining what 
exactly is meant by this. Students call for both decolonisation of university campuses and the 
decolonisation of the curriculum, but the particulars of these processes remain unclear. It is 
useful for this discussion to unpack the meaning of decolonisation to FMF and to understand 
what the fees movement means when it calls for a decolonised curriculum and campus. The 
intention of this study is not to explore the minutiae of what a decolonised curriculum would 
look like, but rather to concentrate on providing some conceptual definition to the broader 
idea and essence of the decolonisation that FMF makes part of its aims. The call for 
decolonisation by FMF has been met with mixed reactions. As such, any exploration of this 
area needs to be undertaken while understanding that it is contested terrain with reactions and 
analyses that are often biased against any decolonisation discourse (Marawu, 2017:23).  
 
One such opinion is that of Jonathan Jansen (2017).
56
 Jansen (2017:154) remarks that in the 
midst of FMF student calls for decolonisation, they have put very little thought into what this 
means. His belief is that the students are making use of decolonisation not out of a desire for 
sincere curriculum change, but instead, he accuses, students are using the call for a 
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 Jansen has written much on decolonising the curriculum and how university curriculums can be decolonised, 
and as such in not necessarily anti-decolonisation; however, he is of the opinion that FMF is not sincere in its 
call for decolonisation, believing that the FMF call amounts to a position of non-sense. For more by Jansen on 
curriculum decolonisation, see: Jansen, J., 1998. Curriculum Reform in South Africa: A Critical Analysis of 
Outcomes-Based Education. Cambridge Journal of Education, Volume 28:321-331. 
Jansen, J., 2004. The Politics of Salvation and the School Curriculum. Verbum et Ecclesia, 25(2):784-806. 
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decolonised curriculum for its rhetorical value in garnering support for student politics 
(Jansen, 2017:163). He further charges that FMF conceptualises decolonisation as a form of 
racial essentialism, where the black African should exist without apology and to the exclusion 
of all other races. He writes that  
on campuses across South Africa, decolonisation quickly lost any sense of historical 
precedent or conceptual nuance and simply became a handy, racialised weapon to silence 
racist whites (by definition) and black compradors who stood in the way of a sharpened racial 
grievance against everything in its sight; the curriculum was simply one of those targets. 
(Jansen, 2017:168) 
Jansen (2017:165) believes that the end of apartheid brought about the overhaul of the 
curriculums of tertiary institutions, citing the many African studies courses and centres for 
African studies as proof of this. Furthermore, Jansen takes issue with the very notion of 
decolonisation as a concept that still needs to be undertaken in postcolonial South Africa. He 
argues that this very concept is false, since all South Africans now live in a constitutional 
democracy and as such all people have equal rights and a unifying national identity. Thus, he 
concludes that any calls to decolonisation are in actual fact a call to a racist black nationalism 
(Jansen, 2017:171). This, Jansen dubs the ‘non-sense’ of decolonisation. Jansen is by no 
means alone on this opinion, although he may be more eloquent and articulate in it. Marawu 
(2017:22-23) remarks that for many people, the idea of decolonisation is one where 
colonisation is reversed. This type of ‘reverse colonisation’ is one that invokes visions of 
violence and racial essentialism. It is with these sentiments that the FMF students’ calls for 
decolonisation are met.     
There are many issues with the type of argument put forward by Jansen, and as a result, there 
are also many ways to refute it. The main thrust of my argument will be that this viewpoint 
fundamentally misunderstands what FMF means and is asking for when they call for 
decolonisation. There is some truth to the claim that decolonisation has not been subject to a 
large amount of conceptual work by the FMF movement. However there are two valid 
arguments that can be made to address this criticism. The first is that it is not necessarily the 
task of the students to provide a fully-fledged, concrete conceptualisation of decolonisation. 
What the students have done is to point out a problem area that needs the attention of society, 
and it is then up to all stakeholders in that society, the students, the academics and the 
community members, to begin to tackle this problem in order to solve it. It is disingenuous 
and insulting to the students to use this as a means to silence the truth of what the students are 
asking for in their protests. The second argument is that for Jansen and others to assume that 
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simply because there are no published definitions or frameworks on how FMF conceptualises 
decolonisation, this does not mean that no thought or work has gone into it. In the many 
student gatherings and meetings, much talk and idea sharing would take place. This talk was 
informed by classes the students were taking, the thoughts they were exposed to, and the 
readings, both curricular and extra-curricular, that they were doing. To say that the students 
had put no thought into the concept of decolonisation is to insult the institutions which are 
training them, the very institutions that people like Jansen claim to respect so much.  
Furthermore, there have been some, albeit few, attempts at official, published conceptual 
definitions of decolonisation. Chinguno et al. (2017:19) offer a definition on behalf of the 
Wits FMF movement. They define decolonisation as being a rejection of “white supremacy 
and hetero-patriarchal order along with other forms of prejudice that characterize the ongoing 
colonial project, as well as the quest to redress the socio-economic, political and spiritual 
depredations of colonial history” (Chinguno, et al., 2017:19). The individual expressions of 
this across tertiary institutions vary, with some, such as the University of Limpopo students, 
arguing for decolonised education meaning to receive the same level and quality of education 
as their counterparts at the wealthier universities. Others from the historically white 
universities, such as UCT and Wits, feel that decolonisation means a curriculum that is 
reflective of their lived realities (Langa, 2017:10). Nevertheless, despite these differences in 
expression, there are also commonalities within the FMF movements that, even without 
written conceptual clarity, display and give evidence to the FMF conceptualisation of 
decoloniality. Thesnaar (2017:2) remarks that the students’ protest for decolonisation is an 
expression of a cry against a condition that still exists (colonisation), and that to claim that it 
no longer exists, as Jansen does, is to deny the truth that the student protesters make apparent. 
However, since decolonisation, understood by its strict definition, refers to the process of the 
removal of colonial power and occupation from a colonised country, this is not in actual fact 
what the fees protests are asking for. Instead, the FMF protests are demanding the removal of 
coloniality. What FMF is calling for is a tertiary educational space and curriculum that is free 
from the systems of coloniality which continue to function within contemporary society, 
despite the end of colonisation.      
4.3. FMF AND COLONIALITY 
In order to illustrate FMF’s call for coloniality and to further explore it, I will be using the 
three colonialities explored earlier in chapter 2, namely the coloniality of power, the 
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coloniality of being, and the coloniality of knowledge, and I will be examining the aims and 
actions of FMF in light of these. This will be done with particular focus, where necessary, on 
the events and narrative of the UKZN FMF protests. 
 
4.3.2. FMF AND COLONIALITY OF POWER 
As explored in chapter 2, the coloniality of power deals with created hierarchies and the 
systems used to maintain it. The particular focus in this section will be on the systems of 
finance and capitalism that maintain the coloniality of power and the ways in which FMF 
protests these systems in respect to tertiary education.   
4.3.2.1. Free Education 
It has already been established that free tertiary education is the primary aim of all FMF 
movements; however, there has been limited focus on the individual and collective 
circumstances that would both prompt and motivate a case for free education. Chapter 1 
established the multitude of PUI issues haunting the South African landscape. The students at 
South African universities are not exempt from these. Chetty and Knaus (2016) note that 60 
percent of students registering for tertiary education around South Africa are black African, 
but only 15 percent of these will graduate, and the high drop-out rate is largely due to the 
impact of poverty on the lives of the students. For many students, the struggle only begins 
with being accepted into university and finding funding for tuition. The country’s president, 
Zacob Zuma, has made comments indicating that he believes that the country’s universities 
cost too much to run. Addressing the ANC’s 2015 anniversary celebrations, he stated that he 
believed that the country was making good progress with providing financial assistance to 
poorer students. This was said in spite of the continuing difficulties faced by both students 
and tertiary institutions with accessing this funding.
57
 He further cautioned that increasing 
tuition costs make tertiary education inaccessible to poor students, and that this was a cause 
for concern for him and the ANC (Nkosi, 2014). However, this was said against the backdrop 
of government underfunding of universities, where SA’s allocation of funds to universities is 
considered low even when compared to other African nations (Nkosi, 2015). The discrepancy 
between statements and policy imply either a lack of true understanding of the depth of the 
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funding crisis at tertiary level, or a government that does not place high value on making 
tertiary education available to all people. 
Aside from issues of tuition and registration, many students are also faced with obstacles 
such as paying for and finding accommodation and food.
58
 Furthermore, there is a substantial 
gap between the cost of residence with food and residence without food, with the price of 
food-inclusive residences sometimes doubling the cost of accommodation. As a result, lack of 
financial resources can result in students being forced to choose between food or 
accommodation (Vakil, 2017). Machika and Johnson (2014), both researchers working at 
Vaal University of Technology, remark that tertiary intuitions need to take into account the 
impact of the poverty conditions under which many students live, and how these affect 
students’ chances of academic success. For these students, a tertiary education is their chance 
to better their and their families’ economic conditions and prospects. However, these chances 
are severely jeopardised without the financial resources to support themselves throughout 
their tertiary education career. This results in a situation where students are “preoccupied 
with finding ways of addressing and meeting their other financial needs such as living, 
accommodation, resources for assignments and registration fees” (Machika & Johnson, 
2014). As a result, their conclusion is that the model of South African tertiary education 
which focuses primarily on funding through student fees results in the needs of poor students 
not being adequately met, putting unneeded stress on them which hinders their chances of 
success. This takes place against the backdrop of decreasing state funding for universities, 
causing universities to attempt to offset this lack of funding by increasing university tuition, 
exacerbating the plight of poor students. 
4.3.1.2. ‘Welfareisation’ of Universities 
A common response to the FMF demand for free education is argued for by Jansen (2017) 
when he discusses the increasing ‘welfareisation’ of South Africa’s universities. He 
comments that “in recent years South African universities have gradually taken on more and 
more social welfare functions that stretch way beyond what was previously expected from a 
modern university” (Jansen, 2017:177). He explains the increasing roles that universities 
have taken in sourcing and providing accommodation, transport, health services, 
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psychological services and food banks for students. These are provided to give socio-
economic support to struggling students. However, all of these extra services make demands 
on the university budget which is already under pressure due to decreasing government 
support and the inability of students to carry the extra financial burden (Wasserman, 2017). 
Jansen (2017:174) argues that the students who are currently at tertiary institutions are some 
of the first to enter the university system after having been raised with government assistance. 
He argues that these students grew up with parents who received grants to support their 
children and these children went to government supported schools, receiving food and other 
such assistance from state coffers. He concludes that this has led to a culture amongst 
university students where there is the expectation of assistance to meet all socio-economic 
challenges, whether this be from the university or from the government. Jansen (2017:174) 
argues that in this, the move to university no longer represents a life change, but rather is 
representative of a continuation of the expectations of students in the provision of welfare.  
The implication of Jansen’s framing of this argument is that it is not the duty of universities 
to provide welfare or other assistance to students, and that to do so creates expectations of 
further assistance and dependency, where students show no desire for independence. 
Speaking at a public lecture at the Cape Peninsula University of Technology (CPUT) in 2016, 
Jansen argues that the type of welfare expectation that has led to the call for fees to fall is one 
that will drive top academics and middle-class, fee-paying students away from universities, 
thus dooming South African universities to mediocrity and failure (Kansley, 2016).
59
 This 
argument is composed of four key elements: the idea that university education is a privilege; 
the idea that this education is a commodity; the idea that welfare breeds entitlement and 
dependency; and the idea that fee-free tertiary education is unattainable and unsustainable. 
This narrative is echoed by others who argue that the scarcity of resources make paying fees 
unavoidable, and that the introduction of fee-free tertiary education would be placing a 
greater burden on an already burdened economy. They further argue that this is a burden that 
will only benefit students, and not society at large (Vally, Motala, Hlatshwayo, & Maharajh, 
2016). These concepts are all problematic, even though they are frequently used as arguments 
against the FMF call for free education. 
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4.4.1.3. The Right to Education 
The South African Bill of Rights, as enshrined in The Constitution,
60
 forms a vital and 
integral part of the South African democracy.
61
 It has been argued that “South Africans boast 
of a constitution that is among the most progressive and human-rights friendly in the world,” 
and a state of the art instrument that sets an example worthy of emulation (Villa-Vicencio, 
2005:231). The opening lines of the Bill of Rights enshrine the rights of all the people in the 
country, and affirm that these rights are based on the values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom (South African Government, 1996:5). Human rights are that which all human beings 
can claim simply though virtue of their humanity. These rights are inherent to all people, 
regardless of their race, gender, nationality, origin or language. The idea of human rights is 
one that recognises the individual moral agency of each person while showing concern for 
their vulnerability. Furthermore, while human rights deals with the agency and vulnerability 
of each individual, it also concerns the community or human collective (Ishay, 2004:2; 
Barnett & Bucar, 2005:3; Palm, 2015:21; Grassow & Le Bruyns, 2017:1). Furthermore, 
Villa-Vicencio (2005:241) remarks that the African notion of Ubuntu is a visible expression 
of human rights ideals in South Africa, where Ubuntu is a way of framing and understanding 
the world that sees membership of a community as the ultimate expression of personhood. As 
a result, South African human rights, as conceptualised and enshrined in the Bill of Rights, 
encompass both ideals of law and Ubuntu. These rights are thus understood in light of the 
concept of Ubuntu where the process of creating a space for all to flourish, through the living 
out of the human rights ideals, is as important as the rules themselves.  
Within these basic rights is also enshrined the right to education. The South African Bill of 
Rights states that everyone has the right “to further education, which the state, through 
reasonable measures, must make progressively available and accessible” (South African 
Government, 1996:12; section 29b). This right is further supported by the newly published 
Veracruz Declaration
62
 (The Talloires Network, 2017). The document recognises the 
difficulties that universities and their communities face, including racism and increasing 
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socio-economic distress. In this changing context, “the declaration affirms that education is a 
universal human right and that universities have the responsibility to promote and address 
this” (Grassow & Le Bruyns, 2017:2). The declaration then establishes that institutions of 
higher learning have the responsibility to create environments that promote this right, and that 
these institutions are places where human dignity and responsibility are taught and 
experienced. The Veracruz Declaration (The Talloires Network, 2017:1) is established on the 
belief that all have a right to education; the rights to opportunities for leadership and 
economic improvement, and the right to their own livelihood. It is the responsibility of all 
stakeholders, namely staff, students and community members, to establish and promote this. 
Thus, education is understood as a human right which should be available to all people. 
Furthermore, in the South African context, this should be understood in light of the notion of 
Ubuntu, where the community cares for the well-being and rights of all. When weighing up 
the costs of the ‘welfareisation’ of the public university, this needs to be done while keeping 
in mind the right of every person to access education and the duty of the state and all 
members of the South African community to make this available and accessible to all.   
4.4.1.4. The Public Good  
There is another compelling argument made against the ‘welfareisation’ of tertiary education. 
This argument is that education, and by extension tertiary education, is a public good 
(Stiglitz, 1999; Vally, et al., 2016; Naidoo, et al., 2016). Stiglitz (1999:308) explains that in 
order for something to be understood as a public good, it must possess two properties: the 
property of non-rivalrous consumption, and the property of non-excludability. Non-rivalrous 
consumption indicates that consumption by one individual does not, and cannot, detract from 
consumption by another individual. Knowledge and education are non-rivalrous. It is possible 
for one person to enjoy and consume knowledge without detracting from the ability of 
another to do the same. The additional cost of consumption for an extra individual is 
marginal, and in no way detracts from the benefits of sharing knowledge, thus making it 
desirable to include people in knowledge sharing. Furthermore, Stiglitz (1999:309) explains 
that the property of non-rivalrous consumption implies that knowledge cannot be privately 
provided, since this would imply a cost being attached to the knowledge, and thus preventing 
consumption when the additional cost to consumption is, in reality, marginal. This does not 
deny that an individual may have to expend resources in the acquisition of this knowledge, 
and as a result “private providers can provide the ‘transmission’ for a charge reflecting the 
marginal cost of transmission while at the same time the good itself remains free” (Stiglitz, 
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1999:309). The principle of non-excludability holds that it is not possible to exclude an 
individual from the benefits of the good. In other words, while the principle of non-rivalrous 
consumption says that no one should be excluded, the principle of non-excludability says that 
no one can be excluded from public goods (Stiglitz, 1999:309). This conception argues that it 
would be detrimental to the public good for knowledge to be privatised, and as a result the 
implication for public policy is that the state should play a role in the provision of such public 
good in order to prevent their undersupply (Stiglitz, 1999:311). Valley et al. (2016) remark 
that education as a public good is vital to developing people and the broader democratic 
society, and that it is important that public resources be used in order to promote and 
engender this. They argue that understanding education in this way can help to create a more 
socially just South Africa. Furthermore, the majority of South African’s tertiary institutions 
are government funded to some extent.  This implies that, to some degree, the state agrees 
with the concept of education as a public good, and as such, engaging the debate for free 
education must also engage the argument for education as a public good. 
 
Education is both a human right and, as shown through the arguments above, it is a public 
good. Yet when the financing of education is discussed, it is most often discussed in 
corporatist terms such as ‘cost-benefit ratios,’ ‘the rates of return,’ ‘feasibility’ and the 
‘economics of education,’ resulting in a system that is overly concerned with the principles of 
the university as a business and not as a human right or public good (Mbembe, 2015:7; Vally, 
et al., 2016; Mashabela, 2017:2).
63
 Speaking of education in these terms is to place tertiary 
education within the constructs of capitalism, which frames education as a commodity to be 
bought and sold. Hadebe (2017:1) remarks that this has “transformed education into a product 
whose value lies in its marketability.” This type of commodification discourse imposes ideas 
such as there being limited resources available for public education, thus justifying the 
increasing costs of tertiary education. However, “this approach is merely a way of inserting 
the agendas of private appropriation and accumulation into the domain of public good. It has 
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allowed the evolution of what has become a global ‘education industry’. This has led to the 
rise of corporate empires intent on commodifying education” (Vally, Motala, Hlatshwayo, & 
Maharajh, 2016). This corporatisation also impacts the public good with Ahmed (2017) 
remarking that: 
For those of us privileged enough to have purchased a formal education, we recognize 
the limits of this kind of learning. The corporatization of universities compels professors to 
spend most of their time publishing papers in peer reviewed journals that only five and a 
half people will read. There is little incentive to teach; let alone be a good teacher. But here’s 
the kicker: as recipients of this kind of education who know that sitting in a crowded lecture 
theatre is largely a waste of time (and money), we continue to believe and invest in this 
traditional system of learning. Worse still, we dismiss any other form of education that fails to 
imitate the antiquated classroom model. 
The increasing university costs, including the socio-economic costs, serve as an obstacle so 
large as to make tertiary education practically unattainable for many of South Africa’s 
students.  
 
This is not only an issue of race,
64
 but also one of class, where the cost of attaining an 
education is so high as to be only available to the middle-
65
 and upper-classes. What Jansen 
calls the welfareisation of the university is a recognition, on the part of tertiary institutions 
and government, of the continued existence of class inequality that makes access to education 
so difficult for so many.  It is an attempt to narrow the poverty and social inequality gap 
which colonialism and apartheid have imposed on people (Ramadiro, 2017:3). When tertiary 
education is commodified, it becomes inaccessible to large sectors of society, especially in a 
country with as much widespread poverty as South Africa. When tertiary education is not 
accessible to all people, this is a violation of the human rights of those who cannot access 
education, and it deprives the greater community of the public good benefit derived from 
education and knowledge being freely available to all. Furthermore, in line with the concerns 
of this dissertation, “commodification denies many students access to higher education and 
opportunities to improve their lives, [which is] an issue of social injustice” (Hadebe, 2017:2). 
In order to ensure that the rights of all to education are met, it is vital that education is 
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understood as a public good. However, this is not possible so long as education intertwined 
with capitalist dogma, which sees students as customers and education as the product being 
sold (Mbembe, 2015:8). When FMF calls for free education, they are not calling for the end 
of the university, a hand out or a free ride. Based on the public discourses of FMF and their 
focus on decoloniality, they are calling for the restoration of human rights to all and for 
education to be understood as a public good and not a commodity.  They call for the end to a 
system of commodified education that sees some excluded from educational opportunities as 
a result of not being able to pay fees. This is a call for the end of the system of coloniality of 
power. 
4.4.1.5.Progress of FMF funding 
Since FMF began its calls for free education, it has drawn attention to the funding crisis 
within tertiary education. This has caused some reaction from government, universities, 
companies and private individuals in an attempt to find solutions to this problem. The state 
agreed to a zero percent fee increase for 2016 and to expand its NSFAS program to include a 
larger range of students (Bond, 2016:193; Langa, 2017:8). The government also agreed to 
establish a special fees commission to investigate the feasibility of free education.
66
 This 
report has been viewed negatively, being seen as sluggish in coming to completion and as 
unfocused in its aims and construction. Furthermore, the framing of the report has been in 
reference to the feasibility of free education while “its mandate holds no clear and tangible 
commitment to exploring ‘fee free education’” (Naidoo, Hlatshwayo, Maharajh, & Marawu, 
2016). The commission understood its mandate to be to explore the feasibility of higher 
education, including understanding why the call for fee-free education emerged and what the 
constitutional obligations are in this regard (Heher, Ally, & Khumalo, 2017:149). The 
framing of the commission’s mandate in these terms would appear to indicate no real 
commitment to looking for ways of making education free, but rather functioning as a report 
                                                          
66
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http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/sites/default/files/Commission%20of%20Inquiry%20into%20Higher%20Educ
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looking at whether free education is possible or not.
67
 The commission, in its report, 
acknowledges that the call for ‘fee-free’ education bears little practical significance to the 
lives of students if it does not take into account the full cost of studying. They acknowledge 
that tertiary education is prohibitive not only because of the cost of institutional tuition, but 
also because of the cost of living, namely funds for food, transport, rent, books and 
stationary, and that this needs to be taken into account (Heher, Ally, & Khumalo, 2017:105). 
Amongst other things, the report concludes that all have a right to education, and the state 
must take reasonable measures to make higher education available. However, it also 
concludes that there is “not a right to free further education” (Heher, Ally, & Khumalo, 
2017:111). It recognises that costs can make tertiary education inaccessible for many 
students, and in order to make meaningful the right of access, assistance is necessary (Heher, 
Ally, & Khumalo, 2017a:1).  
The commission also concludes that there is “insufficient financial capacity in the state to 
provide totally free higher education and training to all who are unable to finance their own 
education, let alone all students” (Heher, Ally, & Khumalo, 2017a:2). As a result, the 
commission proposes amendments to the current funding model in an attempt to provide 
some assistance to financially needy students, as well as recommending that government 
funding for tertiary institutions should increase to 1% of the country’s GDP (Heher, Ally, & 
Khumalo, 2017a:3). Nevertheless, the commission can only make recommendations. 
Whether or not these recommendations are acted upon depends on the South African 
government. However, despite these recommendations, on the eve of the ANC’s annual 
elective conference, President Zuma announced that there would be free education for over 
90 percent of the country’s students beginning in 2018. This announcement took many, 
including members of his own ruling party, by surprise. The President did not provide details 
on how this would happen or where the money to fund this would be found.
68
 The country is 
yet to see whether this promise will be fulfilled, and how this will take place.  
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As already touched on, other creative attempts at funding for students include #Feet4Fees, a 
sponsored hike, UCT appealing to parents to sponsor the fee increase for other students, as 
well as a crowdsourcing platform developed by Standard Bank. These initiatives all indicate 
that the fees protests have been heard and have changed the landscape of tertiary education. 
However, all of these attempts miss the key point to the FMF protest’s call for free education. 
The call for free education is a call for the end of a system which causes the loss of human 
rights for some and the loss of the public good for all. This call is a call for the dismantlement 
of the coloniality of power. Coloniality of power uses systems such as capitalism in order to 
maintain systems of hierarchy where a few are in possession of power to the detriment of the 
many. By understanding and framing tertiary education in terms of business and commodity, 
education remains out of reach for many, and it is the capitalist system than ensures that this 
remains so. Thus, embodied in the call for free education is a call for decoloniality, a call for 
the end of the coloniality of power which continues to oppress South Africans.  
4.4.2. FMF AND COLONIALITY OF BEING  
4.3.2.1. The Violence of Being Black  
Chinguno et al. (2017:24) remark on the intersectionality of the FMF movement, saying that 
it does not take place in isolation from the greater struggle for the liberation and dignity of 
black people. FMF locates this struggle within the academy, charging academia and academic 
spaces with a lack of transformation. The FMF protests pick up on RMF’s call for 
transformation within tertiary education, saying that “academia is a space defined by 
whiteness that often silences Black voices” (Chinguno, et al., 2017:24). The composition of 
academic teaching staff, professors and academics is frequently cited as evidence of this lack 
of transformation. One Mail and Guardian article reports statistics that appear to support this 
claim, noting that despite an increase in black academics, three quarters of the professoriate at 
South Africa’s top universities remain white (Govender, 2016).69 Furthermore, the statistics 
from 13 of the country’s universities reveals that only 9.8% of professors are black, 6.6% 
Indian and 3.1% are coloured; thus, the vast majority of professors at these universities are 
white (71.4%). These demographics remain similar for associate professors, with only 14% 
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being black (Govender, 2016). Of these 13 universities, only two, the Tshwane University of 
Technology and the University of Zululand, showed a higher number of black professors than 
white ones. Langa (2017:27) explains that one of the key motivations for the merging of 
tertiary institutions after apartheid was to facilitate transformation. What the FMF protests for 
decolonisation highlight is that the space of the academy is still dominated by a 
disproportionate number of white scholars, thus lending credibility to the calls for the 
decolonisation of the academic space. In the sense that academia is still almost exclusively 
physically occupied by white people, the FMF call for decolonisation could be understood as 
being a call for the physical process of decolonisation of the academy. 
 
However, not all universities show such disproportionate numbers of white and black staff. 
UKZN reports a demographic staff profile that has increased from only 47% black academic 
staff in 2004 to 61% black staff in 2015 (UKZN, 2015). This would thus indicate some 
attempt and success at achieving the transformation of the racial demographics of the 
university. Nevertheless, the protest aims of the UKZN FMF movement also included the call 
for the decolonisation of the university, indicating that there is more to this call than simply a 
call for physical decolonisation. The FMF movement is informed by key thinkers such as 
Steve Biko, Franz Fanon, Ngugu wa Thiong’o and Robert Sobukwe, who engage with ideas 
of Black Consciousness, Pan-Africanism and decoloniality (Naidoo, 2016:184). The thought 
of Steve Biko and his conception of Black Consciousness (BC) is particularly important to 
the FMF movement. Maringira and Gukurume (2017:40) explain that the FMF movement is 
inspired by BC and its advocacy for an ideology of ‘black is beautiful.’ Biko (2005), writing 
during the height of apartheid, argues that the world in which black people exist is one where 
they are oppressed.  
 
This oppression exists in all aspects of the black person’s life, including work conditions, 
poor pay, poor education and difficult living conditions (Biko, 2005:101). This oppression, 
Biko (2005:90) links to racism, which sees white people enjoying a position of privilege as a 
result of being white, and black people relegated to a position below that of white people 
where they are considered less intelligent, less capable and possessing less humanity. In this 
regard, he remarks that “so immersed are they [white people] in prejudice that they do not 
believe that blacks can formulate their thoughts without white guidance and trusteeship” 
(Biko, 2005:90). Biko (2005:89) explains that this racism extends beyond a solely individual 
experience, but rather is institutionalised such that white people reap the benefits of wealth, 
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security and prestige at the cost of black people. Fanon’s (1963:2) sentiment is similar. He 
explains that the coloniser created the system in which both the coloniser and the colonised 
exist, and out of which the coloniser derives validation, meaning and wealth. Biko (2005:89) 
then argues that the views which see black people as inferior are used as justification to 
support the lie of continued racism and inequality. Oliver Thambo’s views (2014:268) 
complement this idea, as he explains that racism is the by-product of colonialism and plays an 
integral role in its maintenance, thus allowing the continued domination of black people by 
white people. He points out that racism thus does not exist in a vacuum, but rather is “is a 
product, a component part and a reflection of exploitative social relations, a form of 
expression of these relations and a means for their justification and perpetuation.” Biko 
(2005:91) concludes that in the face of such strong white racism, the best answer is a strong 
black solidarity. Out of this, Biko develops his idea of Black Consciousness, which he sees as 
the expression of “group pride and the determination of the black to rise and attain the 
envisaged self” (Biko, 2005:93). The philosophy of Black Consciousness is one where black 
people are reframed with restored dignity and humanity, as no longer inferior to white people, 
but rather as being complete and equal human beings. It promotes pride in being black in the 
face of a system that tells black people that their humanity has no value, and encourages 
black people to see whiteness as no more desirable than blackness (Biko, 2005:93, 101). It is 
this philosophy that informs the FMF call for decolonisation.  
 
Naidoo (2016:181) explains that the last few years have shown a resurgence of Pan-African 
and BC thought on university campuses and in student organisations around the country. She 
remarks that this is particularly apparent at the historically-white universities, and comes 
about as a result of black students’ experiences within these spaces. When expressing how 
they feel within the tertiary education spaces, many black students describe their experiences 
as being conscious of their blackness within traditionally white institutional spaces, and they 
describe the tertiary education experience as alienating. One student, Zama Mthunzi 
(2017:20), speaks of his feelings as a black student at Wits University, saying:  
…our speech as black people is always tempered [sic] with. Black speech is never voluntary 
speech. Whiteness makes us, black people; think twice before we speak and after we have 
spoken. You always have to ask yourself whether you should speak and what will happen 
should you decide to speak. 
Another student explains how the black student is constantly reminded about their fortune in 
receiving tertiary education, and reminded to be proud of this fact. However, at the same 
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time, the university spaces in which they exist are ones where the cultures and practices 
remain largely unchanged since apartheid. He remarks on this strange mix of being made to 
feel grateful while at the same time being made to feel unwelcome in spaces where the 
institutional culture is still reflective of apartheid South Africa, resulting in the poor and 
black students always remaining alienated and excluded (Mbambo, 2017:40). Still other 
students speak about the difficulties of understanding lectures when the translation devices 
work poorly and where  
it seems time and time again that our cries aren’t in close proximity to the “right” type of 
whiteness to be heard, to the perfect blend of melanin for those in power or even our fellow 
students nationwide to intervene. We occasionally ponder if we are too black for those in 
power and too white for our fellow students. To live and study in a system created for white, 
Afrikaner, Christian, heterosexual, middle class males, is impossible. At this institutions 
foundation, its current and previous management and external funding has the interest of their 
own at heart rather than that of the African child (Varachia & Mosala, 2017:44). 
These students are giving voice to discontent with the rate of a different type of 
transformation within the academy. While there is discontent with the ratio of black to white 
academic staff, the sentiments of these students speak to a larger discontent. Not only is the 
academic space not reflective of the physical reality of black people, but it is also not 
reflective of the ideological, cultural and lived reality of black students. Maringira and 
Gukurume (2017:33) describe the challenges faced by post-apartheid students as a collection 
of challenges which “include a continuation of racial oppression and the perpetuation of 
inequality, which is reified through institutions like universities.” As a result, despite the 
ending of apartheid, what students are expressing is an experience of their tertiary institutions 
as spaces which perpetuate the ideology of whiteness as the ideal, and which function and 
teach from positions of white experience and authority. Therefore, despite ideologies such as 
BC being written during and for a time of apartheid, they still find resonance within the lives 
of black students who find themselves in positions echoing those of their forebears during 
apartheid.   
 
According to Varachia and Mosala (2017:44), it is this which prompted students to realise 
that they had had enough, and that they would no longer allow a situation to go unchallenged 
where public institutions ‘accommodate’ black students within white spaces. This realisation 
is part of a larger awareness which understands that the status quo is one that is violent 
towards black people. This violence extends beyond physical violence. Violence is 
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experienced on a psychological and symbolic level within a system that is constantly 
invalidating the experiences and lived reality of the black students though its normalisation 
and institutionalisation of whiteness (Motimele, 2017:5; Langa, 2017:8). As a result, the FMF 
protests are about the failure of South Africa to address the historical inequalities which 
frame whiteness as ideal, and in so doing cause violence to black people through implying 
that to be black is to be less than white. For students, these protests are then about the BC 
quest for the restoration of the humanity and dignity of black people through the end of 
systemic racism within the spaces of the academy (Langa, 2017:8; Maringira & Gukurume, 
2017:37).  
 
Mbembe (2015:5) explains this movement as black students calling for access to education 
and for educational spaces where they feel like they have the right to belong. This is a call for 
spaces which have worked to create the conditions necessary for both black staff and black 
students to feel welcome and to feel equal ownership of academic spaces, without feeling like 
they need to apologise for themselves, or that their existence is merely tolerated so long as 
they successfully assimilate into a culture that is not theirs. This, he argues, can only be 
achieved through the demythologising of whiteness. He argues that the mythologising of 
whiteness positions being white as all-encompasing and as the origin of all thought, thus 
creating itself as omnipotent and pervasive. This ideology is corrosive and needs to be 
“recalled and de-commissioned if we are to put history to rest, free ourselves from our own 
entrapment in white mythologies and open a future for all here and now” (Mbembe, 2015:4). 
BC’s call for a black solidarity70 that promotes pride in being black in the face of systemic 
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 BC’s call for black solidarity should not be understood as a call for black solidarity to the exclusion of all 
else, but rather a call for black solidarity in the face of pervasive and systemic racism as an attempt to counter-
balance the pervasive narrative of white superiority. Likewise, FMF’s call for BC and decolonisation is not a 
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to become one that, instead of representing only one culture (white culture), is one that is representative of all 
people and where all people can find affirmation of their being. The FMF call for the academy to become more 
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racism is an articulation of a call for the end of the coloniality of being. As explored earlier, 
coloniality of being describes a system of hierarchy that positions white people, and all that 
being white entails, as superior to black people, and everything that has to do with blackness. 
It is also about a system which positions men over women, Christianity over other religions, 
and heterosexual and cisgender people over sexual and gender minorities. Arguably, BC 
emerged as a result of the coloniality of being, as an opposition to its oppression. 
Furthermore, FMF reliance on the writings and themes of BC shows a recognition of the 
coloniality of being within academic spaces. Thus, FMF’s inclusion of BC in their protest 
narratives can be understood as including a call for the end of the coloniality of being. The 
intersectionality of the FMF protests means that not only is FMF calling for the end of the 
coloniality of power through the call for free decolonised education, but it is also calling for 
the end to the coloniality of being.    
 
4.3.2.2. The Violence of Being Women   
An integral element in many FMF protests was a gendered, feminist protest. This represents 
the continuation of the intersectionality of the protest movement, this time with a focus on the 
intersection of gender and FMF’s decolonisation aims. It is driven, in large part, by black 
African feminists
71
 attempting to draw attention to their experiences as being both black and 
women within systems that are male- and white-dominated (Marawu, 2017:23). This aspect 
of the FMF protests most commonly takes the form of a protest of violence committed 
against women, specifically a call for an end to rape culture. Rape culture can be defined as 
“the set of widespread beliefs and behaviours which promote rape and sexual violence in 
society” (Chengeta, 2017:12).72 These protests gave rise to various hashtag movements 
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within the fees protests around the country, such as #IAmOneInThree (Wits), 
#EndRapeCulture (Stellenbosch University); #RUReferenceList (Rhodes University), 
#UCTSpeaksBack (UCT) and the more general hashtags #EndRapeCulture and 
#RapeCultureMustFall/ #RapeMustFall. Miller (2016:272) remarks that these female activists 
are a radical force within the FMF protest movement, employing radical feminist tactics, such 
as stripping naked to draw attention to their protests. One such protest took place on the 
Rhodes University campus, on 19 April 2016, where female students gathered en mass, 
blocking one entrance to the university. Many of the young women stood topless in an 
attempt to draw attention to their protest of the rape culture they experienced within the 
university. This protest elicited a forceful response from the university, who called in the 
police to disperse the protesting students. Chengeta (2017:12), who took part in the protest, 
remarks that this was “a confusing response to a group of topless, vulnerable, singing young 
students protesting rape. It stung more given the fact that the police fail victims of sexual 
assault so often in South Africa but on this day, had come out in full force.”  
 
Like other universities around South Africa, UKZN picked up this call, incorporating it as an 
important part of its protest aims. This did not happen until later in 2016. In the second half 
of 2016, the situation on UKZN’s PMB campus shifted, with clashes between students and 
security services becoming increasingly violent as a result of the increasing militarisation of 
the campus (Grassow, 2016:30). By the third day of FMF protests early in August 2016, the 
police and private security forces were reacting to the student protests by firing on protestors 
with paintball pellets and rubber bullets (Wicks, 2016). Following this escalation came a 
report in early September by a PMB female student of being raped by a police officer (Pijoos, 
2016; Umraw, 2016; Singh, 2016). The rape allegation caused much controversy, with police 
denying that it happened and even refusing to open a case, thus causing the student to travel 
to Durban to open her case of rape (Umraw, 2016; Moodley, 2017:48). This sparked outrage 
from the UKZN students, who organised a protest against rape culture on 7 September 2016 
on the PMB campus. This protest was peaceful in nature, with all protestors wearing black to 
indicate mourning and included artworks, placards and condoms, followed by a female 
student-led discussion on rape culture (Grassow, 2016:30; Umraw, 2016; Moodley, 2017:48). 
The university management added to this controversy by releasing an official statement that 
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both condemned rape and implied that the student’s claim was false73 (Grassow, 2016:42). 
The protest against rape culture continued after the September break, with students 
organising a night vigil to be held on the PMB sports field. Participants were invited to 
participate in a time of communal storytelling, either by listening or by telling their own 
stories. Continuing the theme of mourning and remembrance, all were asked to bring a 
candle.
74
 The protest to end rape culture extended to include discussions on patriarchy and 
feminism. This discussion formed a continuous thread that can be found throughout the 
various PMB FMF protests, such as in a prayer vigil where those who had experienced sexual 
violence were remembered and prayed for, and in a poetry session held where the prominent 
black feminist poet, Koleka Putuma, was the guest performer.
75
       
 
These protests seek the end of a culture of violence which gives rise to and sustains a culture 
where rape is accepted and allowed. Additionally, they are protests against the systems which 
create this culture. Students, many of whom are young black women, are protesting historical 
systems of colonisation and patriarchy which position men as more valuable and with more 
agency than women. It is a protest which is highlighting the privileging of the male 
experience over the female experience, and which calls for the creation of safe space within 
university institutions, and by extension society, that recognise and are respectful of the lived 
realities of women and LGBTIAQ+ people. Ultimately, it is a call for a more equal and just 
society, which is representative of the realities of all people and not only of males (Miller, 
2016:273; Moodley, 2017:48; Marawu, 2017:23; Ratele, 2017:55; White, 2017:28).  
 
However, this protest is one that does not only criticise the university institution for its 
maintenance of patriarchal coloniality and rape culture, but also levels criticism against the 
FMF movement itself. The women and the gender and sexual minorities of the FMF protests 
challenge the leaders of the student movements to both reflect on the way in which the 
university perpetuates patriarchy, while simultaneously reflecting on their own leadership 
styles and practices. They highlight the hetero-patriarchal structures unconsciously embedded 
within the construction of the FMF movement and university culture (Langa, 2017:11; 
Chinguno, et al., 2017:25). The emergence of the rape culture protests has often been met 
with a counter narrative by male FMF students, arguing that the inclusion of these 
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intersectionalities would cause a division of resources and energies. These students argue that 
the rape culture concerns of the women students should be set aside for the time being in 
favour of achieving the main aim of the movement, namely free education (Naidoo, 
2016:183). One female student remarks that 
patriarchy expected you to, once again, sacrifice your rage against the normalization of sexual 
violence, to, once again, be silent about the impoverished logic of rape culture, to suppress 
your pain about the historical & systematic intimidation of rape victims and those who 
believe them. But you showed patriarchy that your body belongs to you; you dressed up in 
Black, mobilized students, made some protest banners, collectively got on your knees to pray 
for protection and then marched and raised your fists at rape culture (Moodley, 2017:48) 
This desire to shift away from FMF’s intersectionalities by some, mostly male, FMF students 
was experienced by female protesters, and those from gender and sexual minorities, as being 
prompted by the discomfort of these males in being called to examine their own individual 
patriarchies and homophobia.  
 
The female students experienced this as violence and domination directed at them from 
within the FMF movement (Naidoo, 2016:183; White, 2017:28; Mooketsi, 2017:3). Another 
student remarks on her experience within the FMF movement:  
Even when I am met with contempt by hateful men who make egregious demands for my 
queer as Black ‘solidarity’ because it is convenient, and this hatefulness is reduced to ‘Black 
Man’s Anxiety’ (this is a real thing) with little interrogation. Even when the existence of so 
called Revolutionary spaces are not exempt from being a site of sexual violence. Even when 
we build movements with people whom we fear and this fear quite literally threatens our 
collective wellness. Even when we die multiple deaths; Black feminist resistance still brings 
me back to a place of hope where I am able to will myself back to life in service of a world 
beyond this one. The quiet revolution has kept me wanting to seek community with people 
who look like me, even if their Revolution would rather have me dead. (White, 2017:28)  
This call for the end of rape culture, as well as the systems of patriarchal colonial domination 
that sustain it, form part of the greater FMF call for the decoloniality of being. The feminist 
fallists’ call for the change in patriarchal domination is one which recognises the structures of 
the coloniality of being which position men over women and hetero-patriarchal Christian 
constructions of gender and family over all alternatives. As a result, in calling for rape culture 
to fall, these fallists are making a call for the coloniality of being to fall. However, this is a 
call levelled at both the university, which protects rapists without protecting female students 
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from rape, and male counterparts in the FMF movement, who both perpetuate and uphold 
these systems of being which keep women, and gender and sexual minorities, oppressed. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
4.4.3. FMF AND COLONIALITY OF KNOWLEDGE 
The FMF call for decolonised education’s most obvious interpretation is that of a decolonised 
or changed curriculum. The most memorable of these calls came in the form of a call for the 
decolonisation of science under the hashtag #ScienceMustFall
76
. The origin of this hashtag 
can be traced to a video
77
 that spread on social media in late 2016 of a UCT student, 
participating in a debate on the decolonising of the sciences at UCT, calling for science to 
fall. The student is seen stating, “Science as a whole is a product of western modernity and 
the whole thing should be scratched off. Especially in Africa.” She later continues, saying 
that “Western knowledge is totalising. It is saying that it was Newton and only Newton who 
knew and saw an apple falling and out of nowhere decided gravity existed and created an 
equation and that is it.” She further explains her thinking, saying that "whether people knew 
Newton or not‚ or whatever happens in West Africa‚ Northern Africa‚ the thing is the only 
way to explain gravity is through Newton, who sat under a tree and saw an apple fall.” She 
then concludes that it is western modernity that is problematic, and the solution is 
decolonisation, which would result in knowledge that is produced by Africans, which speaks 
to Africans, and is from an African perspective. Her ultimate conclusion is that the only way 
to achieve this would be to do away with science and start over again.  
 
This video was met with incredulity by both academics and community members alike. 
Opinion pieces were written which decried this as “ludicrous” (Eloff, 2016), “very scary” and 
in the vein of Lord of the Flies (Crowe, 2016). Proponents of this opinion argue that it is 
erroneous to view science as wholly a Western product since this would discount 
contributions made by other cultures and civilisations throughout history (Eloff, 2016). 
Furthermore, Eloff (2016) writes that to call for the decolonisation of science is a ludicrous 
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suggestion, since science is formulated on objective study which looks to create theories 
based on the most likely outcome of observable and provable facts. He argues that “there 
exist no perspectives on science. Science does not have context” (Eloff, 2016). As a result, he 
concludes that to talk about the decolonisation of science is representative of a “continued 
disregard of objective truths” (Eloff, 2016). While representative of the views of many people 
on ideas such as the decolonisation of science or even the decolonisation of the curriculum or 
university, this view misunderstands the fundamental nature of FMF’s call for the 
decolonisation of the university.  
 
In order to better unpack what the FMF call for decolonisation is, an analogy is proposed by 
Julie Nxadi (2017:4), of a rat who goes to a squirrel school because it would give the rat 
many opportunities. The university has a good reputation and the rat worked very hard to fit 
in, even scaling up the trunk of the tree like the squirrels in order to get there. The lessons the 
rat received all consisted of squirrel-related issues, topics and subjects that were designed to 
teach the rat how to be the best possible squirrel. Nxadi (2017:4) explains that with hard work 
and diligence, the rat excelled, but that the lesson she learned over and over again was that 
“there was not, and would not ever be such a thing as an excellent rat, only an almost 
squirrel.” She concludes that the problem with the squirrel school is that the ideology from 
which it taught was based on the student being a squirrel, and if not that, then at least 
possessing a burning desire to become one. Furthermore, even when the squirrel school 
changed its name to include the word rodent in it, and allowed more rats to attend, it still 
stubbornly and unchangingly clung to this ideology. This analogy ends with Nxadi (2017:4) 
explaining that the analogy offers comment on the experiences of the black student at 
university. Her conclusion is that the university is incompetent, since it appears to be 
operating from a definition of what is common, but that this definition is outdated and no 
longer representative.  
 
In this analogy, it is possible to begin to understand the FMF call for university education that 
is decolonised and Afrocentric. The curriculum at many universities around the country is 
one that is both Western and Eurocentric. Personally, this was made most apparent to me 
during my undergraduate studies at the UCT where I studied a major in English literature. 
Throughout my three years of study, students were only required to take one African 
literature course, despite the wealth of literature published by African writers. While my 
experience is only anecdotal, it does pick up on what the analogy by Nxadi highlights. In 
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speaking about the rat learning only subjects that pertain to knowledge on how to be a good 
squirrel, Nxadi (2017) draws attention to an issue with the curriculum taught at universities. 
The course content is skewed towards prioritising Western content, and underrepresenting 
content which is African or marginal (Mbembe, 2015:6; Marawu, 2017:22; Posholi, 2017:19; 
Hadebe, 2017:2). Furthermore, some elements of the curriculum have changed very little 
since before the end of apartheid. Mbembe (2015:9) remarks that “there is something 
profoundly wrong when, for instance, syllabi designed to meet the needs of colonialism and 
Apartheid continue well into the post-Apartheid era.” However, there is more to the call for 
the decolonisation of the curriculum than a mere call for different course content to be 
taught.
78
 
 
Maringira and Gukurume (2017:40) explain that the university curriculum is still colonial in 
both its content and its epistemological traditions, and it is through these curricula that white 
privilege, and the elevating of Eurocentric ideals and epistemologies, are preserved and 
perpetuated. Mashabela (2017:2) agrees, adding that knowledge for Africa needs to engage 
the contexts of Africans. As a result, the call for a decolonised, Afrocentric education is one 
which functions on two different levels, namely decolonisation of the curriculum, and 
decolonisation of the lens through which this content is taught. This concern is one which 
calls for a shift in the paradigms through which knowledge is understood and taught to 
students. Marawu (2017:22) explains that knowledge is informed by experience. However, 
the experience of black students within the halls of academia is of being taught knowledge 
which has no connection to their lived experience, and the way in which this knowledge is 
conveyed is through Western paradigms, which also do not connect with black students. 
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Furthermore, what small progress is made in attempts to shift the paradigm to one which is 
more Afrocentric, is often relegated “to subfields of what already exists as western forms of 
knowledge or ignores it, rendering it non-existent” (Marawu, 2017:22). As a result, the call 
for decolonised education is one which, rather than speaking about decolonisation, is calling 
for decoloniality. This concern with decolonising education, on both a subject level and a 
paradigmatic level, aligns with a resistance to the coloniality of knowledge which privileges 
western knowledge content and epistemological practices.   
 
In light of this, it is possible to understand the UCT Fallist’s call for #ScienceMustFall in a 
completely different light to the critics cited above. FMF’s call for decolonised, Afrocentric 
education can be understood as a call for a university which teaches both subject matter and 
systems of knowledge production differently. Stuart Theobald (2016), studying towards a 
PhD in philosophy, logic and the scientific method at the London School of Economics, 
offers some helpful insight into this debate. He notes that while science is of vital importance 
to the improvement of life, its “embarrassing history of involvement in the colonial project” 
should not be forgotten
79
 (Theobald, 2016). Throughout history, science has been used to 
justify racism
80
 as well as the exploitation of colonised people, who were seen as test subjects 
for many scientific experiments.
81
 Science has also been used to develop technologies 
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specifically aimed at the maintenance and enforcement of global colonial authority.
82
 As a 
result, science cannot ever be viewed as separate from the colonial atrocities which it aided 
and contributed to. In this sense, then, science as a discipline cannot be viewed as completely 
innocent, neutral or free of coloniality, as colonial assumptions and aims which have formed 
the very foundations of certain branches of science. As such, science should also be subject to 
the project of decoloniality. 
 
Furthermore, it is not only ,the manner in which science has treated certain people, but also 
the methodologies, systems and beliefs that are the foundation of the modern scientific 
method that should be viewed with suspicion. Theobald (2016) remarks that “colonial 
mythology fostered a picture of Western culture being scientific and rational, while 
indigenous cultures were unscientific, mystical and primitive.” In this, he is echoing scholars 
who explain the coloniality of knowledge as functioning not only on a content level, but also 
by positioning Western epistemological traditions as being universal, rational and objective, 
and all others as subjective and irrational (Grosfoguel, 2010:67; Walsh, 2010:79; Karkov & 
Robbins, 2013:5; Mbembe, 2015:9; Dreyer, 2017:3). This framing of the Western 
epistemological tradition as the apex of scientific methodology thus constitutes a colonial 
paradigm, and the call for the decolonisation of science is a call for this to be recognised as 
such. This is a call for the Western epistemology, that frames one approach to the scientific 
method as the only true method, to begin to shift and to recognise the implicit racism within 
its approach and practices (Theobald, 2016; Dreyer, 2017:3).  
 
Nevertheless, Theobald (2016) then remarks that when confronted with this atrocious history, 
the automatic response is to rely on the claim of science as founded on rationality and truth. 
However, the legacy of colonialism is still visible in science, such as in the choice of topics to 
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be researched, those involved in the research process and whose interests are prioritised.
83
 
Thus, #ScienceMustFall is not as absurd as it has been represented in public discourse. We 
may not agree with the method the student advocates, namely that science should be 
completely abandoned and the project restarted; however, the call for the decolonisation of 
science is a valid one. It is a call that should be understood within the greater context of 
FMF’s call for the end of the coloniality of knowledge. The FMF call for decolonised 
education is not merely due to students not liking the content being taught; instead, it is a call 
for education that is free from the overwhelming influence of the coloniality of knowledge, 
which positions Western knowledge and epistemological systems as rational, objective and 
omnipotent, and African knowledge as inferior, subjective and worthless. It is a call not only 
for education which is representative of the lives and interests of black students, but also for 
education which adopts an African lens through which to view knowledge, and which does 
not privilege Western knowledge and systems to the exclusion of all other types of 
knowledge. When students call for #ScienceMustFall and #FeesMustFall, the call is for the 
decoloniality of knowledge so that no one is made to feel like an unwelcome rat at squirrel 
school.    
 
4.5. CLOSING 
Central to the aims of the FMF movement is a call for decolonisation. Alongside the call for 
the fall of university tuition, FMF calls for both the decolonisation of university campuses 
and the university curriculum. This call has been met with some ridicule by scholars and 
members of the public who have questioned the validity of such a call, saying that with the 
end of colonisation, as well as the fall of apartheid, decolonisation has already taken place.  
The FMF movement is also criticised for not having put enough intellectual effort into 
clarifying and explaining what they intend by the term ‘decolonised.’ The result of this has 
been the ridiculing and discounting of the students’ call for decolonisation as being non-
sense, or criticised as a movement that calls only for violence and racial essentialism as 
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levelled by prominent scholars such as Jonathan Jansen (2017). However, such a 
characterisation of the FMF movement is overly simplistic, and misunderstands the essence 
of the protest that students are using to challenge the academy and by extension society. 
Decolonisation is the term used for the process of the removal of colonial occupation and 
colonial rule. There is consensus amongst many scholars that decolonisation is a process that 
has been completed with the end of the apartheid regime. Therefore, at first glance, the FMF 
call for decolonisation would appear illogical. Nevertheless, this is a call that has been 
incorporated into the aims of all of the different expressions of FMF throughout the country, 
indicating that there is more to this call than a simplistic understanding of decolonisation. A 
further examination of the FMF movement reveals that what is being called for is not so 
much decolonisation as decoloniality in all its forms.  
Thus, this chapter finds that through its call for free education, FMF is making a call for the 
end of the coloniality of power. Where coloniality of power utilises systems such as 
capitalism to maintain power over the formerly oppressed, the FMF call for the end to 
university tuition challenges this. Some critics have viewed this call as an extension of an 
understanding of a student-government/ student-university relationship which expects welfare 
assistance for students. This view sees students as being ungrateful and as wanting everything 
provided to them by others, without being willing to work for it. This positioning of the 
student relationship to both the university and governmental structures sees increased 
‘welfareisation’ of the university, such as granting the call for tuition free tertiary education, 
as spelling doom for South African tertiary education institutions. Nevertheless, this criticism 
is answered through a more nuanced understanding of the FMF call for fee-free tertiary 
education. FMF draws their call from both the concept of education as a human right and 
from education and the university as being a public good. FMF understands that education is 
a right promised to all in the South African constitution. They argue that the historical 
economic disadvantaging of black people, coupled with a progressive and chronic lack of 
state funding for universities, has created a situation where attaining a university education 
has become close to impossible for many students. If students are unable to access education 
as a result of economic factors largely linked to South Africa’s apartheid legacy, FMF 
concludes that this is a violation of their fundamental human rights. They support this 
argument with the idea that a university education is a public good. It is in the interests of the 
public and to the benefit of everyone, particularly in light of the African notion of Ubuntu, for 
university education to be accessible to all.  
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Furthermore, the commodification of the university by capitalist systems, which frame 
education as a product to be sold to the consumer-student, ensures that education is a product 
only accessible to the elite who can afford it. This system is not to the benefit of the public 
good. As a result, the call for free education forms part of a greater call for the end of 
coloniality. It is a call for the system that maintains the hierarchy of power and oppression to 
be changed into one that meets the needs of all equally. FMF are not calling for only some 
students to be funded, for crowdsourcing platforms to meet the needs of some students, or for 
fundraising to pay for some tuition. To do this would be to continue to enable and promote 
systemic oppression through the capitalist system, and would be a superficial response which 
has very little lasting transformation for a deep, systemic problem. Through its call for free 
education, FMF is calling for the destruction of the coloniality of power. 
Furthermore, the fees movement positions itself within a framework of intersectionality that 
is concerned with the larger issues of liberation, particularly black liberation. Their call for 
decoloniality continues through their protest for universities that are transformed and 
Afrocentric. It calls attention to the racial composition within university structures, where the 
environment is still largely dominated by white academics. It calls for the academy to be 
more representative of the racial composition of the country. However, campuses like UKZN, 
which show more representative racial compositions than some of the other formerly-white 
universities, also picked up this call for transformed, decolonised and Afrocentric 
universities. In so doing, these students are voicing discontent with the rate of a different type 
of transformation within the academy. Not only is the academic space not reflective of the 
physical reality of black people, but it is also not reflective of the ideological, cultural and 
lived reality of black students. As a result, this FMF call needs to be understood as calling for 
more than simply a change in racial composition of the university.  
This chapter finds that FMF is calling for an end to the psychological violence experienced 
by black students who study at university campuses that are not representative of their lived 
reality, and campuses that promote the ideologies, cultures and perspectives of whiteness as 
the only way of being fully and authentically human. FMF is calling for a resurgence of 
Black Consciousness that will combat the coloniality of being which endows whiteness with 
humanity, goodness and dignity while stripping blackness of these same properties.  
Intertwined within the call for the end of the coloniality of being can be found a call for the 
end of the coloniality of knowledge. This is most clearly seen in the aspect of Afrocentrism 
within the FMF call. It is a call for both the curriculum and methodologies taught to change, 
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as well as a call for a shift in the paradigms and epistemological traditions of academia to 
change. In this, FMF is calling for curricula that are representative of African interests and 
African subjects, rather than curricula that see subjects and content pertaining to Africa as 
being peripheral and subordinate to western content. Furthermore, they voice a call for the 
western epistemological traditions which frame themselves as objective, rational, and the 
centre from which all worthwhile knowledge originates, to change by allowing other 
knowledge systems and forms of knowledge production to be recognised as valid and 
valuable. FMF call for the end of the interlinking colonialities which maintain systems of 
hierarchy and oppression within contemporary South African society. 
The call for the destruction of coloniality and its maintenance of inequality and oppression, 
also links to the restoration of dignity and humanity for South Africa’s oppressed people, 
who are mostly black people. The restoration of human dignity and the liberation of black 
people were promised during South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy, 
including through the process of the TRC. However, what the fees protests highlight are the 
spaces within South African society, both interpersonal and systemic, where this has not 
taken place. FMF draws attention to the systems of coloniality which maintain apartheid-like 
inequalities and injustices, and calls for their change. Thus, the FMF call for free, 
Afrocentric, decolonised education is, at its heart, a call for justice. Pillay (2016:63) remarks 
that within the TRC, the idea of justice has been framed as being found through individual 
reparation, with the cost of such reparations being the public shame of seeking amnesty. Yet, 
the recent IJR research indicates that the majority of South Africa’s citizens remain 
supportive of the continuation of reconciliation efforts (Lefko-Everett, et al., 2016:17; 
Thesnaar, 2017:3).  
However, what FMF has revealed is that this framing of justice is one that is incomplete and 
has only partially worked. Despite the work of the TRC, systemic inequalities linked to the 
apartheid legacy continue to exist. In this sense, reconciliation efforts have failed South 
Africans. Thesnaar (2017:4) remarks that “the lack of redistributive justice, restitution, deep 
social polarisation, dehumanisation of black people, growing inequality and our inability to 
attempt to resolve these issues, since the transition in 1994, has all but exposed and 
deconstructed all romantic, simplistic, popular or idealistic understandings of the concept of 
reconciliation.” FMF has revealed to South Africans the shortcomings in our reconciliation 
processes. The TRC has provided us with a starting point and a foundation from which to 
build. To see the TRC as an end of the reconciliation process, something which the TRC 
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never claimed to be, is to sabotage the vital work of ongoing reconciliation. However, 
“reconciliation, for those who still attach any value to it within the student movement, can 
only redeem itself under conditions in which economic justice prevails” (SARB, 2015:3). In 
order for this to take place, it is necessary for South Africa to begin to redefine the 
reconciliation narrative, and to reframe it in new ways that will address calls for the end of 
systemic oppression and the restoration of dignity to black South Africans. Thesnaar (2017:3) 
remarks that decolonisation could offer a possible perspective on the way in which this goal 
can be achieved. FMF shows that what is needed is the end of the systems of coloniality 
which perpetuate and maintain inequality. Without this , justice will not be served, and 
without justice, reconciliation is impossible. Therefore, this chapter finds that in order for the 
continuation of any form of reconciliation project in South Africa, it is necessary to address 
the areas of injustice highlighted by FMF. While Chapter 1 finds that individual 
reconciliation is not sufficient, Chapter 2 adds weight to this, showing that systemic 
reconciliation is needed in South Africa. Chapter 3 establishes the FMF narrative, and details 
FMF’s rejection of SA’s reconciliation narratives. This chapter builds on these findings, 
showing that FMF calls for systemic change in the form of decoloniality. Furthermore, this 
chapter analyses the FMF discourse to argue that it is only through the project of 
decoloniality that justice can be hoped to be achieved. As a result, what is needed in 
contemporary South Africa is no longer a TRC approach to reconciliation, but a decolonising 
reconciliation.   
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CHAPTER 5 
#FeesMustFall: Theological Responses 
 
“Once again, the actions of young activists are calling on the Christian church for a 
new spirit to arise, so the church again may be relevant in the new struggle for justice 
in post-apartheid South Africa. Like the Black Consciousness Movement which 
inspired people like Allan Boesak and Desmond Tutu in the 1970s, the new generation 
of activists should inspire us for a better tomorrow, to dream again of a just and 
equal society.” (Headley & Kobe, 2017:9) 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Earlier chapters have shown in what ways #FeesMustFall is expressive of a protest for a 
decolonising reconciliation in South Africa. The FMF protests have highlighted the need for 
narratives of reconciliation to be redefined in terms of decoloniality. However, the question 
of what the role of the church and its theology is, both in this decolonial reconciliation and 
within the fees protests, still needs to be addressed. The fees protests have been a site of 
contestation, provoking mixed reactions within South African communities. These mixed 
reactions have also been reflected in the church and its theological response to FMF, which is 
remarkably similar to the response of the church during apartheid. Throughout South Africa’s 
struggle for freedom from apartheid, theology and the Christian church have had an active 
involvement. This role has not always been positive, and it is this history which gave birth to 
the Kairos Document with its conceptions of State Theology, Church Theology and Prophetic 
Theology. Kairos theology was instrumental in offering the church a prophetic theological 
response to apartheid. However, an analysis of church theological responses to FMF shows 
that too many of these responses are reflective of Church Theology, with very few prophetic 
responses observable. Furthermore, some interactions and responses to FMF display a 
disturbingly toxic and oppressive theology. This Theotoxic Theology response to the students 
is one that contributes nothing towards the liberation or freedom of the oppressed, but rather 
uses biblical and theological constructions to enforce and maintain oppression. This type of 
response is toxic to both the physical and spiritual health of people, robbing them of life. In 
light of this, a detoxing is necessary. Indecent theology gives helpful insight into how this 
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detoxing might take place. It highlights the ways in which ‘decent’ theological narratives 
have contributed to the maintenance of oppression. These narratives function in the same 
ways as the matrix of coloniality, interacting with this matrix and contributing to its 
maintenance. Furthermore, these ‘decent’ constructions are evident in FMF. As a result, a 
theology of decoloniality is needed, and Althaus-Reid’s (2000) indecent theology offers a 
way in which this could take place through the creation of an ‘indecent’ theology.  
5.2. THE ROLE OF THEOLOGY 
Gustavo Gutierrez (1973:9) remarks that “theology must be critical reflection on humankind, 
on basic human principles.” He argues that it is only by doing this that theology can be a 
serious discourse that has the potential to make any type of real difference to the lives of 
people. He writes that this type of theology must also engage with socio-economic issues and 
their impact in the lives of Christian people. To deny the impact that these issues have on the 
Christian community would be an act of deception. This type of theological reflection would 
then also become critical of society, as well as the Church and its behaviour in light of the 
Word of God. However, Gutierrez (1973:9) argues, this level of critical reflection is only 
possible within the framework of a theory of critical praxis. He suggests that theology should 
always be reflection, “a critical attitude. Theology follows; it is the second step” (Gutierrez, 
1973:9). The function of theology is as a critical reflection on praxis (1974:5). Theology 
should never be the first step in the process of engagement with society, but rather should 
always follow after and be the second step. This reflection needs to be the response to a 
situation, or the second step in the cycle of see-judge-act.
84
 Gutierrez (1973:10) says that it is 
of vital importance that faith reflection accompany the pastoral action of the Church, but also 
that this reflection needs to be seen as the response to a situation. He explains that the action 
of the Church within society is not produced because of theological reflection, but rather that 
action and reflection should go hand-in-hand, accompanying and supporting each other. 
Gutierrez (1974:10) writes that “theology thus understood, that is to say as linked to praxis, 
fulfils a prophetic function insofar as it interprets historical events with the intention of 
revealing and proclaiming their profound meaning.” As a result, theology can only be 
prophetic, and maintain its prophetic voice, when theology emerges out of accurate socio-
political analysis and is understood as an answering action to these observations.  
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Theology. Kent: Burns and Oates. as an example 
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Le Bruyns (2015:462-463) remarks that Christian theology should have an intentionally 
public role and relevance outside of the ecclesial realm. Theology should engage with issues 
of public concern in ways which promote and work towards to common good of society. 
Moltman (1973:76) echoes this, saying that there is an expectation that the church should be 
“a moral vanguard of a better world.” However, this orientation could be misunderstood as 
the church working from a future-orientated eschatology, which works for heaven in the 
future. As such, Moltman (1973) cautions that the function of the church in the world is 
greater than this. The church is not merely a means to an end; the purpose of the Church is 
greater than the “the edification of believers and its congregants but to take part in what the 
triune God is doing in the world” (Baron, 2017:2). The Church is called to be co-creator with 
God in the creation of God’s kingdom on earth, and as such, it has a responsibility to its 
people to prepare them for participation in this liberating work (Moltman, 1973:86; 
Niemandt, 2012:5; Baron, 2017:4). Furthermore, the liberation of God’s creation is 
dependent on simultaneous struggles against all forms of oppression (Meeks, 1975:xv). 
Boesak (2014:1056-1059) describes this as prophetic theology that is both ‘theology at the 
edge’ and ‘theology with an edge.’ For Boesak (2014), this theology is not representative of 
all theology, but of a liberational and prophetic approach to theology. Here, ‘theology at the 
edge’ is one which responds to the context of the community it serves and strives to struggle 
with the oppressed in their fight against oppression. In this sense, it is theology that is directly 
relevant to the struggles of the people, reflecting their concerns with integrity. This theology 
also needs to be ‘theology with an edge.’ The edge is found in the critique of oppressive 
powers by the church. This political and prophetic critique finds inspiration in the life and 
ministry of Jesus and his opposition to injustice, reminding earthly powers and authorities of 
the limits to their powers (Boesak, 2014:1060). Thus, the Church has a responsibility to the 
world that extends beyond prayers and preaching to believers. The Church is missional and 
participatory, and the role of theology in the world is to inform and prepare the community of 
witnesses whose job is to fulfil this role. In short, it is the church’s role to be Moses to the 
people of God by being both the prophetic voice and source of action in the world.  
 
5.3. NOT THE PROMISED LAND 
The TRC’s reconciliation process was intended to promote social cohesion in the aftermath 
of apartheid. However, any brief survey of South Africa will show that the country is faced 
with continuing problems on many levels. As previously explored, South Africa experiences 
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multiple PUI issues which touch on both the economic and social realities of the majority of 
its citizens. As a result, South African society is still dominated by divisions which would 
appear to indicate the failure of the TRC’s reconciliation. As already touched on, one of the 
problems with the national and TRC narrative in the years after apartheid has been the 
construction of the idea of the rainbow nation. While intended to promote national identity 
and social cohesion, it also has created disillusionment and anger due to a lack of socio-
economic change experienced by the majority of the country’s citizens. Maluleke (2016) 
remarks that  
reconciliation was the vision around which South Africa was to be rallied. Today, 
reconciliation, together with its sister notions of negotiation, truth and forgiveness, lies in 
ruins. Rather than negotiate, we have seen university students fight physically among 
themselves – sometimes with their parents, fists flying, at their sides. Instead of protesting 
creatively, albeit loudly, we have seen South Africans burn, loot and kill. Rather than 
negotiate, we have seen our police reach for their guns. Again and again we have seen men 
assert their violent masculinity to violate and terrorise women, and exercise control over 
them. No amount of verbal gymnastics or endless appeals for social cohesion will mask the 
fact that multiracialism and nonracialism are in deep crisis. Many suggest these are notions 
that are increasingly being misused, misunderstood and watered down. That may be true. 
Furthermore, systems of coloniality continue to function within post-colonial, post-apartheid 
South Africa. This combination of continued individual socio-economic inequality and 
systemic oppression gives rise to a situation where those who were oppressed under the 
apartheid dispensation continue to experience oppression in their daily lives. The student fees 
movement exposed these problems, bringing public and academic attention to the continuing 
inequalities within contemporary South Africa. In light of this, it is apparent that the current 
South Africa is not the one dreamed of and fought for by those who struggled for liberation 
during apartheid. The promise of the end of apartheid did not result in the freedom that was 
envisioned. In the phrasing of the Exodus narrative that this chapter will make reference to, 
South Africans have not reached the Promised Land.  
 
5.4. THE WILDERNESS SCHOOL 
If South Africans are no longer under the oppressive rule of apartheid, but the country has 
also not achieved the dream of equality and the end of systemic oppression, the current state 
of the country and its people remains unclear. Kaunda (2016:52) remarks that many groups of 
people throughout history have suffered oppression and domination under the rule of other 
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groups. From the beginning of human history, stories of one group of people dominating 
another can be found. One such story is that of the Biblical narrative of the oppression of the 
Hebrews by the Egyptian people, as found in the book of Exodus. This story has been the 
inspiration for many liberation theologians, who have found in it a message of liberation for 
oppressed people.
85
 This narrative, with its story of enslavement, exodus and liberation, is 
one that has been used by many to speak of a personal God who grants people liberation from 
enslavement and freedom from disenfranchisement (Hebblethwaite, 1993:3; Kirk-Duggan, 
2012:6). Hebblethwaite (1993:106-107) explains that one of the reasons that the Exodus 
appeals to liberation theology is because it answers the dualism that liberation theology 
protests. This story of liberation speaks of both a spiritual/religious liberation as well as a 
practical/political liberation. The Exodus narrative is seen not only as speaking about 
liberation in the past, but also as foreshadowing liberation that is to come for oppressed 
people today. As such, the Exodus story is one that not only resonates with South Africa’s 
apartheid past, but one that is still applicable within the current context.
86
  
 
The narrative of the Hebrews in Exodus can act as a metaphor for God’s work in the world. 
Following the narrative of this metaphor
87
, the South Africans under apartheid rule were like 
the Hebrews under Egyptian oppression. Expressed in terms of the Exodus metaphor, the 
oppressed people, both the Hebrews and the South Africans, expected liberation from 
oppression to lead directly to freedom and the Promised Land. For the people of Israel, this 
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 The Anglican Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu recognises this as early as 2008 in his annual Desmond 
Tutu Peace Lecture. On this occasion, Tutu uses the same analogy that I will be making use of, saying that many 
South Africans are still wandering in the wilderness before the Promised Land. He takes a more individualistic 
approach to this analogy, saying that some have already crossed the Joran River into the Promised Land, 
forgetting that there are others who have been left behind in the wilderness. My argument will be that South 
African society as a whole is still in the wilderness before the Promised Land. For more on the Desmond Tutu 
Peace Lecture see: Mail & Guardian, 2008. Tutu says South Africans, Churches Have Lost Their Way. [Online]  
Available at: https://mg.co.za/article/2008-10-07-tutu-says-south-africans-churches-have-lost-their-way 
[Accessed 16 11 2017]. 
87
 The primary aim of this chapter is not to promote the idea of the Exodus as a metaphor for the South African 
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did not happen. Hebblethwaite (1993:112) remarks on the exodus as being the inauguration 
of liberation with the act of crossing the red sea, but that liberation had not yet been realised.  
Instead, the Hebrews wandered in the desert wilderness for forty years before finally reaching 
the Promised Land. Daniel Erlander (1992:7) in his paraphrase of the Bible, Manna and 
Mercy, dubs this period ‘The Wilderness School.’ He frames this as a vitally necessary 
teaching period in which God helps the Hebrew people (re)learn how to live as a free 
people.
88
 Kaunda (2016:52-53) remarks on this as the period in which the Hebrew people 
recovered from slavery, reconstituting their identity as both free people and as Hebrews. This 
was a period in which the mentality of slavery and of being a slave was undone and replaced 
with new ways of living as people in relationship with each other and with God (Kaunda, 
2016:61). Similarly, like God liberated the Hebrews, so too did God liberate the South 
African people.  
 
However, as explored in Chapter 2, the narrative of reconciliation was one that implied that 
freedom had been attained with the fall of apartheid, and that all that was needed was a TRC 
process to complete it. This impression was further solidified through the creation of the idea 
of the rainbow nation. These functioned together to create the expectation of freedom and 
equality for all immediately after the fall of apartheid. Nevertheless, similar to how the 
Hebrews did not enter the Promised Land immediately after their escape from oppression, it 
would seem that South Africa has not provided a Promised Land to its people either. The 
expectation of the Promised Land immediately after apartheid oppression is one that has 
caused the disillusionment and anger within many South Africans. This is expressed by the 
FMF protests. This is an area where the reconciliation narrative of the TRC and the 
construction of the rainbow nation fall short. While the TRC never explicitly claimed that its 
process would ‘fix’ South Africa, seeing their process only as a basis from which to start, the 
popular perception was that the end to legislated apartheid would bring about the proverbial 
Promised Land. However, a helpful lesson for South Africa to take from this metaphor is that 
of the Wilderness School. Before the Hebrew people could be truly free, they first had to 
learn how to be free people. In the same way, before South Africans can be truly free, there 
first needs to be a period of (re)learning how to be in relationship with each other and God. 
As a result, to frame South Africa as having accomplished the actualisation of liberation with 
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122 
 
the end of apartheid is unhelpful. South Africa has not yet achieved liberation; instead, 
liberation was inaugurated with the end of apartheid, but has not yet been fully realised. The 
period in which South Africa currently exists is one of (re)learning. South Africa is not in the 
Promised Land, but rather is still in the Wilderness School.
89
    
 
5.5. KAIROS THEOLOGY 
However, the question that needs to be asked is what the role of theology is in this journey 
towards liberation. During the height of apartheid, the observations of some sections of the 
church gave rise to a theology that answered this question in the form of The Kairos 
Document (Kairos, 2010). Kairos theology emerged out of the struggle for the end of the 
apartheid regime in South Africa. It was a theological and prophetic response to what was 
being observed in the country at the time (Boesak, 2015:9). The word kairos is a Greek word 
used to refer to a moment in time. This is not a reference to a chronos understanding of time, 
but rather an understanding of a moment of time that become opportune in the face of a 
period of crisis (Kairos, 2010:7; Vellem, 2010:1; Boesak, 2015:9). The opening lines of the 
Kairos Document (KD) describe this as a moment of truth in the midst of the ongoing crisis 
that was apartheid (Kairos, 2010:7). The KD was launched in 1986, offering theological 
insight and critique on both South Africa’s political and theological landscape. The document 
is made up of four components. The first section is a critique of what the KD conceptualises 
as ‘State Theology.’ The document explains State Theology as “the theological justification 
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of the status quo with its racism, capitalism and totalitarianism” (Kairos, 2010:9). This form 
of theology is one which makes (mis)use of theological concepts and Biblical texts in order to 
justify and maintain oppressive political power. This critique was levelled at the apartheid 
government and its use of Biblical and theological concepts to justify its continued 
oppression of black people.
90
 The KD concludes that State Theology is both a heresy and 
blasphemous (Kairos, 2010:13).  
The second category where critique is offered is that of ‘Church Theology.’ This theology is 
one which is cautiously and guardedly critical of the state, but whose criticism amounts to a 
superficial and counterproductive critique (Kairos, 2010:21). The KD criticises this 
theological position as being one which fails to engage in any in-depth social or political 
analysis of the current context, relying instead on superficial, ‘stock ideas.’ Further critique of 
this theology is that it is individualistic in nature, seeing religion as something that is private 
and the realm of individual expression. This theology is criticised by the KD as offering 
words of criticism against the status quo while waiting for God to intervene to change the 
perceived injustice. Church Theology’s construction is one which sees the social and political 
aspects of life as matters with which spirituality has no place, except to pray for God’s 
intervention (Kairos, 2010:21). The KD concludes that this type of theology is one which has 
no Biblical basis, since the Bible does not see the person as separate from the world in which 
they exist. The categories of State Theology and Church Theology were both observed as 
functioning within the apartheid regime, contributing to its justification and maintenance.  
The KD offers a response to these theologies in the form of Prophetic Theology. This is a 
theology that seeks to be clear and unambiguous in its stance against oppression, speaking 
directly to a particular moment of crisis in society (Kairos, 2010:23). It seeks to do in-depth 
and honest social analysis as the place from which to begin. It then draws on the Christian 
traditions of opposition to oppression to offer a message of hope to the oppressed. The final 
section consists of a ‘Challenge to Action’ (Kairos, 2010:31). This call to action establishes 
that the people of the church are the poor and oppressed, and the Church has a duty to side 
with them in the face of state oppression. It then offers a range of ways in which the Church 
can side with the oppressed against the state’s heretical theology and its justification of 
apartheid, and calls on Christianity to provide moral leadership in the midst of this crisis 
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(Kairos, 2010:31 - 33). Foster (2016:62) remarks that “South Africa has a complex and 
conflicted history of the relationship between the church and the state.”  The KD highlights 
these ambiguous positions of theological response to apartheid, and as such the launch of the 
KD was met with mixed reactions and contesting views (Le Bruyns, 2015:471). Vellem 
(2010:1) describes the emergence of KD into the South African landscape as like that of the 
vuvuzela
91
 in the Confederations Cup when it was hosted by South Africa in 2009. Like the 
vuvuzela is a home-grown South African invention, the KD is a South African-grown 
theological response to crisis. Furthermore, like some soccer supporters during the 
Confederations Cup found the vuvuzela an irritation and rude intrusion into their sport, many 
Christians found the KD to be a loud and irritating intrusion into their faith constructions. 
Vellem (2010:2) remarks that 
The launch of the KD, we should imagine, was like a decisive blow of a home-grown 
liberation theology, a decisive irruption of a voice in the burning townships and a powerful 
wave that ruptured the approach of doing theology in South Africa from the colonial and neo-
colonial assumptions that captivated the churches in South Africa for centuries. 
The Kairos Document was a theological and prophetic response to what was being observed 
in the country at the time. As such, it was a theology of liberation, offering comment on the 
role of theology and the church within apartheid society. During the times of enslavement by 
‘Pharaoh,’ Kairos theology was the prophetic voice of Moses calling to ‘Let my people go!’ 
5.6. POST-KAIROS? 
Foster (2016:63) remarks that the role of the Church and Kairos theology in the dismantling 
of apartheid in South Africa was significant. However, while Kairos theology was one 
answer by the church to its role in the world, Kairos theology is also viewed as a struggle 
theology. Thus, like apartheid, Kairos theology is often relegated to the position of a theology 
of the past, belonging in the apartheid era and not relevant to contemporary society (Le 
Bruyns, 2015:461). If Kairos theology, and the churches who subscribed to it, were Moses 
and the prophetic voice calling for the freedom of God’s people, what happens after the 
people are free? What is the role of the church and theology once the people have been 
liberated? Le Bruyns (2015:464) remarks that Kairos theology appears to have had very little 
impact on the formation of a contemporary liberation theology for a democratic South Africa. 
He further comments that “it is now a platitude to point out the fact that something happened 
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to our theological paradigms during the post-apartheid era” (Le Bruyns, 2015:464). Bentley 
(2013:2) argues that a contributing factor to this was the shift in power that took place 
between the church and state post-apartheid. He remarks that the church’s history of either 
legitimising state oppression during apartheid, or of opposition to apartheid, resulted in the 
church holding a privileged position within society and being able to speak with a voice of 
power and authority. However, the end of apartheid and the adoption of a new constitution 
resulted in equal constitutional rights being accorded to all religions. This resulted in the 
surrender of power on the part of the church, with the church becoming simply another voice 
amongst many. As a result, the church has found the transition to democracy difficult, 
struggling with issues of identity and the place of the church and theology in the new 
democratic South Africa. Bentley (2013:3) remarks that the identity of the church had for so 
long been shaped by prophetic witness against apartheid that its removal left a void within the 
church’s national identity, leaving it in crisis. This crisis extended not only to the church and 
its relationship to the state/political power but also to the church and its relationship with 
people. This was an identity crisis concerning the church’s relationship with and place in the 
world.  
 
Bentley (2013:4) traces three distinct shifts in the church’s understanding of its relationship 
with the world as a result of this. The first shift could be understood as a rebound from 
prophetic theology back to the Church Theology that the Kairos Document had warned 
against. In this shift, the church limited its prophetic voice to the realm of personal 
salvation,
92
 which resulted in churches concerning themselves more with social needs and 
prayer than with political criticism. This is reflected both in the church’s view of itself as well 
as the views of political leaders on the role of the church. A brief survey of news headlines 
will show many prominent politicians such as Cyril Ramaphosa, Jacob Zuma and Gwede 
Mantashe giving voice to sentiments that the role of the church is to pray for politicians, but 
not to get involved in politics.
93
 Despite later shifts in understandings of the church-state 
relationship, this view still has currency within contemporary South Africa.  
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The second shift was as a result of the state’s establishment of the National Religious Leaders 
Forum in 2011, later becoming the National Inter-Faith Council of South Africa. This 
movement led to a very close relationship between church and state, which resulted in the 
blurring of the boundaries between the two. Under the leadership of Pastor Ray McCauley, 
the movement became so closely aligned with the state that many member churches even 
gave government political platforms within their churches to canvas for voters (Bentley, 
2013:4; Foster, 2016:68). Foster (2016:68) explains this relationship as one which grew out 
of the close relationship between the post-apartheid church and resistance movements. As a 
result “it is not surprising that with such strong solidarity in the fight against apartheid, such 
deep care for political activists and their families, and even the personal faith convictions of 
many significant struggle leaders, that there would be a close relationship” (Foster D. , 
2016:68). However, in a post-apartheid South Africa, this relationship also becomes cause for 
concern. The concern is that both church and state have sought, and still seek, to misuse this 
relationship, with the church at times seeking to gain power and wealth, and the state seeking 
to co-opt the church (Foster, 2016:68).  
The third shift, Bentley (2013:4) says, was one mainly reflected in the mainline churches who 
were partners of the South African Council of Churches (SACC). This shift was one which 
called for churches to become partners with the state in transformation. This critical solidarity 
was one which called for the church to simultaneously foster a close relationship with the 
state in order to effect transformation, as well as to maintain some measure of critical 
distance in order to speak critically if needed. However, in their involvement with this 
transformation discourse, the church has only engaged superficially and in ways which 
lacked true involvement with the struggles of South African people (Vellem, 2015:5; Headley 
& Kobe, 2017:7). Boesak (2014:1062) remarks of theological resistance prior to the Kairos 
Document as being made up of voices that would often represent “a theology of protest, 
while what we actually needed was a theology of resistance.” He argues that without a 
liberation theology, this type of Christianity could only ever remain an act of begging for 
change. In many senses, this is the position in which much post-apartheid theology finds 
itself today. This understanding of the role of theology and the church in the world is very 
much representative of Church Theology. This, Boesak (2014:1066) calls the church losing 
its prophetic voice. If the Exodus analogy were to be continued, instead of being Moses and 
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the prophetic voice, the church, in its Church Theology form, is the same as the Hebrew 
people who, as soon as Moses went up Mount Sinai, reverted to their worship of worldly 
things (Exodus 32). This regression from Prophetic Theology to Church Theology is a move 
away from the prophetic voice of God in the world to a maintenance of the status-quo.    
5.7. THEOLOGICAL RESPONSES TO FMF 
The Church Theology regression within the South African context can be seen in the 
Christian church response to #FeesMustFall. Following from the framework of prophetic 
theology, where accurate socio-economic analysis is vital for a prophetic theological 
response, the protesting students of FMF have made the church aware of continuing 
inequality within the South African landscape. The students have done the work of contextual 
analysis for the church in pointing out the continuing inequalities within society which are 
perpetuated and sustained by the matrix of coloniality. The FMF protests are the first step in a 
see-judge-act framework. However, now that the Christian community has ‘seen,’ what will 
the theological response be, both in the forms of judging and acting? Since its inception, there 
has not been extensive critical engagement with the FMF movement, although this is 
beginning to change.
94
 Nevertheless, the academy and its writings, while being thought 
leaders and trendsetters, are not always representative of the beliefs and views of the ordinary 
Christian. The beliefs of the pastors and people in the church are important, because these 
inform the church’s presence in the world as well as reflect the theological beliefs of 
Christianity. As a result, a brief survey of Christian interactions with FMF will give important 
insight into the theological response and actions of the church in the current context. Much 
like the sluggish response of the academy, the Church response to FMF has been somewhat 
limited and slow to emerge. At first, at the beginning of the protests in 2015, church response 
showed little interaction and no clear position on the protests. However, by the second half of 
2016, much more theological interaction and response, from both the larger denominations 
and individual churches, were visible. These responses were by no means unified in nature, 
ranging along the spectrum of extremely negative to more positive, and from a prophetic 
response to a Church Theology response. These also included much more toxic responses.   
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5.7.1. A Prophetic Theology Response 
Since the publication of the first Kairos Document, many other Kairos documents have 
emerged as new theological responses to other crises are needed. Examples include: Kairos 
Centroamericano (1988), Kairos Kenya (1991) and Kairos Palestine (2009). As a result “this 
challenge to the church remains as important today as it was 30 years ago. What the Kairos 
Document did was to remind both the church and the state that each had a specific role to 
play within God’s intended will for society” (Foster, 2016:66). Although not representative of 
the majority of reactions to FMF, this Kairos legacy has been evident in some responses to 
the student protests. In October of 2016, an event occurred which shook many church pastors 
and Christian people around the country. On the 10
th
 of October, 2016, Father Graham Pugin, 
a Jesuit priest serving at the Catholic Church next to a Wits University campus, was shot in 
the face with rubber bullets by police while trying to prevent police in a Nyala
95
 from 
entering the Catholic Church premises (eNCA, 2016).  
 
During the height of the fees protests, Father Pugin had offered his church as a neutral space 
in which students could find safe haven without fear of violence. As a result, when clashes 
between police and students escalated into violence, fleeing students were attempting to find 
shelter in the Catholic Church. When the police pursued them, Father Pugin placed himself 
between the police and students at the entrance to the Holy Trinity Catholic Church, refusing 
them entry, after earlier refusing to lock the gate between his parish and the university when 
ordered to by police (Munusamy, 2016). In his refusal to allow police to pursue students onto 
the church property, and his willingness to stand by this stance even at the cost of his own 
safety, Father Pugin displayed a Christian response that was prophetic in nature. It could be 
argued that this response, with its orientation towards non-violence and what would appear to 
be a lack of active participation in the FMF protests, is more in line with a Church Theology 
than a Kairos Theology response. However, disobedience of a police order, as in the case of 
refusing to lock the inter-leading gate, is in itself an act of participation. Furthermore, his 
refusal to allow police entry and risking his own safety can be seen as standing with the 
oppressed in the face of oppression. As a result, Father Pugin’s actions show a prophetic, 
theological element. The violence of the police reaction to a clergy figure left many in the 
Christian community shocked and concerned.  
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Another such response to the FMF protests emerged much earlier, in October 2015. This 
response to the fees protests emerged out of the annual National Church Leaders’ 
Consultation held on 21-22 October 2015. After the conference, the group of church leaders 
put forth a statement in solidarity with the students. It begins with a lament of the current fee 
crisis, and states that the students have been failed. It further laments the failure to include the 
poor in spaces of higher education and learning. The document then resolves that the church 
leaders will visit Wits in an act of symbolic solidarity with students and their protest. The 
document then closes by calling on the government to address the historic inequalities that 
led to the student protests. The document includes signatures from a cross section of 
Christian clergy (Mail & Guardian, 2015). In its construction and reading of the socio-
economic landscape, this response has echoes of the Kairos Document. Standing in solidarity 
with the oppressed and calling for change are prophetic in nature. As a document, this is a 
prophetic response that emerges out of a current crisis, much like the KD was for the 
apartheid crisis.   
 
5.7.2. Call to Critical Engagement 
Another such document offering prophetic theological engagement is found in ‘A Call to 
Critical Engagement’ (The Callists, 2016). Written by academics working out of universities 
around South Africa, it is an example of a Kairos theology for today. This response to FMF 
draws from South Africa’s Kairos tradition in both format and theological content. It was 
made available in October 2016. The document was presented as a study document, with the 
anticipation being that it would be changed and added to. The result is a document that leaves 
space for growth and change within this critical reflection on praxis. The intention of the 
authors is for the document to be circulated widely and endorsed by members of the 
theological community, both at universities and churches around the country and the world. 
The result of this is that the document enters public discourse. In order to contribute to the 
discourse, the document was made publically available for download.
96
 It attracted close to 
200 signatures, with signatories from university institutions, church denominations and 
community organisations from all over the country. The endorsement of many community 
members has the effect of allowing public ownership of the document. This then becomes a 
statement of the position of a community of people rather than merely a position of one or 
two individuals. Asking for public endorsement in this manner follows in the Kairos tradition 
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where the first Kairos document, as well as those which followed, invited public participation 
and endorsement in the form of signatures. 
 
5.7.2.1. What Does It Attempt To Do? 
The “Call to Critical Engagement” (The Callists, 2016) uses theological language to frame 
the protests in a manner that attempts to offer prophetic hope in the midst of crisis. The first 
section, entitled “We acknowledge,” states what has happened, noting in particular the pain, 
frustration and anger of black students as well as acknowledging the systems that have caused 
this pain and anger (The Callists, 2016:2). It acknowledges that it sees how the dominant 
narratives of FMF have been created in ways that cause people to become silenced or 
unacknowledged. The next sections are entitled “We mourn” and “We confess.” The act of 
mourning implies a loss of something, although it can also be understood as an 
acknowledgement of what is wrong in the current situation. In this section, the act of 
mourning is structured as an acknowledgement of what is wrong. The authors and signatories 
mourn “the growing arrogance of those in positions of governance” and “the lack of 
decolonization at our institutions in relation to curricula” (The Callists, 2016:2-3). This is a 
statement of sadness at what has been observed, as well as a judgement of the factors that 
have led to the current situation. The “We confess” section of the document sees confession 
being made at the complacency of the community, as well as an acknowledgement of each 
person’s actions that have made them complicit in a system of oppression (The Callists, 
2016:3). The study document also makes special mention of the theological sins that need 
confessing. The confessional aspect acknowledges that narratives have been created where 
not all are equal. It acknowledges that the grand narrative that has been created around FMF, 
where some have been silenced, is one that is oppressive.  
 
The next sections are those entitled “We affirm,” “Therefore we commit ourselves,” and 
“Therefore we plead the following.” The section of affirmation is important in the process of 
creating action. This section affirms what has been observed in the FMF protests, and in so 
doing also begins to establish a counter-narrative, one that counters the dominant hegemonic 
narrative that argues that the students are being emotional and overreacting, and frames the 
students’ actions as sinful (The Callists, 2016:4). The act of becoming committed is the 
second step in creating action. After affirming what has happened, the act of commitment 
promises action. The section entitled “Therefore we plead for the following” makes an appeal 
for action to take place in other aspects of society involved in the movement (The Callists, 
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2016:5). The final section is entitled “In humility we pose these questions of invitation for 
on-going dialogue and reflective engagement” (The Callists, 2016:6). In posing questions that 
attempt to offer space for ongoing dialogue and reflection, the document acknowledges that 
the exercise of critical reflection is not linear or a once-off process, but rather a continuous 
cycle. This document is helpful in offering theological reflection on what has already 
happened, as well as offering the Church a means of beginning to engage meaningfully with 
both universities and protestors. This response is one that stands with the oppressed, 
recognising their struggle and offering theological hope in the midst of suffering. This type of 
theological interaction and response remains true to the aims of prophetic Kairos theology, 
making it a liberational response for the current context. 
 
5.7.3. A Church Theology Response 
The prophetic response to the FMF protests has not, however, been the response of the 
majority of those in the church to FMF. Arguably, most church responses can be called 
Church Theology responses. Many church responses appear to have emerged after, or as a 
result of, the shooting of Father Pugin. In the aftermath, the Catholic Church put out a 
statement which recognised the struggle of the students and stated support of their plight 
(South African Catholic Bishop's Conference, 2016). However, after stating this, it condemns 
what it calls violence and looting by the students. It states that the whole of society is aware 
of the student plight, but that there is nothing extra that the universities can do to solve the 
problem currently. As a result, it calls for students to end their disruption of the academic 
program and to return to class (South African Catholic Bishop's Conference, 2016). This 
sentiment was echoed later in October by a Catholic priest holding a mass to pray for peace 
in universities. He reiterated support for #FeesMustFall, but stressed that it should only take 
place peacefully, with dialogue between the parties involved, and condemned the violence 
and looting by students (Pheto, 2016). Two days after the attack on Father Pugin, a response 
by Methodist and other clergy, as well as lay people, was to spend the day on Wits 
University. This was intended as an act of solidarity with the students, with the intention that 
these Christian representatives would act as a buffer or barrier between students and police. 
While doing this, these clergy reiterated their stance on a commitment to non-violence from 
all parties (Makgatho, 2016). Another such act of solidarity took place on UKZN PMB 
campus on 29 September 2016, with a group of student ministers from the neighbouring Seth 
Mokitimi Methodist Seminary coming to the campus to sing, pray and act as a barrier 
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between students and security forces.
97
 Another such statement was made by the Methodist 
Church of Southern Africa (MCSA) a few days prior to the incident with Father Pugin. Like 
the Catholic statement, the MCSA notes that the students’ protests are an indication of a 
crisis. Furthermore, like the Catholics, the Methodists also condemn the use of any and all 
violence (Methodist Church of Southern Africa, 2016).  
 
The KD explains that Church Theology is marked by a combination of interrelated 
theological assumptions, all involving the concepts of non-violence, justice and 
reconciliation/peace (Kairos, 2010:15). The critique of Church Theology is not that 
theology/Christianity does not care about the poor and oppressed; rather, it is too cautious in 
its support of the oppressed, thus resulting in very little change taking place. This effectively 
ensures the maintenance of the status quo (Kairos, 2010:15). In the church responses above, 
this is evident. The church is clearly concerned, and makes its concern known through 
symbolic gestures and issuing church statements and pronouncements. However, these 
actions and responses do nothing to change or fix that which the students are protesting.  
 
Church pronouncements are, in many senses, words without very much meaning attached to 
them. These words serve to state concern, but do not do enough to cause any change. Bentley 
(2013:6) remarks that “the church's prophetic witness cannot be reduced to verbal 
pronouncements, whether as sermons, public discourses or statements. These are important, 
but not enough.” Similarly, symbolic acts of solidarity are important in showing support for 
the oppressed, but they are not enough to cause any real change. The theme running 
throughout much of the church support is a condemnation of violence, with particular 
emphasis on the violence and destruction of the students. This is then followed by calls for 
peaceful protest. These responses are indicative of a Church Theology orientation to 
Christianity.  
 
The KD explains it as “a blanket condemnation of all that is called violence” (Kairos, 
2010:18). This blanket condemnation of any and all violence condemns the actions of the 
people struggling against oppression, but fails to account for the structural violence against 
which the people are struggling. As a result, condemnation of all violence has the effect of 
condemning the struggle of the oppressed while appearing to justify, or at the very least 
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overlook, the systemic violence experienced on a daily basis by the oppressed. The consistent 
church response of issuing statements emphasising peaceful protest on all sides neglects to 
mention or account for the structural and bodily violence experienced by students on a daily 
basis. Boesak (2014:1066-1067) remarks that the post-apartheid church is marked by this 
return to Church Theology where it has forgotten the many lessons learned during the time of 
apartheid struggle. The Church response to the fees protests is indicative of this. These 
responses display a concern for the students, but do very little to cause any real or lasting 
change. Consequently, they are actions which support the status quo rather than challenging 
it.     
 
5.7.4. Theotoxic Theology Response 
Other reactions to FMF have been extremely negative. The Joy Magazine
98
 presents a report 
on the FMF protests which frames the students protesting as foolish, selfish and as not having 
a proper grasp of the true causes of the factors about which they are protesting (Georgiou, 
2016). It then calls for Christians to pray for Christian communities on university campuses 
that they would do what is right. It does not specify what this ‘right’ course of action might 
be, but leaves the impression that the protesting students are not part of the ‘right’ that is 
being prayed for (Georgiou, 2016). This article is representative of the general opinion put 
forth by charismatic, evangelical church denominations such as the His People church and the 
Baptist church, which has been one which condemns FMF. One such opinion, proposed by a 
Baptist pastor and missionary, argues that the FMF aim of free education amounts to stealing, 
and since stealing is a sin, FMF is calling for ungodly behaviour (Meyers, 2016). This 
opinion further argues that the call for decolonisation is a baseless call since there are no 
multiple truths, such as colonial truth or African truth, but only God’s truth. The conclusion is 
that to support FMF would be to jeopardise one’s future immortal salvation.  
 
Furthermore, to support FMF would be to promote something which would hurt others, since 
it is not a biblical or a scriptural cause (Meyers, 2016). Another Baptist lecturer uses Romans 
13 and its call for Christians to respect earthly authorities as a basis from which to ‘sit-on-the-
fence.’ He recognises the difficulties of the historical disadvantage that the students are 
experiencing, but argues that any protest can only be undertaken while obeying the Biblical 
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instructions to obey the authorities (Haag, 2015). A third opinion is that the student call for 
fee-free education is indicative of an attitude of entitlement, which is ungodly and sinful. The 
role of the church, then, is to pray for the students that God might change their mindset into 
one that is God-honouring and authority-honouring (Chitsike, 2015). Another pastor offers 
the opinion that it is not the job of the church to choose sides, but rather to recognise that 
humanity is sinful, as a result of the fall of Adam, and that we as Christians await the 
revolutionary work of Jesus in the world (Koning, 2016). These conceptions of the role of the 
church in response to FMF are ones which view FMF and its calls for liberation as being 
sinful in their approach and nature. As a result, support of FMF is not warranted in any form 
except prayer for the correction of this sin.  
 
These reactions to FMF show a complete lack of understanding of both the contextual factors 
which led to FMF as well as the aims and principles of the movement itself. There are 
multiple issues at work here. Firstly, framing the protests as the misguided efforts of entitled 
students, who are unwilling to work for what they want, shows a lack of understanding of 
both the impact of South Africa’s past inequalities on the lives of black students today, as 
well as a lack of interaction with the multiple PUI issues still active within the current South 
African context. This misunderstanding points to church leaders and denominations whose 
socio-economic analysis is either non-existent or only informed by a superficial 
understanding of South Africa’s socioeconomic challenges. Furthermore, framing the protest 
for fee-free education as students stealing what is not rightly theirs places the fee discussion 
within the realm of capitalism, where education is a commodity to be traded. As has already 
been explored, FMF is calling for the end of the systems of coloniality, such as the rigid 
capitalism which frames education discourses. As a result, to locate a theological response 
within a capitalist framework betrays a complete lack of understanding of the aims of the 
movement. Therefore, the theological response by these church denominations is poorly 
informed, and framed within an incorrect, incomplete or absent socio-economic and historical 
analysis. Furthermore, the theological reaction to what has been observed, following the ‘see-
judge-act’ framework, is inadequate.99 In framing the FMF movement as sinful and calling 
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for Christians to pray, the evangelical response represents a call for the maintenance of the 
status quo and the oppression it reproduces.    
 
5.7.4.1.Theotoxis 
These responses to FMF are not representative of a Church Theology, but are something 
worse, which I will call Theotoxic Theology. The term is drawn from the words ‘theology’ 
and ‘toxic,’ to refer to Christian theologies which are poisonous, unhealthy and not life-
giving. The second concept which informs this is that of theotokos. Theotokos is the 
theological term used to speak of Mary the mother of God or God-bearer (Hendry, 1969:57; 
McGrath, 2001:365,375). Mary was the one who gave birth to Jesus, the one who brought 
forth God’s life.100 In the biological sense, Mary, like all women, is the creator and bringer of 
new life. As a result of the birth and life of Jesus, our understanding of God is challenged and 
changed. Therefore, in the theological sense, Mary is the bringer of new theology and 
theological life. Theotoxis, then, is the opposite of theotokos. Where theotokos brings life 
both to and through theology, theotoxis is not life giving. Theotoxis is Christianity that, 
through its theological conceptions, promotes or allows oppression to continue. In addition, it 
uses theological language and concepts to frame arguments, positions and justifications that, 
under further examination, are not Godly or Christ-like. These theological orientations do not 
bring God’s life, hope or love to the lives of the people it touches, but rather is a form of toxic 
theology that slowly starves God’s prophetic message of its potency.101 This type of theology 
is the direct opposite of the Kairos Prophetic Theology. 
 In the church responses above that are anti-FMF, this type of theology can be found. 
Arguments such as those which propose that the aims of FMF amount to stealing neglect to 
consider the full historical context which leads to the call for fee-free education. This 
theological orientation does not condemn the coloniser for stealing the land and labour of the 
colonised. It does not even appear to recognise that there is a greater wrong – a systemic evil 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and theology being used to maintain the status quo, and the tendency to conform to oppressive structures rather 
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– to be found within the current form of the capitalist system in South Africa, with its bias 
towards privileging only a few. This theology shows only narrow and superficial socio-
economic analysis, and combines it with shallow biblical exegesis to arrive at its oppressive 
conclusion. The FMF protests are protesting a system of laws which is unjust and oppressive. 
The system being protested is one which is not in keeping with God’s laws of righteousness 
and love. As a result, the use of theological justification for the maintenance of such laws is 
tantamount to heresy. It does not stand on the side of the poor and oppressed, and it does not 
work for better laws which are in keeping with the laws of God. The attitude which maintains 
oppression, and even advocates for it, is sinful. To return to the metaphor of the Israelites and 
their wilderness wanderings, this form of theology is representative of the maintenance of the 
oppressive status quo. It is theology which justifies the oppression suffered under Pharaoh 
and argues for obedience to this system. This theology argues for the return from the 
wilderness to the system of Pharaoh, and as such is not a constructive or helpful theological 
response to the period of ‘wilderness school’ that South Africa currently exists in. This type 
of theology is Theotoxic Theology. 
 
5.8. THEOLOGY OF DECOLONIALITY 
In light of this, it has become clear that there is something lacking in the Church’s theological 
witness in the world. Le Bruyns (2015:467) comments that “it has become increasingly 
evident that a Kairos consciousness needs to be regained with its aspects of contextuality, 
criticality and change.” In light of Theotoxic responses and Church Theology responses to 
FMF, it is now, more than ever, that a prophetic and liberation theology is needed. Headley 
and Kobe (2017:3) remark that the liberation theology framework is one which struggles for a 
life-giving theology in the midst of death. The fees protests draw attention to the areas where 
death in the form of systemic oppression is being experienced on a daily basis. The fees 
furthermore protests draw attention to the cry for decoloniality, and in this “the call from 
today’s fallists presents the church with several opportunities of active engagement” 
(Headley & Kobe, 2017:10).  Kaunda (2016:59) suggests that the wilderness wanderings of 
the Israelites in the post-Egypt period can be understood as a type of decolonial process. In 
the time of wandering, the Hebrew people were not only physically liberated, but were also 
liberated from their internalisation of the mindset of their Egyptian colonisers. Similarly, in 
the post-apartheid wanderings, a process of decolonising from the internalisation of the 
colonial/apartheid mindset needs to take place. The fees protests have drawn attention to the 
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fact that decolonisation has still not been adequately accomplished. In its return to Church 
Theology and its adoption of Theotoxic Theology, the church has reverted to the thought 
patterns of the coloniser. As a result, “the church must be unshackled from the colonial 
legacy and its pervasive trauma that remains a ferocious residue in South Africa post-1994” 
(Vellem, 2015:5). Not only is the university space in need of decoloniality, but the church’s 
theological interactions with FMF need a form of theology of decoloniality.  
 
5.9. INDECENT THEOLOGY 
The theologian Marcella Althaus-Reid (2000) offers insight into how this theology of 
decoloniality might be approached through her work Indecent Theology. Althaus-Reid, born 
in 1952 in Rosario Argentina and raised in Buenos Aires, is a Latin American trained 
liberation theologian. She coined the term ‘Indecent Theology,’ and through this work has 
developed a form of queer theology. Queer theology is a form of theology which takes its 
meaning from two interrelated concepts relating to the term ‘queer’ (Loughlin, 2008:144). 
This type of theology is ‘queer’ in the sense of the words meaning odd or strange. In this 
understanding, theology is queer because it does not follow the norms of society. 
Furthermore, theology is also ‘queer’ “because it finds – like queer theory – that gay 
sexuality is not marginal to Christian thought and culture, but oddly central” (Loughlin, 
2008:146). The Indecent Theology of Althaus-Reid (2000:2) is intersectional in nature, 
developing from the intersection of liberation theology, queer theory and post-colonial 
thinking. Its approach is to examine theological constructions, with particular emphasis on 
sex and sexuality, which cause the marginalisation and oppression of people (2000:2). 
Althaus-Reid (2000:1) interrogates the narratives which theology creates, asking questions 
about the ideas of ‘decent’ and ‘indecent’ behaviour which are constructed. Such 
constructions are particularly concerned with sexuality. This theology proposes that ‘decent’ 
theological constructions are oppressive, and cause marginalisation and the disappearance of 
those who are different. To combat this, what is needed is a theology that is no longer decent 
– an indecent theology.   
 
Indecent Theology aims to deconstruct the layers of mythology which are used in the 
maintenance of decency, particularly sexual decency. Althaus-Reid (2000:9) writes that 
“Indecent Theology is the opposite to a sexual canonical theology, concerned with the 
regulation of amatory practices justified as normative by economic infrastructural models 
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where anything outside hegemonic patriarchal heterosexuality is devalued and spiritually 
alienated.” This theology’s approach is to perform theology from the margins of society, 
attempting to give voice to the experiences and realities of those who are usually forgotten or 
neglected by society. Althaus-Reid (2000:4) argues that all theology is sexual in orientation, 
whether consciously or unconsciously so. As a result, all theology constructs and projects 
ideas about acceptable and unacceptable sexual practice within society. Furthermore, she 
argues that traditional, decent theological-sexual discourse is based in male dominated, 
western, heterosexual binaries. She also remarks that traditional liberation theology 
discourses are no different, constructing “a (hetero) sexual idealist theology, based in the 
systematic traditions of the West” (2000:23). However, Althaus-Reid (2000:22) argues that 
this ‘decent’ sexual discourse which frames sexuality as a binary is not an honest reflection of 
reality. Instead, she proposes that authentic theology which is representative of the 
marginalised will be one which does not adhere to traditional or binary constructions 
(Althaus-Reid, 2000:64). This type of theology, which concentrates on authentically 
representing the realities of the oppressed rather than an idealised construction, is Indecent 
Theology.  
 
5.10. INDECENT THEOLOGY IN FMF 
Althaus-Reid (2000:64-65) explains that Indecent Theology is a contextual theology that is 
not constrained by definitions or specific constructions. Instead, it acknowledges that there is 
diversity in life and a diversity in individual experiences that cannot be expressed through 
binary constructions. Since it is contextual, one form or expression of this type of theology 
may be relevant in one context but not relevant in another. Althaus-Reid (2000:64) uses the 
example of the Virgin Mary as a construction which is decent and in need of an Indecent 
Theology. She then reconstructs the discourse into one that is Indecent, and as a result also a 
theology that speaks from the margins.
102
 However, in Latin America, Mary is of great 
theological significance and as a result “a queering of Mary…becomes then an indecency 
(Indecent Act)” (2000:64 - 65). While Mary is an important figure for Latin American 
society, this is not necessarily so for a South African context. As a result, it is important to 
ask what an Indecent Theology would look like in a South African context, and specifically, 
what would it entail for #FeesMustFall. Indecent Theology attempts to interrogate accepted 
constructions of the world and to re-present them in ways that include voices from the 
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margins. In light of this, it is a helpful theology to use for the analysis of FMF. The work of 
Althaus-Reid in demonstrating the functioning of ‘decent’ theological narratives in the 
oppression of the marginalised will provide insight into the current theological constructions 
and their interactions with FMF. Furthermore, in interrogating established narratives and 
supplanting them with alternate ones, this theology will provide valuable insight into ways of 
interrogating the already established narratives of coloniality, and finding ways of 
supplanting them with new, decolonial ones. Althaus-Reid’s work is developed along various 
themes, two of which will be explored and used in relation to the decolonial discourses 
highlighted by the FMF protests to better understand the role that theology can play in FMF.  
 
5.12.1. DISAPPEARANCES  
The first theme is that of ‘disappearances.’ Throughout Indecent Theology, Althaus-Reid 
develops an ideology of disappearances, where the construction of narratives that do not 
represent the lived reality of people cause these people to become invisible (2000:25). An 
example of this can be found in the constructions of the poor within Christian narratives. 
Althaus-Reid (2000:32), arguing from her local context in Latin America, says that very often 
the poor are treated as homogenous. This homogeneity constructs a narrative of the poor 
where their lives are seen as romanticised and idyllic versions of poverty. This idea of the 
poor is one which portrays them as innocent, naïve as well as asexual or virginal. The 
construction of ‘the poor’ is what Althaus-Reid calls a ‘decent’ narrative construction of who 
and what the poor are. However, this narrative is also one that is created and constructed. In 
illustration of this, Althaus-Reid (2000:32) gives the examples of the poor transvestite who 
prostitutes themselves in order to eat, the single woman fighting to become ordained, or the 
mother selling lemons on the side of the road. She remarks that these people are also the 
poor, even though they do not fit into the idyllic construction of ‘The Poor.’ As a result, 
treating poor people as a single homogenous group denies the lived reality of many poor 
people. Consequently, the term ‘the poor’ becomes a category with homogenising properties. 
To call people ‘the poor’ creates one term, with a single set of properties and characteristics, 
under which all poor people can be classified. Walsh (2008:78) remarks that this type of 
“sweeping valorisation of the inherent truth… is not only misleading, but it is potentially 
damaging to community movements.”   
 
Nevertheless, this type of narrative construction which frames poor people as innocent, naïve 
or asexual gained popularity within Christian theology. However, such representations of 
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poor people are “in fact fetishisations, reified phenomena extrapolated from the reality of 
people’s lives, concepts which lost any relation to the context which produced them” 
(Althaus-Reid, 2000:34). When narratives are constructed to show a certain picture of reality, 
but this picture does not represent the life and experiences of the people it is supposed to 
portray, then the narrative causes the real people to disappear. If a narrative does not 
represent the realities of the people it purports to speak for, then the people supposedly 
represented are not people. Furthermore, these fictional people become surrogates for real 
people, obscuring the lives and realities of the actual people that the narrative is meant to 
speak for.  Constructing a narrative that is ‘decent’ results in the erasure of real, complex 
people. Furthermore, Althaus-Reid (2000:28) argues that in society, the law of ownership 
determines how a narrative is created, and ownership most often resides with the powerful. In 
the case of the poor, she argues, they are turned into a commodity to be written about, but 
they do not have the power or means to produce their own discourse. ‘Decent’ theology 
creates narratives that claim to represent the marginalised, but they are not representative. 
Since the oppressed and marginalised often do not have the means or the platform with which 
to create their own narrative, the dominant ‘decent’ narrative replaces them, in effect causing 
them to become invisible and disappear.  
 
5.10.1.1 FMF and Disappearances 
Within the fees protests, the same types of disappearance-causing constructions and 
narratives can be found. The ‘decent’ narrative of ‘the poor’ is one such narrative which 
causes the disappearance of both the students and the decoloniality that they are calling for. 
The idea of ‘the poor’ as a class or category is one which is relatively new. It has emerged as 
a result of newly-formed development discourses emerging at the end of the Second World 
War. These discourses divided the world into developed and underdeveloped, rich and poor, 
Third World and First World.
103
 These discourses tended to view the world through a neo-
liberal, capitalist world-view, where to be poor was the direct result of laziness or a lack of 
work-ethic, and wealth was the product of hard work (Escobar, 1995:22; Walsh, 2008:75). 
This poverty discourse only became hegemonic after the World Bank began to promote it as 
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the definition of poverty in the 1970’s (Green, 2006:5). Furthermore, reports such as the 2001 
World Development Report objectified poverty in ways that served to further entrench the 
homogeneity of poverty (Green, 2006:7).
104
 Walsh (2008:75) explains that in an attempt to 
counter this problematic framing of poverty, “the Left has at times homogenised and 
decontextualised injustice and oppression through the maintenance of a virtuous Poor or 
grassroots subjectivity that is ‘pure’, close to the ground, and sacrosanct.” Nevertheless, this 
simply creates a binary representation of the poor, which merely adds an alternate 
homogeneity which in no way solves the underlying problem of rendering people invisible. 
These competing binaries are evident within the construction of the FMF protests as well as 
within the differing Christian responses to it.  
The neo-liberal, capitalist construction of ‘the poor’ as lazy and ungrateful can be seen in 
responses to the FMF call for fee-free education. Responses such as Jansen’s (2017), who 
frames the students as ungrateful welfare cases only looking for a government handout, or 
theological responses such as that of Meyers (2016), which constructs the students as thieves, 
draw on this narrative.  When students who are also poor call for free education, framing their 
protest in terms of understanding ‘the poor’ as being poor due to their own actions, allows 
their protest to be silenced. If the protesting students are either lazy or criminal, then what 
they are asking for is merely a result of greed, either because they are too lazy to work for it 
or because they wish to steal. Furthermore, if their demands are only borne out of greed, then 
these are calls that do not make any demands on the moral conscience of society. The 
construction of the students as the lazy, morally-objectionable poor allows the students and 
their cause to be disregarded, thus causing its erasure and disappearance in favour of a 
narrative which is not representative of the lived reality of the protesting students. This 
erasure is facilitated by both societal constructions of the protestors as well as some 
theological responses. Furthermore, through these constructions, the call for free education is 
silenced. This silencing facilitates the maintenance of the coloniality of power through the 
continuation and valorising of the capitalist system to frame education discourses.  
The second construction of ‘the poor’ – that of the good natured and naïve poor – is a 
narrative that can also be seen in the constructions surrounding FMF. Framing ‘the poor’ as 
naïve and virginal invites a comparison with children. The result is a tendency towards 
viewing poor people as childlike and in need of guidance from some other, more experienced, 
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more knowledgeable source. This paternalistic construction of ‘the poor’ is one that implies 
that due to their naiveté, ‘the poor’ also have very little knowledge or grasp of the world and 
the issues which govern it, such as in the spheres of politics and economics. The response to 
FMF by former struggle heroes who are surprised and affronted that their opinions are not 
wanted, as well as the assumption by these heroes that their voices and guidance are needed 
in the midst of the FMF protests, is an example of this. This assumption demonstrates a 
misplaced belief that the students are naïve children who are in need of guidance.  
This attitude is also displayed in the responses by many churches in their constant calls for 
the students to only protest peacefully. These calls for peaceful protest are most often 
delivered from a position of observer, not participant, in the protest. Their tone tends towards 
judgemental and condemnatory, leaving the impression of church disapproval for the student 
protest. The manner in which these calls for peaceful protest are made is one that evokes the 
image of a disapproving parent speaking to a disobedient child. The mere fact that this type 
of church response feels that it has any right to offer such judgements betrays the paternalistic 
notions with which the narratives of the protesting students are constructed. Furthermore, 
these calls for peaceful protests are often couched in terms of moral guidance. However, this 
moral advice is unsolicited and is offered at a remove, without any active participation in the 
prevention of the injustices being protested. The construction of the poor students as naïve 
and child-like is one which allows for their struggle to be diverted in favour of discourses 
about past struggles, in the case of the former struggle heroes, and an obsession with so-
called peaceful protest in the case of churches and theologians. These constructions of the 
poor as lazy and criminal cause the aims of the FMF protests to be obscured under a 
constructed narrative. Not only does this paternalistic construction cause both the students 
and their cause to disappear, but it also assists in the maintenance of the matrix of coloniality. 
The position which assumes that some have the right to speak, make pronouncements and 
give guidance is one which operates out of the coloniality of being, where some are 
positioned higher on the hierarchy of being than others. Furthermore, the paternalistic attitude 
in itself is reminiscent of the attitude of the coloniser to the colonised, showing an orientation 
which believes that some knowledge and opinions are worth more than others. As a result, 
the construction of the poor as naïve allows for the continuation of both the coloniality of 
being and the coloniality of knowledge, and theological constructions are complicit in this.  
 
143 
 
5.12.2. BODY THEOLOGY 
5.12.2.1. Bodily Functions 
The second theme that can be drawn out of the work of Althaus-Reid deals with theology of 
the body. Althaus-Reid (2000:18-19) explains that with colonisation came the replacement of 
the Grand Narratives
105
 of the indigenous people with those of the coloniser. Grand 
Narratives are used to impose constructed binaries of normal and abnormal, good and bad, 
and right and wrong, as well as to shape the relationships between people. Althaus-Reid 
(2000:18) then explains that Systematic Theology is a construction of the Western Grand 
Narratives. This construction is based on a false dichotomy of the relationship between mind 
and body as existing in dualistic opposition. Very often, this relationship is skewed to 
prioritise the mind over the body, which has also influenced understandings and constructions 
of theology. However, both theology and the Bible are filled with bodily struggles with which 
we are constantly confronted. Althaus-Reid (2000:18) further remarks that the foundations of 
Christian Dogmatics are found in these bodily struggles, with all of Christian faith appearing 
to be related to such physicality. These bodily struggles often consist of one body struggling 
for dominance over another, and can be found in the many physical violations which run 
throughout the narratives of the biblical sacred texts.  Examples of this can be found in the 
artificial insemination of Mary, the birth of Jesus, issues such as torture, hunger and death, 
control over sexuality, and “the return of the killed body in resurrection” (Althaus-Reid, 
2000:18). Further elaborating on the example of Mary and her impregnation is useful to this 
discussion. Althaus-Reid (2000:39) argues that this act is one of violation. She points out that 
Mary did not consent to being pregnant, in fact, she was not even asked. She did not have 
control over her body in what happened to her. As a result, her pregnancy could be seen as a 
violation of her bodily rights. This construction results in the violation and physical 
domination of one (male/god) body over another (female) body. This type of narrative is one 
of the control and regulation of sexuality, particularly the sexuality and sexual expression of 
the female body.  
 
5.12.2.2. Bodily relations 
This bodily dimension of Christian faith extends beyond mere bodily functions to also 
include bodily relations and the constructions of relationships of power between them. 
Althaus-Reid (2000:23-24) argues that the entire biblical text is concerned with sexual 
                                                          
105
 The stories by which people understand their lives and histories. 
144 
 
control, and that this thread runs alongside, and intertwined with, discourses of power. 
Western Christian narratives have constructed an unambiguously, biologically (white) male 
god. An example of these bodily relations can be found in the theological construction of the 
Trinity. Althaus-Reid (2000:19) explains that the Trinity is representative of a symbolic 
recreation of the social structure of a medieval family, where there exists a rigid structure of 
hierarchy which orders the relation of one body to another. The construction of the Trinity is 
of God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Spirit. While there are constructions other 
than God as male,
106
 the predominant view within society is God as the ideal heterosexual 
(white) man (Althaus-Reid, 2000:18). This construction of a male God impacts the 
construction of Mary too. It turns Mary into nothing more than the silent carrier of the Word 
of God. She is the carrier of male seed (Althaus-Reid, 2000:69). This construction is one 
which simultaneously causes Mary-the-person to disappear and asserts a narrative of gender 
hierarchy where God is in a position of primacy, followed by male persons and lastly female 
persons.
107
 Therefore, while the bodily dimension of life is often neglected within the 
Western Grand Narratives, it is intimately intertwined with Christian theology. As a result, 
the inclusion of a body dimension in theology is an indispensable part of the act of 
theological analysis. Furthermore, in order to be an authentic and ‘indecent’ theology, it 
needs to be one which takes account of this bodily dimension from the perspective of the 
marginalised and oppressed, and not of the oppressor.  
 
5.10.2.1. FMF and body theology 
5.10.2.1.1. Bodily Functions 
The theme of body theology and bodily relations is visible within the FMF narratives. The 
instance of the rape of a UKZN student is an example of the interaction of bodies within the 
landscape of FMF protest. Clearly, rape is a violation of bodily rights, and concerns the 
struggle of one body for domination over another (Grassow, 2016:43). However, in the 
instance of this rape, multiple violations occurred. Not only was the student violated on a 
physical level through the bodily act of rape, but in the aftermath, her violation was 
compounded. This took place through the university that created the impression that the rape 
did not occur, and through the PMB police, who in refusing to open a case of rape, also 
refused to acknowledge that the rape occurred (Grassow, 2016:43; Grassow & Le Bruyns, 
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2017:6). These multiple acts of violation embodied acts of domination on the part of the 
rapist, the university and the police over the student. These acts of domination stripped the 
student of her human rights, causing her to become an object of contention to be possessed by 
the dominating bodies. FMF’s protest against rape culture highlights this. Althaus-Reid’s 
body theology exposes the ways in which narratives are created that allow the dominance of 
one body over another, allowing the marginalised, like women and LGBTQIA+ people, to 
disappear under this domination.  
 
Similarly, the violent clashes between students and security forces, and students and the 
university, can also be understood in light of the domination of bodies. The interactions 
between students and security forces, where the security forces were armed with rubber 
bullets and paintball guns
108
 and the students with nothing besides an occasional stone, are 
instances where this narrative of bodily domination continues. The narrative of UKZN FMF 
was one marked by creative resistance on the part of students, which was met with violent 
suppression from security forces and university management (Grassow, 2016:30-33). 
However, despite the students’ attempts at engaging in creative, non-violent and non-
threatening protest, the only response was that of violence and suppression. This can be 
understood as an interaction of bodies
109
 fighting for dominance. When the students protest, 
they are using their bodies to call attention to their cry for change. These protesting bodies 
are met with other bodies whose struggle is to oppose the protest. Through the use of force, 
the students’ protesting bodies were usually subdued and their physical protests suppressed. 
The clashes of bodies that took place on a regular basis within the FMF protests resulted in 
the physical domination of the students’ bodies by the bodies of the security forces.  
 
The narrative of bodily domination is supplemented and reinforced through the use of the 
law. Towards the end of August 2016, UKZN, like many other tertiary institutions, obtained a 
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court interdict preventing any protest, gathering or demonstration on its campuses (Grassow, 
2016:27; Grassow & Le Bruyns, 2017:5). The introduction of the court interdict into the 
landscape of protests endowed the university with the legal power to suppress protests. This 
created a narrative in which the use of physical violence to suppress protest became morally 
justifiable (Grassow, 2016:42; Grassow & Le Bruyns, 2017:6). As a result, not only was 
violence and force used to suppress protesting bodies, but the law was co-opted as an 
additional force to ensure this physical suppression. Furthermore, as a direct result of the 
court interdict, physical, bodily domination is reinforced with the arrest and incarceration of 
those same protesting bodies.
110
 Domination is enforced through the law which grants the 
power to arrest and the power to keep imprisoned. The landscape of physical domination 
created by constant violent suppression, along with the moral power granted by the court 
interdict, created a narrative of distraction. Due to their physical and psychological violence, 
these acts of domination have tended to become the focus of attention, distracting from the 
real aims of the FMF protests. In effect, the struggle for domination by one group of bodies 
over another has become another silencing, causing the disappearance of the students and 
their protest.   
 
5.10.2.1.2. Bodily Relations 
Like bodily struggles for domination are evident within FMF, so too are the struggles 
between bodily relations. Within the landscape of FMF, the struggle and contestation of 
relationships between people become obvious. The events surrounding the rape of the UKZN 
student are illustrative of this struggle of bodily relations. The reaction of the university, 
where the institution both condemned the theoretical act of rape but at the same time 
constructed a narrative which effectively denied that the student was raped, is illustrative of 
an enactment of bodily relations. In constructing the impression that the rape did not occur, 
the university invalidated the violation experienced by the student, using their power to cause 
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the violated student to disappear (Grassow, 2016:44; Grassow & Le Bruyns, 2017:7). This 
forced disappearance completely disregards the student who was violated, and in so doing, a 
particular hierarchy of being is reinforced. The invalidating of the raped, female student 
betrays a value system which appears to place less value on the life of the female student than 
on the reputation of the university. The construction of such a narrative is one where the body 
of the violated student has less value placed on it. Furthermore, the VC and university 
management who put forth the statement use their bodily proximity to power to establish the 
dominance of their bodies, in the form of their opinions, in relation to the body and being of 
the student.  
 
This same dynamic is visible in the interactions of the police with the student. The PMB 
police’s refusal to open a case of rape is another interaction of bodily relations. Here the 
police use the bodily authority given to them, by virtue of the power their position affords 
them, to assert their primacy in the relation between police and student. The refusal to open a 
case of rape operates within the same bodily relational space as the university interaction with 
the student, where the life of the violated student is viewed as less valuable. Furthermore, the 
FMF protest for the end to rape culture is a call for the equalising of these bodily relations. 
The FMF call recognises that not only is the hierarchy of these bodily relations determined by 
power, but that an element of gender plays a role in this too. It is a call which highlights the 
unequal relationship between people based on gender and sexual orientation. This 
construction is one where the relationship between the male body and the female body is 
based on a hierarchy of male superiority.  In light of Althaus-Reid’s framework of bodily 
struggles, the FMF call is a struggle for the re-alignment of bodily relations from one where 
some bodies are given supremacy over others to a system where all bodies are equal in 
relation to each other.  
 
However, as Althaus-Reid demonstrates, even Christian theology, as constructed by the 
Western Grand Narratives, is dominated by these same hierarchies and relational struggles. 
Understandings of theology such as that which objectifies Mary as the carrier of the seed, and 
as one whose permission was not asked prior to insemination (Althaus-Reid, 2000:69), are 
examples of problematic theology within landscapes such as the FMF’s protest. These 
theological constructions are patriarchal and based in the patriarchal constructions of the 
Western Grand Narratives which normalise Western, hetero-patriarchal constructions of 
hierarchy, gender and family (Althaus-Reid, 2000:13). These constructions are the same 
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constructions which the coloniality of being utilises when imposing its hierarchies of 
importance onto the landscape of the formerly colonised. Furthermore, the normalising of 
these bodily relations contributes to the maintenance of the coloniality of being. Nevertheless, 
it is the normalisation and acceptance of the coloniality of being, with its hierarchy of worth, 
which contributes to the creation and maintenance of rape culture. As a result, ‘decent’ 
theologies, based on ‘decent’ narratives of how bodies should be in relation to each other, are 
complicit in the maintenance of hierarchical and oppressive bodily relations such as those 
found in the functioning of rape culture.  
 
5.13. TOWARDS AN INDECENT THEOLOGY OF DECOLONIALITY 
The work of Althaus-Reid has highlighted and drawn attention to the ways in which 
dominant, ‘decent’ theological constructions of the world function to maintain the 
marginalisation and oppression of people. Within the fees protests, ‘decent’ narratives have 
played a role in both the silencing and bodily domination of the students. Furthermore, these 
same ‘decent’ theologies have functioned with the systems of coloniality that FMF protests, 
supporting the continuation of the very oppression which FMF is calling for an end to. In 
light of the ‘see-judge-act’ framework, the Kairos assessment of the church’s involvement 
and response to FMF has provided the ‘see’ part, with its analysis of past theological 
responses and current theological responses. The work of Althaus-Reid, with her framework 
which assists in understanding the theological constructions behind the church reaction to 
FMF, provides the ‘judge’ aspect of the framework. What is now needed is the ‘act’ portion 
of the framework. In this, the theological work of Althaus-Reid’s Indecent Theology is also 
helpful. What the Indecent theology explored above has shown is that South African and the 
protest of FMF could be assisted by a prophetic theology for decoloniality. The majority of 
theological responses to FMF have allowed oppression to continue unchallenged, leading 
Headley and Kobe (2017:9) to ask “where is the church with resistance, energy and 
imagination to overturn tables of injustice which have captivated state institutions meant to 
uplift those who have been subjugated by systemic discrimination?”  However, not only does 
Indecent Theology demonstrate the ways in which ‘decent’ theology oppresses people, but it 
provides a suggestion for how this might be changed. Althaus-Reid proposes that in the face 
of ‘decent’ theology, an ‘indecenting’ of theology needs to take place. These ‘indecent’ 
theologies are ones which reject the ‘decent’ narrative with its disappearances and bodily 
dominations. In South Africa, a theology which rejects the ‘decent’ narrative would be one 
which rejects constructions such as those explored above. What has been shown is the ways 
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in which these ‘decent’ theological constructions function in the same ways as the systems of 
coloniality. Therefore, in order to begin to move towards a theology of indecency, the church 
needs to begin to adopt a decolonial approach to its witness in the world. Furthermore, 
reconciliation will not be possible so long as the systems which maintain this oppression 
continue to operate and exist. Since, as Indecent Theology demonstrates, ‘decent’ forms of 
theology are complicit in this oppression, the church needs to begin to examine its theological 
orientation in order for it to begin to adopt an indecent theology of decoloniality that can 
positively contribute towards a decolonial reconciliation for all of South Africa.   
5.14. CLOSING  
The fees protests have highlighted areas of injustice and oppression which continue to exist 
within South Africa, despite the end of apartheid. These protests have drawn attention to the 
continuing oppression experienced through the functioning of the systems of coloniality, and 
highlight the need for narratives of reconciliation that are redefined in decolonial terms. This 
chapter has explored the role of the church and theology in contemporary South Africa, 
specifically in relation to the FMF protests. In light of this, the chapter has explored the role 
of theology in South Africa’s past struggles, using this to evaluate the state of theological 
response to the current struggle of FMF. It has found that the church involvement with the 
fees protests has been as contested as public reactions to FMF. Some theological reaction has 
been prophetic, offering support and hope to the oppressed students. Other reactions, 
however, have not displayed this. Instead, they have displayed Church Theology and 
Theotoxic Theology responses to the FMF protests. Whether consciously or not, these 
responses have served to maintain the oppression experienced by students on a daily basis. 
When assessing the theological response in light of the Indecent Theology of Marcella 
Althaus-Reid (2000), theological responses to FMF are shown to, very often, be 
representative of ‘decent’ theological constructions. These theological constructions function 
to create disappearances that silence and oppress the marginalised. Furthermore, the bodily 
construction implicit within these theologies function to create relationships where some 
bodies are given dominance over others. These ‘decent’ theologies function in the same 
manner as the systems of coloniality, serving to re-enforce and maintain this colonial 
oppression. In order to combat the oppression of the ‘decent’ theological narrative, what is 
needed is the ‘indecenting’ of theology. Implicit in the process of adopting an ‘indecent’ 
theology is the rejection of the theological construction which causes oppression, 
marginalisation and disappearances. Since it has already been shown that coloniality causes 
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oppression and that ‘decent’ theological narratives support and maintain this, one can 
conclude that an ‘indecent’ theology for the South African FMF context would reject this 
coloniality and respect the being of the marginalised. The adoption of an indecent theology of 
decoloniality can assist the work to end the continued oppression of South African people, 
and foster authentic reconciliation.    
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IN CONCLUSION 
The aim of this dissertation has been to explore in what way #FeesMustFall Pietermaritzburg 
has been expressive of a protest for decolonising reconciliation in South Africa and how an 
indecent theology of reconciliation might contribute to this. This has been accomplished 
through addressing four objectives. This dissertation aimed to determine to what extent 
reconciliation discourses are still active within South African society. It has also aimed to 
establish how movements such as #FeesMustFall Pietermaritzburg are articulating a call for 
reconciliation. A further aim has been to discover how a paradigm of decoloniality could 
meaningfully contribute to reconciliation between South Africans, as well as to explore the 
extent to which a Liberation Theology could inform reconciliation and transformation in 
South Africa.    
Chapter 1 – Reconciliation: South African Narratives 
Chapter 1 aimed to discover the extent to which reconciliation discourses are still active and 
useful within South Africa’s current context. This chapter examined the definition and 
conception of reconciliation in light of South Africa’s TRC process. It has found that while 
the idea of reconciliation is one that captured the collective imagination of South Africa with 
the dawning of the new democratic order in the early 1990’s, this idea is one which has lost 
some of its appeal more than twenty years later. This chapter has explored the difficulties of a 
conceptual definition of reconciliation, as well as some models for the functioning of 
reconciliation. It then moves on to examine South Africa’s interactions with reconciliation, 
beginning with historical interactions and progressing to current contextual reconciliation 
discourses. South Africa’s most memorable and well-known interaction with reconciliation 
can be found in the form of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). It briefly 
touched on the promotion of reconciliation between South Africans that the TRC was tasked 
with in the aftermath of apartheid. It was believed that the process of truth-telling would have 
a cathartic effect, on both a national and an individual level, which would promote 
reconciliation. Furthermore, while the TRC never provided conceptual clarity on how it 
defined and understood reconciliation, there was the hope that reconciliation could take place 
between individuals, between communities and nationally. As a result, this chapter finds that 
the closing of the TRC and the subsequent publishing of its findings may have left the 
impression that the work of reconciliation was completed.  
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However, a brief survey of South African society post-TRC shows a country still dominated 
by the type of inequality found during apartheid as well as incidents of racism, such as that of 
Penny Sparrow or Mabel Jansen, which appear frequently in ways which appear to indicate 
that reconciliation has not been achieved. As a result, in order to begin to understand in what 
way #FeesMustFall could be expressing a call for decolonised reconciliation in South Africa, 
it is necessary to first understand what reconciliation within the current South African context 
could mean. Therefore, this chapter continues by exploring the impact of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and its conception of reconciliation on the current South African 
context. It offers a brief assessment of the successes and failures of the TRC and its version 
of reconciliation. This assessment is drawn not only from the opinions of South African 
people on the success of the TRC, but also from an assessment of the socio-economic climate 
within South Africa today. The assessment in this chapter concentrated on two specific 
human rights issues, namely that of race and racial reconciliation, and that of economics and 
socio-economic reconciliation.  
 
Chapter 2 – Decolonisation: What Does It Mean?  
In order to fully assess the success of the TRC and to understand in what way the narratives 
of reconciliation function within South Africa, it is necessary to understand something of the 
larger South African context which gave rise to both the TRC and the FMF calls for 
decolonisation. As a result, this chapter explored the concept of colonisation as well as its 
accompanying terms. South Africa’s contemporary history, like that of much of the rest of 
Africa, is one of colonisation, which has left a marked impact on it. This chapter began by 
exploring and defining the difference between the terms found within colonisation discourses. 
Colonial rule ended in a process of decolonisation. However, while decolonisation signified 
the end of physical colonial occupation, it did not end the systems constructed by colonial 
rule designed to ensure the control and oppression of the colonised people. These systems 
have been referred to as coloniality. This chapter has explored these systems of coloniality 
and their continuing influence on contemporary society. It has explored the three interlinking 
systems of coloniality, namely the coloniality of power, coloniality of being and coloniality 
of knowledge, and demonstrated how each contributes to the maintenance of oppression both 
as an individual system and as interrelating systems. 
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Chapter 3 - #FeesMustFall: Establishing the Narrative 
The aim of Chapter 3 was to establish and explore the #FeesMustFall narrative. It focussed 
on the broader, national narrative in order to establish the aims and principals of the 
movement, as well as exploring the context which produced the protests. It established that 
the landscape of FMF protests was marked by an intersectionality of concerns. The central 
aims of FMF were a call for fee-free, decolonised, Afro-centric education, with a strong 
emphasis on a gendered protest against rape culture, as well as a call for the insourcing of 
university workers. The chapter then explored the Pietermaritzburg iteration of the fees 
protests, finding both similarities and differences in its expression of FMF. The central aims 
of the PMB FMF was fee-free, decolonial Afrocentric education, as well as a strong emphasis 
on a call for the end of rape culture. Furthermore, this chapter explored some of the FMF 
interactions with reconciliation discourses.   
Chapter 4 - #FeesMustFall: Decolonisation  
This chapter continues the narrative of FMF begun in Chapter 3, focussing specifically on the 
FMF call for decolonisation. The aim of this chapter was to better define what FMF’s call for 
decolonisation means. While at first glance, the call for decolonisation may seem outdated 
since decolonisation has already taken place, this chapter demonstrates that the call involves 
more than a call for the removal of colonial occupation. It is a call for transformation of both 
the physical, academic space, as well as the psychological spaces of tertiary education. This 
chapter shows that FMF’s call is a call for the removal of the systems of coloniality explored 
in Chapter 2. As a result, the FMF aim of decolonisation needs to be understood as asking for 
more than simply a change in racial composition within academia. This chapter has shown 
that FMF is calling for an end to the psychological violence experienced by black students 
who study on university campuses that are not representative of their lived reality and that 
promote the ideologies, cultures and perspectives of whiteness as the only way of being. It is 
calling for a resurgence of Black Consciousness that will combat the coloniality of being 
which endows whiteness with humanity, goodness and dignity while stripping blackness of 
these same properties. The call for decolonisation of university campuses is therefore also a 
call for the end of the coloniality of being. Intertwined with the call for the end of the 
coloniality of being is a call for the end of the coloniality of knowledge and the coloniality of 
power. It is a call for the curriculum and methodologies taught to change, as well as a call for 
a shift in the paradigm and epistemological traditions of academia. What FMF is calling for is 
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not decolonisation, but rather the end of the interlinking web of colonialities which perpetuate 
the colonial and apartheid legacies, keeping South Africans oppressed.  
Chapter 5 - #FeesMustFall: Theological Responses 
The aim of Chapter 5 was to discover how Indecent Theology might inform reconciliation 
within South Africa. The fees protests have highlighted areas of injustice and oppression 
which continue to exist within South Africa, despite the end of apartheid. These protests have 
drawn attention to the continuing oppression experienced through the functioning of the 
systems of coloniality, highlighting the need for narratives of reconciliation that are redefined 
in decolonial terms. This chapter has examined the role of the church and its theology in the 
FMF protests. In light of this, the chapter has explored the role of theology in South Africa’s 
past struggles, using this to evaluate the state of theological responses to the current struggle 
of FMF. The fees protests have been sites of contestation which have provoked mixed 
reactions, and these mixed reactions have also been reflected in the church and theological 
responses. This chapter has explored the church response to apartheid, specifically in the 
form of the Kairos Document, and then used the Kairos framework to assess current 
theological responses to FMF. This chapter then uses the Indecent Theology of Marcella 
Althaus Reid (2000) as a framework to assess the theological responses to the FMF protests. 
It has explored the construction of ‘decent’ theological narratives which have caused the 
marginalisation and oppression of people. These constructions have been used to assess the 
ways in which ‘decent’ theology has functioned within the FMF protests.   
Research Findings 
Chapter 1 – Reconciliation: South African Narratives 
This chapter has found that, while some small gains in racial reconciliation are evident, this 
reconciliation has not taken root within South African society as deeply as could be hoped. 
Furthermore, it finds that issues of poverty, inequality and unemployment are still rife within 
South African society in ways which interact with and reinforce one another. The chapter 
finds that most people acknowledge that reconciliation remains impossible so long as those 
economically disadvantaged due to apartheid remain so. However, the lived reality of the 
majority of South Africans shows that the poverty gap remains worryingly large, therefore 
leading to the conclusion that authentic reconciliation will be difficult so long as this gap 
remains.  
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The issues of both racial reconciliation and economic reconciliation are of equal importance 
in the South African reconciliation landscape, and both show worrying gaps and failures. 
However, both issues of race and socio-economics do not exist in isolation, but rather are 
intertwined and affect each other. As a result, they should be treated as intersectional in order 
to address reconciliation of both race and socio-economics. The research and results of this 
chapter suggest that the reconciliation of the TRC has not worked as well as was hoped by 
many South Africans, merely laying a foundation on which to build future reconciliation 
efforts. Areas of racial reconciliation and economic justice, possibly in the form of 
reparations, and restorative justice are areas in need of future academic work.  
This chapter suggests that it is time to reassess whether the reconciliation narratives of the 
TRC are still useful to the current South African context. The research and results of this 
chapter conclude that the process of the TRC has not achieved full reconciliation, as was 
hoped, but that it laid an initial foundation on which to build future reconciliation efforts. It 
finds that it is now time to begin to explore new forms of reconciliation which might further 
the reconciliation work begun by the TRC. 
Chapter 2 – Decolonisation: What Does It Mean?  
There have been a few notable findings in this chapter. It has found that despite the end of 
colonisation, the systems established during colonial occupation endure. These systems 
function in ways which reproduce apartheid and its inequalities despite the end of legislated 
apartheid more than twenty years ago. This chapter draws from the previous chapter, where it 
was established that the only conditions in which any genuine healing or reconciliation can 
take place are where all people can interact as equals. It concludes that the continuation of the 
systems of coloniality ensure that inequality between people is maintained. The chapter finds 
that so long as black people are constructed as inferior, savage and without being, while 
white people are seen as the paragon of all humanity, it remains impossible for any equal 
interaction to take place. These constructions take place through epistemologies, ideologies 
and power structures. Furthermore, it remains impossible for reconciliation to have any 
meaning within a context where apartheid inequalities and oppressions are perpetuated.  
Despite the ending of legislated apartheid, the systems of coloniality maintain impressions of 
black inferiority which have become internalised. In light of this, it concludes that part of the 
promotion of decoloniality is rooted in Black Consciousness. The scope of this paper has not 
been able to fully explore this and, as a result, the area of a modern, contextual Black 
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Consciousness is one where possible future work could be conducted. As a result, this chapter 
concludes that without the dismantling of the systems of coloniality, equality cannot be 
reached, and without this, true reconciliation cannot take place. 
 
Chapter 3 - #FeesMustFall: Establishing the Narrative 
Chapter 3 has found that the larger aims and principals of FMF are consistent from campus to 
campus, and from FMF protest group to FMF protest group. However, it has also found that 
the emphasis placed on aims does differ between campuses, thus reflecting a certain level of 
individuation of the various iterations. It has found that the FMF protests and protestors reject 
the current narratives of reconciliation. This rejection of reconciliation stems from a deep 
disillusionment and anger within young people towards the current state of affairs. The 
students, through the FMF protests, express a feeling that Mandela and the reconciliation 
process sold them out, compromising on the freedom of black South Africans. They also 
express disillusionment with the current leadership of the country, who they feel rely on their 
struggle credentials in order to enrich themselves without doing anything to uplift the futures 
of their fellow South Africans. The students thus conclude that very little has changed since 
the end of apartheid, and that while they are supposed to be free they are still living in socio-
economic oppression. Thus, these young people reject the narrative of the rainbow nation and 
reconciliation, which they believe has served to distract from any real change or 
transformation. As a result, this chapter has shown that FMF rejects the current reconciliation 
narratives in favour of a call for a decolonisation in order to effect authentic change for the 
majority of South Africa’s citizens.   
Chapter 4 - #FeesMustFall: Decolonisation  
This chapter has established that FMF is not calling for decolonisation, but instead is calling 
for decoloniality. The chapter has shown that in its call for free education, FMF is calling for 
the ending of the coloniality of power. It has shown that in its call for the end of rape culture, 
FMF is calling for the end of the coloniality of being. Furthermore, it has established that 
FMF’s call for Afrocentric education is indicative of a call for the end of the coloniality of 
knowledge. This chapter has established that if it is not possible for reconciliation to occur 
while conditions of oppression continue to exist, true reconciliation cannot take place until 
the decoloniality called for by FMF is a reality. In FMF’s call for decoloniality can be found 
a call for the reimagining of reconciliation in terms of decoloniality, a call for a decolonised 
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reconciliation. The area of decolonised reconciliation is an area where future work could be 
greatly beneficial.  
Chapter 5 - #FeesMustFall: Theological Responses 
Chapter 5 has found that there have been very few prophetic theological responses to FMF. 
The majority of church theological responses have been representative of Church Theology 
and Theotoxic Theology. It has found that responses such as these serve to maintain the 
oppression that the FMF students are protesting. This chapter has found that the South 
African context is one which is not the Promised Land, but rather that South Africa still exists 
in the Wilderness School, or the period of learning how to live in post-apartheid freedom. 
Furthermore, this chapter has found that ‘decent’ theological constructions continue to 
function within the South African and FMF contexts, in ways that are the same as the systems 
of coloniality. These ‘decent’ theologies cause the continued disappearance, oppression and 
marginalisation of people. The conclusion is that South African theological discourses are in 
need of an ‘indecent’ theology that combats the continued oppression sustained by the 
‘decent’ theological constructions. This chapter finds that since it has already been shown 
that coloniality causes oppression and that ‘decent’ theological narratives support and 
maintain this, the conclusion must be reached that an ‘indecent’ theology for the South 
African FMF context is one which would reject coloniality. It finds that the adoption of an 
indecent theology of decoloniality to aid in the struggle against the continued oppression of 
South African people can be a powerful tool in the achievement of authentic reconciliation. 
Furthermore, it concludes that church prophetic theology is theology which sides with the 
oppressed. In this context, the oppressed are the students, and what is now needed is a 
prophetic theology for decolonisation. This will make a prophetic contribution to a new and 
decolonised reconciliation for the current South African context.  
Conclusion 
This dissertation finds that FMF is indeed expressive of a protest for decolonising 
reconciliation. It finds that while FMF rejects the current reconciliation narratives that exist 
within the South African context, its call for decolonisation can be understood as a call for a 
new and different form of reconciliation. Through chapter one, this thesis finds that the 
results of apartheid systems and policy have been systemic injustices, which have resulted in 
poverty and inequality that is marked particularly along race lines. However, it also finds that 
reconciliation efforts have not focussed on apartheid’s legacy in relation to structural 
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injustices, and that this is an area where more work is needed. Through Chapter 2, this 
dissertation has also shown the functioning of systematised oppression. It builds on Chapter 
1, giving weight to the assertion that reconciliation needs to move beyond conceptions of 
individual-to-individual reconciliation. The dissertation finds that South Africa needs a 
reconciliation for the systemic oppression perpetuated by the colonialities of power, being 
and knowledge. Chapter 3 established the narrative of #FeesMustFall and finds that these 
young people reject the narrative of the rainbow nation and reconciliation, which they believe 
has served to distract from any real change or transformation. As a result, FMF rejects the 
current reconciliation narratives as explored in Chapter 1, and calls for the adoption of a 
decolonisation approach to effect authentic change for the majority of South Africa’s citizens.   
Chapter 4 builds on the findings of the previous chapters. The chapter finds that FMF’s call is 
for systemic change in the form of decoloniality. Furthermore, this chapter finds that it is 
only through the project of decoloniality that justice can hope to be achieved. As a result, it 
concludes that what is needed in contemporary South Africa is no longer a TRC approach to 
reconciliation, but a decolonising reconciliation. Since it has already been shown that 
coloniality causes oppression, this dissertation explores in Chapter 5 the ways in which 
‘decent’ theological narratives support and maintain this oppression. Ultimately, Chapter 5 
argues that an ‘indecent’ theology for the South African FMF context would reject these 
colonialities. As a result, this dissertation concludes that the adoption of an indecent theology 
of decoloniality to end the continued oppression of South African people will assist with 
authentic reconciliation.      
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